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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1976 
G. W. SPICER 
versus 
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, HART-
FORD, CON·N., INC. 
PE.TITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Petitioner, G. W. Spicer, respectfully represents that he is 
aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court of Culpeper 
County, Virginia, rendered on the lOth day of July, 1937, in 
a certain law proceeding pending in said court in which he 
was plaintiff, and Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Hart-
ford, Connecticut, Incorporated, was defendant. 
A transcript of the record accompanies this petition from 
which can be seen the errors hereinafter complained of. 
In the preparation of this petition plaintiff in error, G. W. 
Spicer, will be referred to as plaintiff, and the defendant in 
error, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, Conn., 
Inc., will be referred to as defendant. 
The case was regularly matured and tried before a jury on 
the 27th ~ay of March, 1937, who returned their verdict in 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
favor of the plaintiff in the sun1 o~ $1,639.41. ~ motion ~as 
submitted by defendant to set aside the verdict, on which 
motion argument 'vas heard, and on the lOth of July, 1937, 
the motion was ,sustained, verdict set aside, and judgment 
rendered for the defendant. },ronl the ,July judgment (p. 12, 
1\fS. Record}, plaintiff is applying for a writ of error. 
TilE PLEADINGS. 
Plaintiff filed his notice of motion on or about the 29th of 
September, 1936, in which he alleged that under a certain con-
tract of insurance entered into on or about the 29th of July, 
1935, through one R. A. Fifield, an ag·ent of the defendant 
company, 'vhose office was located at Remington in Fauquier 
County, Virginia, which contract is referred to as the de-
fendant's policy ·No. CI 437, by which contract of insurance, 
or rather policy of insurance, the defendant promised to 
insure the plaintiff in consideration of certain stipulations and 
of the sum of $31.12 paid in cash and like amounts to be paid 
on the :first days of Aug·ust 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939 there-
after; the four last payments evidenced by an installment note 
of $124.48. The cash payment was made and the note exe-
cuted, and the contract insured certain buildings as set forth 
therein, and certain personal property to an amount not ex-
ceeding $5,300.00, and which contract or policy embraced or 
included i·n the coverag·e part thereof a two-story metal roof 
frame dwelling house located near Elkwood in Culpeper 
County, Virginia, and which building was protected by the 
policy to the extent of $2,400.00, and the personal property 
to the extent of $GOO.OO, the rest of the coverage protected 
outbuildings; that is the difference between $3,000.00 and $5,-
300.00. The property is described in the notice of motion (p. 
3, ~IS. Record). 
After the issuance of the policy and payment of the 
premium, and execution of note, and 'vhile it was in full force 
and effect, on or about the 29th day of May, 1936, the dwell-
ing and personal property was totally destroyed by fire, and 
the plaintiff damaged insofar as the dwelling· house and per-
sonal property was concerned to the amount of $3,000.00, in 
such manner as to come within the contract provisions; 
That innnediately after the fire plaintiff called upon R. A. 
Fifield at his office at R-emington in Fauquier County, Vir-
ginia, and asked for a form for proof of loss, and was told 
by the agent that there was no occasion for it, that he was au-
thorized to speak for the company in that regard, that all 
plaintiff wanted was an adjuster; that the adjuster came and 
later ag-reements were entered into between plaintiff and de-
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fendant 's agent ascertaining the value of lost property; de-
mand 'vas made and defendant company refused to p_aythe 
plaintiff for his loss, or for any part thereof (pp. 1 to 6, MS . 
.Record). 
On the 1st day of the Oeto ber term, 1936, defendant through 
counsel appeared and Sll:bmitted its plea of the general issue; 
to which the plaintiff replied, and issue was thereupon joined 
(p. 7, MS. Record). 
And on the 25th of March, 1937, the cause having been con-
tinued by consent of parties, the defendant .:filed its grounds 
of defense in the words and figures following (pp. 7 and 8, 
J\IIS. Record) : 
'' 1. Fraud in the procurement of the contract of insurance 
in that the assured concealed from the insurer the existence 
of other insurance then had or placed upon the property in-
sured; misrepresentations as to yalue, and fraud and mis-
representations before and after the loss. 
'' 2. Any right of recovery that the plaintiff may have had 
under the policy sued on was lost or forfeited because at the 
time of the fire complained of, as set out in its notice of 
motion, the as.sured had, contrary to the provisions of said 
policy, another contract of insurance on the property covered, 
which additional insurance was not permitted or provided 
by agreement in writing added to the terms of the policy 
of insurance as required in such case. 
"3. The assured failed to comply with the provisions of 
the policy respecting the furnishing of Proofs of Loss in that 
the Proofs of Loss if tendered and furnished did not contain 
or carry under oath the data and information as is required 
and provided in the policy sued on. · 
''4. That the policy upon which this action is founded was 
and became void because: 
''(a) The interest of the assured in the property insured. 
was other than unconditional and sole ownership. 
"(b) That foreclosure proceedings had been commenced 
by the Federal Land Bank which held a mortgage and/or deed 
of trust upon the J)roperty insured of which fact the insured 
had knowledge. 
''5. That if said insured is entitled to any recovery, which 
this defendant denies, that s~ch recovery would be limited in 
an amount not gTeater in proportion than the amount insured 
under the policy sued on would bear to the whole insurance 
covering the property and/or any item thereof whether valid 
or not and whether collectible or 'not.'' · 
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TH.E EVIDENCE. 
The agreement entered into between counsel of record for 
plaintiff and defendant that original papers mentioned in 
certificates 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, need not be printed, but could 
be used in this court in event a writ of error is granted (p. 
13, MS. Record). 
The plaintiff testified that he was sixty-three years old, 
had been a resident of Culpeper County, Virginia, since 1914; 
that the building on the .property, which had been destroyed, 
was insured in the Hartford Fire Insurance Company by him 
when he bought it in 1914; and that he has continued to in-
sure with the same company up to the present tin1e, and that · 
Fifield has· been the agent of the company for fifteen years, 
and has been issuing the policies from time to time to plain-
tiff, and that he had been paying the premiums all these 
years. 
Policy No. CI 437 in Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
Hartford, Conn., I~c., dated the 29th of July, 1935, 'vas 
handed to the witness (G. W. Spicer), who said that it was 
the last policy issued to him by the defendant through its 
agent, R. A. Fifield (p. 31, ~IS. Record). The policy ·was 
later formally introduced in evidence. 
In regard to what took place at the time the policy was 
issued, the plaintiff says: ''That Fifield came to my house, 
I think it was on the 27th of July, 1935, and the policy would 
be out on the 1st day of August.'' He said, ''you know your 
policy is about out''. I said : ''Yes, I was coming over to see 
you." He said: ''Mr. Spicer, I haye come over to see you. 
I know the policy is important. You want to be protected. '' 
He said, ''We will measure the building". He stepped off 
the building, hen house, barn, and meat house. 
'' Q. He did that, himself f 
"A. Yes, and he said, 'Mr. Spicer, I will take the policy 
home with me and fill it up'. I said, 'All right'. He said, 
'You just sign the note'. He said, 'Who must I make it pay-
able to? You? I said, 'You make it payable to me and mv 
wife, the same as ~ir. Hudgins. He said, 'All right, Mr. 
Spicer, you and me being friends, I will make it right'. In 
two or three days it came and I took it to the National Bank 
and put it in my box, and I did not know what it was until 
after the fire. , 
'' Q. You told him to issue it to you and your wife Y 
''A. Yes, because me and my wife were in the joint deed. 
"Q. What did you say about Mr. Hudgins? 
''A. I said 'the same as Mr. Hudgins'. 
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'"Q. You mean :Wir. Hudgins had issued one to you and 
your wife? 
"A. Yes, years ago. I trusted to Mr. Fifield. 
"Q. Now, lvfr. Spicer, you say, as I understand, that Mr. 
Fifield had you sign the blank application 1 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Where were you at that time1 
''A. .Standing in the yard at home. 
"Q. All you did was to sign that application' 
"A. Yes, that was all. 
"Q. Was there anything in it at'that time¥ 
''A. Not a thing. He said, 'I will take it home and fill it 
0~~ , 
' ' Q. And you don't know now what is in it Y 
''A. I do not. 
'' Q. Were any questions asked you at all except what you 
have stated 7 
"A. No, he said, 'I will fix it right'. No questions what-
ever. I said, '~Ir. :bl.field, cOine into the house'. He said, 
'iN o, it is not necessary. I know what is in your house'. He 
said, 'I know you cannot furnish a room like that for less 
than $250 or $300'. He said, 'I kno'v you are fixed nicely'. 
"Q. Mr. Spicer, what ' 1las a fair cost of that house¥ 
"A. I guess when that house was built it cost $6,000 or 
$7,000." (~IS. Record, pp. 32 and 33.) 
'' Q. Well, now, after the building and your furniture was 
destroyed by fire, what did you do~ 
"A. I notified 1\ir. Fifield to come over and bring the man, 
- the auditor, and he wrote me it was not necessary for him 
to come, but as soon as this man came he would come over, 
and in a few days, I don't know bow many, maybe five or six 
days, they came and made adjustment. 
''Q. Where does lVIr. Fifield live? 
"A. Remington, in Fauquier County. 
'' Q. How far from you Y 
''A. I guess about three miles. 
'' Q. The man he brought over was whom? 
''A. The auditor. 
"Q. What did they do when the auditor carneY 
"A. He took the measurements of the house and every- . 
thing and after he did that, he said, 'Meet me over at Rem-
ington at 1 o'clock, where we have a typewriter'. I said, 'All 
right', and I went over and he ·wrote a paper. You have it 
there. I said, 'Is that all that is necessary?' He said, 'That 
is all. You will have a check in a few days'. He said, 'let me 
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give y~u· a good. piooe of advice. Go ahead and build you a 
house, not over $2,500 or $3,000 and I will go over'· I took 
him at his word. I got a contractor and put 10,000 feet of 
lumber there and that lumber laid there and the check did not 
come and that man had to come and move that lumber away 
and it was damaged considerably.'' (Pp. 34 and 35, MS. Rec-
ord.) 
''Q. Where do you live nowf . 
''A. Well, I hate to say it, but I live in a chicken house, a 
brooder house. I lived in 1ny garage a while in the summer 
and it got cold and I had this brooder house, 10lj2xl6, and I 
am living there. You know how ,I am cramped. 
"Q. Mr. Spicer, has the rnsurance company ever paid you 
anything on account of your loss? . 
''A. Not a thing. They never even said they were sorry. 
"Q. When did you first receive notification that the policy 
was cancelled Y 
''A. You have the date, have you not 1 I have not got the 
date. 
''Q. Is the paper I now hand you, which I will ask the 
stenog·rapher to mark for identification, 'Ex. No .. 2' with 
G. W. Spicer's evidence, the first notification that you received 
of the cancellation? 
"A. That is the date, July 27, 193(3. 
"Q. You don't rernember the date exactly, but the date 
was somewhere about July 27, 1936 ~ 
''A. Yes, I said that. 
".Q. Do you remember how long after that you received it? 
''A. No, I could not tell you. 
''Q. But it was about that timeJ{ · 
''A. 1res, sir. 
"Q. ·And, at the same time that you received that notifica-
tion of cancellation your premium note for $124.48 was re-
turned to you, was it Y 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. That note I will ask the stenographer to mark for 
identification, 'Ex. No. 3', with G. W. Spicer's evidence. The 
record ~bows, in fact, your policy shows, that $31.12 was paid 
to protect you, that is, your building and personal personal 
property was burned, as you say, on May 29, 1936. Was any 
part of that $31.12 _ever returned to you Y" 
Counsel begin argument and question was never answered, 
but admitted later that no part of the premium was re-
turned. 
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'' Q. You signed two writings on the 3rd of June, did you 
not? · 
"A. Yes, sir. . 
''Q. 'And the two writings are now handed you, marked 
'Ex. 4', and 'Ex. 5', respectively,, 'vith G. W. Spicer's evi-
dence, and I will ask you if the two papers so marked and 
now handed you are the papers signed by you at the time 
you mention f 
"A. Yes, sir.· 
'' Q. I notice in that you placed the valuation of $2,902.46 
on the building· and $7 40.70 on the personal property, did you 
agree to that? 
''A. I agreed to that. 
'' Q. You thought that was about a fair valuation 7 
''A. He, he said that was a half v:aluation. 
"Q. He said what? 
''A. He said that was not a half valuation. When I gave 
him the list he said, 'Some people put an enormous valua-
tion'. 'I want to congTatulate you; you did not put half 
value'." (Pp. 37 and 38, ~IS. Record.) 
The writer will add that up to this. time the policy sued on 
had not been formally introduced in evidence. 
'' Q. Did you afte'r the destruction of the property by fire 
make any effort to find out upon what grounds payment was 
refused? 
"A. I never have found out. 
''Q. Did you try? 
''A. Yes, we tried. 
'' Q. Through whom 1 
''A. I tried through you and the Company and they just 
referred me to the policy, which they said was clear and spe-
cific. That was all I could get out of the company." (P. 38, 
I\IS. Record.) 
''Q. Tell the jury now about that proof of loss. You knew 
of the proof of loss and were advised it had to be submitted 7 
"A. Yes, sir. , 
"Q. What was said? 
"A. Mr. Fifield said it was not necessary. 
'' Q. That was less than ten days after the fire? 
"A. He fixed the papers. I said, 'is anything else neces-
sary?' He said, 'Nothing at all. You will have a check in a 
few days'. 
'' Q. You put what you have related on that statement to 
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Fifield and never issued any further proof of loss, because 
you thought it was not necessaryT 
"A. That is right." (P. 39, J\![S. R,ecord.) 
The plaintiff was then cross examined by Mr. Sands, coun-
sel for the defendant, in regard to all the statements he had 
made. See cross examination by Mr. Sands beginning on 
page 49 MS. Record. 
Since it was shown that there was an actual adjustment of , 
the amount of the loss which was adopted as the quantum of 
the verdict by the jury at the sug·g·estion of defendant's coun-
sel, MS. R., pp. 216-217, as will be pointed out hereafter, in 
the ultimate analysis of the case the defence was forced to 
rest upon certain restrictive printed provisions in the policy 
and the application therefor, the following evidence on the 
point becomes important: 
Raleigh T. Green testified in part as follows ( p. 66, MS. 
Record): 
''That he was editor of The Culpeper Exponent, a news-
paper published in Culpeper, Virginia; had been engaged in 
the printing business for forty years; that he was at one time 
a typesetter and did everything around a country newspaper 
and job printing office; that he was sufficiently familiar with 
the size of type to tell the jury what size the type is that ap-
pears in print; that linotype is a machine that sets type in-
stead of setting by hand, and that linotype went into prac-
tical use about 1890 and has been used in Culpeper since about 
1914; before that time all type ever set in Culpeper was by 
hand.'' 
The policy sued on was then handed to the witness, who 
said that he was positive that the words opposite the X mark, 
letter (a), reading as follows: ''while the insured shall have 
any other contract of i·nsurance, whether valid or not, in whole 
or ill part by this policy; or 
'' (b) while the hazard is increased by any means within 
the control or knowledge of the insured", were in type 
smaller than 8-point; that brevier and 8-point 'vere the same. 
'' Q. That includes the provision 'This policy shall be can-
celled at any time at the request of the insured,'' &c.1 
''A. Yes. The head lines are larg·er than 8-point. '' 
The court then propounded the following question: 
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· ''Q: Mr. Green, so the jury and I may see it later, )Vill you 
take a pencil and draw a mark to show what you Include 7 
''A. The whole thing except the head lines.'' 
Mr. Sands then proceeded to cross examine the witness and 
propounded the following question: 
''Q. J\tir. Green, what type do you say the body of this is in Y 
"A. I am familiar with 5-point, 6-point, 7-point, 8-point, 
9-point, 10-point, 11-point and 12-point. I would say that is 
7-point type, what we used to call minion. 
'' Q. Look at the Code of Virginia, Sec. 4227, the print, what 
is that7' 1 
Mr. Miller then interposed an objection, and said: 
"What is that you have given the witness, Mr. Sands?" 
Whereupon Mr. Sands replied: 
''A publication gotten out by the insurance companies.'' 
Then the Court: 
''An excerpt from the Code as applied to insurance!'' 
Mr. Sands replied: 
"Yes, sir." 
Mr .. Green then answers : 
"A. That looks more like 8-point than the policy. 
"Q. You think that is larger? · 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. What would you call that 7 
''A. I would call that brevier, or 8-point." 
The witness says: 
''To my eye this Code print looks slightly larger· than the 
type in the policy, but I am not prepared to say it is. The 
capital letters look like they are a little larger, but the lower 
case letters don't appear to be." 
The 'vitness, Mr. Green, said, and explained his position 
that all the provisions, stipulations and re~ervations in th~ 
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policy, except the headlines, were in type smaller than 8-point 
or brevier type. · 
At the conclusion of the witness's testimony, the court said: 
"1\-Ir. Green's .testimony is directed to the conditions and 
restrictions in the policy sued on, as found on page 2 there-
of" (p. 72, ~IS. Record). 
One J. B. Lavinder, n1inister of the gospel, said he knew 
the general reputation of the plaintiff in the community in 
which he lives for truth and veracity, and that it was good; 
and that since the destruction of the property by fire he had 
a conversation with ~Ir. Fifield; in fact, only a few days after 
the fire, and that Fifield said ~fr. Spicer would get his money 
in about thirty days (pp. 73 and 74, MS. Record}. 
Raleig·h T. Green was recalled by counsel for the defend-
ant, and asked whether he had any rule·which would be ap-
proved by the ordinary printing showing different sizes of 
type. Mr. Green said there was. Then 1\tlr. Sands, repre-
senting· the defendant, asked the ·witness if he would bring 
or send over to the courthouse for his use at the proper time. 
The witness i'eplied, "Yes", but said that in the catalogue it 
would be found that they call 8-point four or five different 
sizes. Then 1\!Ir. 1\!Iiller, ropresenting the plaintiff, said: 
"Q. ~Ir. Green, I want you to explain fully to the jury 
about that type at the base and on the surface. Explain that 
more fully? 
''A. l\fy linotype Ina chine-we call a linotype a slug, on 
which the letter appears. On an 8-point slug I can. put a 
10-point face or a 6-point face. 
"Q. The face is what appears in print? 
''A. Yes, a linotype catalogue 'vill show under the heading 
'8-point' type half again as small as 8-point, or half again 
as large as that. 
"Q. You tell the jury again that the type as it appears on 
that policy is less than 8-pointY 
''A. Yes, less than 8-point. '' (Pp. 75 and 76, ~IS. Record.) 
1\frs. lVIildred F. Spicer testified that she was the wife of 
plaintiff, and remembered Mr. Fifield coming to the house 
which was destroyed, before the policy was issued, and at the 
time the policy was issued; was in the yard; and she saw him 
walking around, but she never heard what he said; that she 
does know he carried a paper home with him and it came 
back. She was referring to the application for the policy. 
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It was returned by mail, but she knows nothing about the fill-
ing out of the application. 
Then the witness was asked if she knew anything about a 
· notice served on her on the 26th of May, before the building 
was burned down, and she replied : 
"A. No, I know it meant for us to come here, but for what 
purpose I don't kno,v. '' 
On cross examination witness says she was not at home at 
the time of the fire; that the house was burned somewhere be-
tween seven and eight o'clock in the evening. 
Another witness, Otis l{emper, said he was a builder and 
that the house could be rebuilt from $3,500.00 to $3,800.00 and 
put in the condition it was at the time of its destruction. 
On behalf of defendant there were a number of witnesses 
introduced, among them 1\'Ir. Fred Hudgins, who said he car-
ried an insurance of $1,700.00 on the building and $500.00 on 
personal property that was destroyed; that the company he 
represented was the Continental Insurance Company of New 
' York; that he had carried the policy some eight or ten years, 
did not know exactly, but for quite a long time, even longer 
than ten vears. 
~Ir. I-Iudgins, in testifyi·ng, lVIS. R.ecord, page 94, says he 
did not remetnber how many rooms there were in the house 
that burned; was even uncertain about going in it, but really 
remembered going in two rooms, but only on the first floor. 
He was asked if he regarded the rooms as well furnished, to 
which he replied he did not remember. .All that Mr. Hudgins 
really knows about the i·nterior .of the house was that he went 
in the hall. · 
"Of course, I went in the main hall. I think I went in the 
roon1 on the right, but I am not positive about that. I don't 
remember positively whet~er I went ht two ror.ms, or just 
the hall and one romn.'' 
l\farion B. vV arren, introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
says at the time of the fire he represented The Continental 
Insurance Company of New York, and had been represent-
ing the Company since April 1st, 1919; that he made an in-
spection of the property in 1935; that the amount of insurance 
The Continental had on the property at the time was $1,700.00 
on the building and $500.00 on the personal property. Then 
he gives his opinion about 'vhat he thoug·ht the property was 
worth, and there does seem to be a conflict in regard to the 
real value of the property. But, as will be hereinafter stated, 
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it was agreed to between the adjuster and the assured about 
the value of building a'nd personal property, as heretofore 
stated. 
R. A. Fifield, attorney at law and insurance agent, said he 
took the Hartford Insurance Company policy over from an-
other company; that Spicer's policy was on the books at the 
time he took over the business, and that the policy expired 
July 29, 1925; that he took a new policy, and got a policy 
from Spicer again in 1930, and did the same for him again 
on July 29, 1935, which was the last policy; that he did not 
learn that another policy was carried through Mr. Hudgins' 
office until after the fire. That the first he knew about it 
was when Mr. Spears was investigating the loss and came to 
his office at Remington and asked what he thought about the 
matter. 
;Mr. Fifield was asked the following question: 
'' Q. Since you acquired that knowledge have you ever had 
any conversation wtih Mr. Spicer in reference to this loss 1 
''A. I think Mr. Spicer was in my office once or twice, but 
I don't remember any particular conversation. He was in 
my office once or twice and we talked in a general way, but 
nothing particular, that I remember" (p. 109, MS. Record). 
This witness denies that ].{r. Hudgins' name was ever men-
tioned to him, or that any other insurance was ever men-
tioned to him before the fire. In other ·words, he contradicts 
G. W. Spicer's testimony in this regard. 
Then Mr. Fifield says : 
''The only proposition was this: I asked him the amount 
of the loan he had on the place, 'vhich he said was $800, and 
I argued with him about the value of the place. I told him I 
would be better satisfied if he took $2,000 instead of $2,400 '' 
(p. 113, MS. Record). · 
But, Fifield says that all the questions in the application 
were filled out at his office by him, and the policy sent back 
to Spicer; and that the answers to questions were taken from 
another record that he had; that is an old application that 
he had signed before. 
The following questions were asked Mr. Fifield and answers 
given: 
'' Q. You say you never asked him about the other insur-
ancef · 
''A.. I took this standpoint; I argued with him about the 
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value of that house. I said $2,400 was too n1uch. It did not 
cross my mind that he had another policy. 
'' Q. And you never asked him' 
''A. No, sir.'' (P. 113, 1\tiS. Record.) 
''Q. What did you mean by stating two or three days after 
the fire to the Methodist preacher that 1\tir. Spicer would have 
his money in thirty days~ 
''A. That is our usual practice. We always pay promptly. 
'' Q. · Why did you not pay him~ 
''A. This is the :first time since I have been in the insur-
ance ·business that I have had any question raised. 
"Q. What was the statement you made to the 1\fethodist 
preacher as to when he would get his money? 
''A. That was my supposition. I don't deny making the 
statement. That was our practice. 
'' Q. Don't you know you had quite a correspondence with 
me and you would never tell me the reason for declining to 
make the payment? 
"A. I did not know." (P. 114, l\1:8. Record.} 
The witness 'vas here talking to 1\fr. Burnett Miller, the 
cross examiner. 
R. A. Bickers te~ti:fied about certain trusts in which the 
Federal Land Bank was involved, and about a correspond-
ence with the Land Bank concerning the Spicer property. 
His evidence is found on .pages 116, 117, 118, 119, 120. and 
121 of the record. 
On pag·e 117 1\tir. Bickers says: That on ~fay 26th he re-
ceived from. the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore a letter in-
cluding a copy of a memorandum of suit and copy of bill in 
the matter of Federal Land Bank v. Geor.ge TV. Spice1· and 
wife. He then went to the clerk's office and verified the fact, 
and a subpoena was issued returnable to First June RulP-s, 
and from the original subpoena issued it showed that it ac-
tually issued on 1\{ay 25, 1936, and served upon 1\fr. and Mrs. 
Spicer on 1\fay 26, 1936. That the summons only told the de-
fendants, Spicer and wife, to appear at rules in June to an-
swer bill in chancery. Both Spicer and wife say they did 
not know what the bill was for or about, but appeared at the 
rule day to which they were summoned, and even then did 
not learn what the bill was for. As a matter of fact, the ob-
ject of the suit was to foreclose a mortgage binding the real 
estate, but the property was destroyed by fire before the rule 
day to which the respondents were subpoenaed. 
Mr. Bickers says (p. 120, 1\.fS. Record}: To the best of his 
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recollection plaintiff on the first 1\tionday in June, or prob-
ably the next day, was, in his of lice after the property had 
been destroyed. Spicer asked him whtJ,t the process served 
on him and his wife rneant, and he explained it to him. All 
after the fire. 
T. D. Bickers, another witness, says: There were exten-
sions, and certain re-extensions in regard to the mortgage 
binding the Spicer property; that he was the representative 
of the Federal Land Bank. Th~n this witness, T. D. Bickers, 
says on cross examination that all of his talks with the·plain-
tiff amounted to nothing insofar as getting results. 
The testimony of one J. R. Haught (p. 130, 1\tiS. Record), 
submitted to the jury, can be found from page 130 to 132; 
only that Mr .. Spicer approached him to borrow money. 
The testimony of J. A. Spear being on page 133, MS. Rec-
ord. He testified that he was a special agent, etc., of the 
National Board of Fire Underwriters of New York; that he 
asked 1\tir. Spicer certain questions after the fire, and Spicer 
answered as shown by the record from page 133 down to and 
through page 138, :NIS .. Record. 
The witness Spear does say that 1\{r. Spicer told hin1 he 
had never ·received any notice of any foreclosure proceedings · 
on the part of the Land Bank. 
Another witness, Claude Inskeep, was introduced, who said 
he was employed by The Virginia Star, a newspaper published 
at Culpeper, Virginia; had been a printer.about fifteen years, 
was familiar generally with the size of type. The following 
question was asked the witness by counsel for defendant (p. 
143, 1\tiS. Record) : · 
'' Q. A question has been involved here in this case as to 
whether or not certain type found in this policy which has 
been introduced in evidence ''CI 437 :Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company', on the second page thereof, or the pag·e which car-
ries this X mark, whether that is breyier or 8-point type, 
and I ·want to ask you to look at this policy and state to the 
gentlemen of the jury what is the type of this policy, as you 
observe the general line of the policy; to be specific, that 
portion of it which concerns 'other insurance', where that 
X is?" 
An objection was then interposed because the witness had 
not qualified. Certain questions were asked him by the court 
which did qualify him, and he responded, "it is 8-point type": 
_He also testifie~ that the size of the type on page 2 of the 
policy was 8-po1nt. 
Inskeep measured the type and said it was 8-point. Then 
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he was asked by a juror what the difference was in size of 
8-point type and 7-point type, and the reply was there was 
one point difference (p. 145, NIS. Record)._ 
The witness admitted that 8-point was larger than 7-point. 
Then a copy of The v·'irginia Star, another newspaper pub-
lished in the town of Culpeper, and the· same copy is filed With 
this record as "Exhibit 6", was handed the witness and he 
. ·was asked in what size type the paper was printed. He re-
sponded ''7-point". That is he said the body was 7-point. 
The paper was introduced in .evidence before the jury. A 
question was asked in the follownig lang-uage (p. 147, · M·S. 
Record): 
'' Q. I am handing you a copy o£ The ·Virginia Star and 
over the words 'most any and everything', beginning -with 
these words: 'A newspaper story from Scotland is to the 
effect, &c.'', in \vhat size type are the words I have just men-
tioned to you, as found on the first page of The Virginia 
Star 7 You just said that was 7 -point type, is that right Y 
''A. The body. 
"Q. In fact, all the body, except the headlines, is· 7-point 
type' 
"A. Not all of it, but practically all of it. 
'' Q. All of the first column in the copy of the Star that I 
am handing you: now, beginning with the words 'a newspa-
per', all the way down through seven paragraphs to the word 
'considerably' is in 7-point type, is that right? 
"A. Yes, sir." (Pp. 147 and 148, MS. Record.). 
On page 150 this ·witness says in response to the follow-
ing questions : 
"Q. Now, Mr. Inskeep, that type and all type that you set 
is larger at the base than on the face, is it not? 
''A. The base of the type is larg-er than the face. 
"Q. So, you can have an 8-point base on a 7-point face, 
ca•n you not f 
"A. You can put 7-point on 8-point base, yes. 
'' Q. The difference between the 8 and 7 -point--now, I am 
talking about the face- as it appears on the paper--is very 
little, is it not, hardly the width of a sheet of paperY 
"A. State your question o~er, please. 
''Q. I said, the difference in measuring between 8 and 7-
point is very little, is it not' 
''.A. Very little.'' 
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One, G. G. Worsham, introduced by counsel for defendant, 
undertook to testify about the size of type. He and Inskeep 
differed about the size of the type. One said the size of the 
type in the policy was 8-point on a 7-point base, the other 
said it was 8-point on a 9-point base. _ 
Worsham says that the type in the paper, that is The Vir-
ginia Star, is 7 -point on a 8-point body; while the policy is 
8-point on the standard body. Then witness concludes his· 
testimony by stating the policy type is 8-point on 8-point 
body; the type in the paper is 7 -point on 8-point body; but 
that would be considered 7-point in the paper; that in the 
policy would be considered 8-point or brevier. 
Witness, Claude .Inskeep, again on page 160, ~IS. Record, 
we find saying that The Virginia Star is printed in 7-point 
type on a 9-point base. 
'' Q. Then, you differ with the gentleman who just testi-
fied? 
"A. I know it, because I set it. 
"Q. Then, he is wrong in what he says¥ 
"A. Slig·h tly.' ' 
The witness is emphatic that he said the type in The Vir--
ginia Star was 7-point on a 9-point base. · 
C. B. Roberts, introduced by counsel for defendant, tes-
tified considerably in regard to what he knew nothing about 
(pp. 161 to 182, MS. Record). 
Mr. Green, recalled, explained ho,,r he arrived at the con-
clusion in regard to the size of the type. 
G. W. Spicer, the plaintiff, recalled (p. 190, I\fS. Record). 
I\frs. Mildred Spicer recalled ( p. 191, MS. Record). 
The Virginia Star used in evidence is filed with the record 
as Exhibit #6. · 
The policy of insurance sued on as Exhibit #1; the daily 
report and application as defendant's Exhibit #2; the agree-
ment as to value of property destroyed as defendant's Ex-
hibit #1. 
The restrictive provisions of the policy and application 
were claimed by counsel for the plaintiff to be void under the 
st3:tute becau~e they appeared i!l type smaller than eight-
point or brev1er, and that question was squarely submitted 
to the jury by Instruction No. 6, MS. Record, page 220 and 
resolved in favor of the plaintiff. ' 
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ARGUl\tJ.EiN,T AND AUTHORITIES SUB~IITTED. 
If the restrictive provisions in the policy sued on, as any 
provision in the policy, is in type less than 8-point or brevier 
type, such provisions are not binding on the insured, and in 
which event we have nothing but a plain promise on the part 
of the company to pav the insured if his property is de-
stroyed by fire. In otlier·words, nothing can be relied upon 
by the insurance co1npany in the })Olicy, except such as ap-
pears in type in size 8-poi'Ut or brevier. 
The issue was squarely submitted to the jury on this ques-
tion. 1\t[r. Raleigh T. Green testifying that conditions and 
restrictions, all in the policy sued on, were smaller than 
8-point; while Mr. Inskeep and 1\ir. Worsham testifying the 
type was equal to 8-point. But the two last witnesses, Wor-
sham and Inskeep, differed not as to the face but about the 
base of the type. The jury, as the record discloses, called 
for a rule, measured the type, carried the rule to the room 
with them, and had with them the policy sued on and a copy 
of The Virginia Star, which was introduced in evidence; and 
it was admitted that all the. type in The Virginia Star, ex-
cept the headlines, was 7 -point type. 
The issue was submitted squarely to the jury, and evi-
dently a decision reached that the type was smaller than 
8-point or brevier. 
~fr. Green was very positive that he was right, and the 
jury had a right to believe his testimO'ny. A comparison of 
the type in the policy 'vith that in the paper showed that as 
it appeared in the paper it was as large or larger than it ap-
peared to be .in the policy. 
Sections 4227 and 4227a provide: 
"Nb condition in, or endorsen1ent on, any policy, of insur-
ance, nor any restrictive provision thereof, shall be valid, 
u•nless such condition or restri~tive provision is printed in 
type as larg·c as brevier, or eight-point type, or is written in 
pen and ink or typewriter, in or on the policy." 
The language in Section 4227 a in regard to the size of type 
is exactly the san1e as in Section 4227. The revisors of the 
Code of 1919 in a note to Section 4227 expressed the opinion 
that the act of 1918 (no''l 4227a) superseded and repealed 
Section 4227, but Section 4227 was amended by the Act of 
1924 showing the revisors were in error; that 4227 ,vas in 
fact never superseded nor repealed. But it makes no Ina-
terial difference with the })lainti:ff here whether 4227 was re-
pealed or not, because if repealed it was repealed by Section 
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4227 a, and insofar as the ttJpe size question is involved both 
statutes furnished the same protection and it was only in 
other respects that the question of repeal of 4227 was 
raised. Both sections, according to the last note of the re-
visors, are in effect and should be read together. These 
two sections, insofar as we are concerned, are only one, and 
for the protection of insured, and no reason can be urged why 
the Legislature enacted the two statutes. . 
The writer here refers to the opinion of Judge Keith, de-
livered in the case of SultJhur Mines Co. v. Pho·enia; Insurance 
Co., 94 Virginia 355, 359. The learned judge said, in referring 
to the statutes, that is as to Section 4227: 
''The object of the statute is a wise and beneficent one to 
protect applicants for insurance who are often times inex-
perienced and unacquainted with the provislons and stipula-
tions usual in policies of insurance, by requiring that such 
condition and restrictive provision shall not constitute a de-
fense unless they are printed in the policy in type of pre-
scribed size. It does not forbid companies to protect them-
selves by the insertion of conditions, limitations, and restric-
tions upon their liability, for men usually have the right to 
contract as they please about their own affairs. If printed in 
small type these restrictive provisions might easily escape 
the observation of the unwary, and it has therefore been 
wi~ely ordered that they and not the policy shall be nugatory 
unless printed in type of such size as would challenge the at-
tention and be easily read by the ordinary applicant." 
With the two sections of the Code mentioned in full force, 
why should plaintiff's rights be destroyed by the use of 
weasel words so SJuall as to escape the attention of the un-
wary? 
Section 4305a was enacted by the said Legislature, viz: the 
Legislature of Virginia; and at a time when the members 
thereof were well acquainted with the previous sections men-
tioned, and enacted for the benefit of the insured. 
This last mentioned section, 4305a, was for the protection 
of insurance compa~nies. Notice the provision contained 
therein as follows : 
''Shall make, issue or deliver for use any fire insurance 
policy or the renewal of any such policy on property in this 
state, other than such as shall conform in all particulars as 
to blanks, size of type, context, provisions, agreements and 
con~itious with such printed blank form of contract or policy; 
and no other or different provision, agreement, condition or 
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clause shall be in any manner made. a part of such contract 
or policy endorsed thereon or added thereto, or delivered 
therewith, except as follows, to-wit:'' 
The meaning of this provision was to give the standard 
fire insurance c01npanies the right to fix the size of their type 
provided for their conditions and restrictions as much larger 
than the companies desired to fix it than 8-point type, but 
not smaller than 8-point type: As evidence of their inten-
tion, we find the same language in the Act: 
''Any other matter necessary clearly to express all the. 
facts and conditions of insurance on any particular risk; 
provided, however, that no such agreement or rider shall be 
inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the conditions or 
provisions of the standard fire insurance policy hereby estab-
lished, except that in case of a mortgagee not named in the 
policy as the insured, such provisions may be added as shall 
not be inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the provisions 
of the said standard policy relating· to mortgage ·interests, 
but if so added shall include the provisions of a standard 
rider or endorsement relating to such interest, the form of 
which shall have been approved by the State Corporation 
Cmnmission and filed in the office as hereinafter provided. 
Every such agreement or rider shall be plainly printed in 
type, the face of which shall not be smaller than 8-point, or 
is written in pen and ink or typewriter.'' 
vVhy did the Legislature embody this provision in the ActY 
Because there was no provision of law, common or statutory, 
providing for 8-point type regarding- the standard rider or 
endorsement relating- to interest of mortg~agee, and the ~eg­
islature intended that when such riders were attached they 
1nust be printed in type not less than 8-point. 
VVhy did not the Legislature at this time, that is when 
Section 4305a was enacted, provide that conditions and re-
strictions in policies should be in type, that is face type, not 
1ess than 8-point or brevier type? · Because the law already 
so provided. The two sections, 4227 and 4227a, had already 
provided, as heretofore mentioned, that the conditiO'ns and 
restrictions in policies must be printed in type not less than 
8-point in size; and the Legislature in its wisdom was un-
willing to enact the statute and recite what had already been 
provided for in the other sections. 
Where then is there any inconsistency between the statutes? 
One is for the protection of insurance companies, the other 
two read as one for the protection of the insured. The last 
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section referred to, namely, 4305a, simply g·ives insurance 
companies the right to fix the size of that type. But in doing 
so they must adhere to the law as it was at the time of the 
enactment of the statute. 
Says the Legislature: ''Fix the size of your type, but in 
doing so obex the statutes already in force with regard 
thereto. If, however, you want a rider to protect mortgagee 
to become a part of your policy, there is no provision of law 
in regard to size of type that must appear in such riders, 
therefore the type in such riders must not be less tlian 8-point. 
Learned counsel representing the insura'l1ce company con-
tends, after assuming for the sake of argun1ent, that the type 
provision as contended fo1· by the plaintiff is binding on the 
company, that the statmnents made by the insured in the ap-
plication are binding- upon the insured, and relies upon the 
case of Royal Insurance Co11tpany v. Poole, reported in 148 
Virginia, page 363. 
The ground upon which that opinion is based-opinion be-
ing prepared by Justice Chichester-is that the application 
became and was a part of the policy, and the application 
showed that the powers of the agent who got the policy were 
limited, and Chichester says that as the application showed 
that the powers of the agent were limited this was notice to 
the applicant, and that the applicant was therefore bound by 
his statement and was fully notified of the limitations upon 
the powers of the agent, because it so appeared upon the face 
of the application. lfad not the agent's po,vers been limited, 
and knowledge of such limitation carried home to the insured 
by reason of it appearing on the application, then the state-
ments made by the agent at the time the policy was issued 
would have been binding upon the cmupany. 
That proposition appears to be well settled in the Poole 
case. But we call attention to the fact that here in the present 
case the application is made a part of the policy, and there 
is a provision printed on the application to the effect that 
the powers of the agent who took the policy were limited. 
The lang·uage, as we find it in the application, follows: 
''This Con1pany shall not be bound by any act or statement 
made by or to any agent, or other person, which is not con-
tained in this my application.'' 
But the limitation clause in the policy is printed in type 
less than eight-point or brevier; in fact in type less than 
seven-point on the face. This appears by an examination of 
the type as shown on the policy. If the face of the type "in The 
. Virginia.Star is seven-point, and seven-point is less than eight-
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point, this type referred to in the application fixing the limi-
tation upon the agent's powers is less than seven-point, and 
therefore, far less than eight-point. 
.And this law as to tvpe applies to both application and to 
the policy. In other w~rds, the type must be of the required 
size in the application for the policy as well as in the policy, 
and especially when the application is made a part of. the 
policy, which is the case here. 
The case of Bttrruss v. N at,ional Life Association, reported 
in 96 Virginia, page 543, is authority for this proposition. 
Judge Harrison, in delivering the opinion of the court, in 
part says: 
''The court is of opinion that Sec. 3252 of the Code, which 
provides that no failure to perform any condition or re-
strictive provision of a policy shall be a valid defence to an 
action thereon unless such condition or restrictive provision 
be printed in type of a specified size, or written with pen and 
ink in or on the policy, applies alike to the application and 
the policy issued thereon, where, as in the case under consid-
eratio'n, the application is expressly tnade a part of the con-
tract of insurance. In such a case the application and the 
policy issued thereon, taken together, constitute the contract 
of insurance between the parties. Any other construction 
would enable the insurer to avoid the statute by putting all 
such conditions and restrictive provisions in the application 
alone. 
"In the case at bar it is conceded that the conditions and 
restrictive provisions, found in the application, the failure 
to perfonn which is relied on by the defendant, in part, as 
its defence to the plaintiff's motion, are in type smaller than 
that required by the statute. The clause in the application 
obnoxious to this provision of the statute 1nust therefore be 
disregarded, and the case considered as if no conditions or 
restricthre provisions were embodied in the contract sued 
on.'' 
Judg·e Harrison is referri'ng to Section 325/2 of the Code of 
1887, which provides as follows: 
''In any action against an insurance company or other in-
surer, founded on a policy of insurance issued after the first 
day of ,July, eighteen hundred. and seventy-eig·ht, no failure 
to perforn1 any condition of the policy, nor violation of any 
restrictive provision thereof, shall be a valid defence to such 
action, unless it appears that such condition or restrictive pro-
vision is printed in type as large as or larger than that com-
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monly known as long primer type, or is written with pen and 
ink in or on the policy." . 
A reference to this section of the Code shows that all along 
when type is required to be of a certain size in policies by 
statute, the statute must be obeyed and followed. 
What did the Legislature of Virginia intend when Section 
4305a ·was enacted~ Did the members intend to repeal and 
destroy the force and effect of these other statutes which 
had been recognized for over sixty years, and to allow insur-
ance companies to print their policies, and the conditions 
and restrictions therein, with any size type they chose in 
contemptible weasel letters? Certainly not. The Legislature 
meant by the Act to allo'v insurance companies to issue either 
policies and print the written matter therein with type of any 
size they thought proper, prov,ided not less than eight point, 
as much larger as the company desired. 
All the authorities, and especially the Federal authorities, 
apply the rule and have for a number of years back done so, 
and repeals by implication are not favored. 
In the case of Continental bz..s?trance Co-n~pany v. Simpson, 
8 Fed. (2d) 439, the ruling is to the effect clearly that re-
peals by implication are not favored. 
Although the insurance companies, acting under and by 
virtue of Section 4305a, may have issued their policies and 
circulated them, and delivered them to the insured, if the 
conditions, restrictions and limitations th~rein and appearing 
thereon, whether in the application or in the policy, are not 
of size equal to 8-point or brevier, the insured will not be 
bound by them. The L~gislature did not intend to repeal 
Sections 4227 and 4227 a. If the members had wanted to re-
peal such statutes they ·would have so stated. But they did 
not so state, because they did not inte'nd to repeal the statutes. 
The truth is, that when the insurance companies, and the com-
pany in the present case, had their policies printed with a 
view to using them, they believed the conditions and restric-
tions were printed in type as large as 8-point or brevier type. 
But the issue has been submitted to a jury in the present 
case, and the jury determined from the evidence that the 
policy, or rather the conditions·, restrictions and limitations 
thereon were in type not so large as 8-point, and therefore 
the i:nsured is not bound thereby. 
The trial court, as we understood, would neyer have set 
aside the jury's verdict had there been evidence introduced 
showing that the provisions in the application for the policy 
\Yere in type less than 8-point. 
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We did not introduce any expert evidence on that particu-
lar point because there was no occasion to do so. 
We had the admission by the defendant that the Virginia 
Star newspaper was printed in seven-point type, and when 
the type in which the restrictive provisions and conditions of 
the application was compared with the former, it was evi-
dent to the naked eye of any observer that the type in the 
application was not one-half the size of the newspaper. 
The two papers have come up with the record and are now 
before the court for its inspection. We applied here the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquit'ltr. This court in a recent case has so 
acted. 
Bell Storage Co. v. Harrison, 164 Va., at pp. 285-6. 
In that case a question of fact arose, whether certain goods 
. for which a written receipt had be~n given were perishable. 
There was a failure of parol evidence on the point, but this 
court proceeded on the theory that none was necessary be-
cause from the face of the receipt the nature of the goods 
thereon described was self-evidence. 
ASSU~IING TI-IE TYPE TO BE Q,F LEGAL SIZE. 
The defendant, through its attorney, filed its five grounds 
of defPnse. as already stated, contending the plaintiff could 
not recover. 
If P.very provision, stipulation and condition in the policy, 
and in the application were of leg·al size, that is as large, or 
lar~·er than 8-point or brevier type, still the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover. 
In regard to thP. first ground submitted to defeat the plain-
tiff's recovery. Did not the insured (plaintiff) do what any 
rc~sonable man of ordinary intelligence would have done 
nuder like circumstances when acting in ignorance of the 
Company's rules~ The insured said to the agent (Fifield), 
who ostensibly had authority to act for the company: ''You 
lllake it pay,able to me and my ·wife, the same as l\fr. Hudgins". 
He said, ''All rig·ht Mr. Spicer, you and me being friends I 
'vill make it right". 
When this statement was 1nade by the insured, should not 
the ag-ent have at least turned to the insured and said: ''How 
n1uch insurance has Mr. Hud.&;ins"? "Do you mean by this 
to tell me that l\1r. Hudgins has insurance on this property?" 
But the agAnt did not do this, he turned a deaf ear to what the 
nlaintiff said. Such being true, was not the question of other 
insurance a question for jury consideration~ We submit it 
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was. . That is, the question submitted was whether or not the 
agent soliciting the insurance knew of other insurance, or 
was put on inquiry~ If he lmew or was put on inquiry, then 
the other insurance issue, if decided in favor of the plaintiff, 
would not defeat recovery. 
In this same ground of defence we find the company defend-
ing because of misrepresentations as to value, and fraud 
and misrepresentations before and after the loss. But the 
defendant fails to state in what respect there was fraud or 
misrepresentations. How could there b~ any misrepresenta-
tion of value when the agent was there on the ground accord-
ing to own evidence, his own adn1issions, looked at the prop-
erty, expressed himself as being thoroug·hly acquainted with 
it~ and there is no evidence that plaintiff told the agent what 
the property was worth; and even if he had so told him Fifield 
was looking at the building and was present and in sig·ht of it 
at the time he contends t}1e false representations \vere made. 
In regard to the second ground of defence, it is claimed 
that any right of recovery the plaintiff had, or may have had, 
under the policy, \Vas forfeited, because there was other in-
surance, and which additional insurance was not permitted 
or provided by agreement. 
As was testified by the plaintiff, he was not asked about any 
ot~e1· insurance. The ag·ent assumed to kno'v all about the 
property, and stated to him that he had all the information 
he wanted, and that he would fill out the application on his 
·return to his office at Ren1ington, and the plaintiff never saw 
the application again until introduced here in evidence. The 
san1e question is presented here as was presented in the first 
ground of defense set forth. 
This question of other insurance, we submit, could have 
have ascertained had the authorized agent of the company 
tried to ~scertain it, without any real effort, ·when the insured 
said ''You make it payable to me and n1y wife, the same as 
Mr. Hudgins", the agent should have inquired of the insured 
and of Mr. Hudgins. He knew that Mr. Hudgins was an 
agent, and a prorninent one, with an office located at Culpeper, 
Virginia, where he has br.en located for over forty years. 
The undeniable fact is that none of the statements in the 
application relir.d on here was in the application when it was 
~igned and delivered to the agnt procuring the policy for the 
insurance company. They were subsequently insP.rted there-
. in by the agent Fifield, who, as to this transaction, 'vas the 
alter e_qo of the company without the knowledge of Spicer. 
And in view of the evidence in the ca~P the defendant com-
pany waived its rights to insist upon the provisions in ~he 
policy concerning other insurance. 
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In regard to the third ground of defense concerning proofs 
of loss. Assuming none were furnished, how can this be ~ 
ground of defense in view of the testimony of the plaintiff, 
which the jury had a right to believe 1 He testified that Fifield 
informed him that there was no reason why he should file a 
proof of loss; that he (Fifield) had received information of 
the fi~e and of the destruction of the building and personal 
property, and that an adjuster would be around. in a few 
days. The adjuster came in a few days, and there was no 
difficulty encounterP-d in adjusting both the values of the 
building and personal property destroyed. 
And that adjustment reduced to writing, signed by Spicer 
and the adjuster, was adopted as the basis of the jury's ver-
dict at the suggestion of counsel for the defendant and with 
the acquiescenc-e of counsel for the plaintiff (MS., Record, p. 
216). 
. Was not tl1is a waiver of the rig·ht of the Company to call 
for proofs of loss as provided in the policy? We submit it 
was, and thP. question of 'vaiver was submitted to the jury, 
and it decided contrary to the contentions of the defendant 
company. 
In regard to the fourth ground of defense, where the 
grounds are referred to in letters ''a'' aud '' b' ', we will say 
as to the question of unconditional and sole ownership the 
plaintiff was not asked about ownership, the agent assumed 
to know; but the plaintiff did have an opportunity of telling 
him, and told him, that he wanted ''the policy payable to him 
and his wife the same as Mr. Hudg·ins'', and Mr. Hudgins 
bad issued a policy in the Continental Insurance Company 
payable to both the plaintiff and his wife. 
Agents of insurance companies cannot, we submit, rush to 
an o"\\ner of property and say, ''Let me insure your property, 
I ilo not care anything· about what answP.rs you give, sign 
this application and I will fill it out when I return to my of-
fice, all I ask you to do is to pay the premiums when they be-
come due", and listen to nothing that may be said in regard 
to ownership of property, or other insurance. 
\Vhen the plaintiff said to Mr. Fifield, the agent, "You 
make it payable to me and "rife, the same as J.VIr. Hudgins." 
If then, as already contended, the representative, R. A. 
Fifield, agent and attorney at law, had been paying attention 
he could have so easily said to the plaintiff: "If you want the 
policy in the name of yourself and wife, and l\fr. Hudgins so 
insured it, then the real estate on which the buildings are lo-
cated must be in the names of both you and your wife''. A:nd 
Mr. Spicer would have had an opportunity of saying "''Yes", 
and \vould have said "Yes". But did the agent do this? 
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No, he was as silent as the skeletons of human beings that oc-
cupy graves. 
Under the letter '' b'' we find the foreclosure proposition 
mentione<!. Does the evidence show that the plaintiff had 
knowledge of the foreclosure proceeding before the fire f All 
the evidence introduced on the subject at the trial was that 
the deputy sheriff's return on a subpoena in chancery in a 
suit brought by the cFederal Land Bank of Baltimore to fore-
close a niortgage binding the property insured, showed that 
the plaintiff and his wife were summoned to appear at First 
J unP. Rules to answer bill in chancery. Before the return 
day, however, the property in question was destroyerl by fire_; 
in fact destroyed on the 29th of May. The subpoena was 
served as mentioned by the deputy sheriff on the 27th nf J\Iay 
-three days before the fire. But the subpoena did not tell 
the nlaintiff and his wife to come to the clerk's office until 
First June Rules, and 'vhen the plaintiff and his wife learned 
what they were summoned for, or what they were summoned 
to answer, the property had been burned. To say the least, 
it was certainly a jury question, and the trial court so held 
as to whether the plaintiff and his wife had notice of the fore-
closure proceedings, both of 'vhom said they had not. 
The subpoena although served was insufficient to notify the 
Spicers of foreclosure proceedings as a matter of law. How-
ever, that question does not arise. It was a jury question as 
to whether there was ample notice or sufficient notice of the 
foreclosure proceedings. 
When Mr. and ~Irs. Spicer knew what the summons meant, 
and they went the day they were summoned, which as stated 
was after the fire, and talked with the attorney, R. A. Bickers, 
who instituted the foreclosure suit, they for the first time 
wP.re in possession of inforn1ation that enabled them to de-
termine what the subpoena meant. 
In regard to the fifth ground assigned. Permit us to say 
this question has been settled in favor of the defendant, the 
fiartford Fire Insurance Company. The court instructed in 
acco1·dance with the defendant's view, and the jury so de-
cided; that is decided in favor of prorating as between the 
two companies. 
THE LAW GOVER.NING SUCH CASES. 
In the case of lJfttf'ltal Benefit Health and Accident Associa-
tion v. Alley, decided by the Supreme 'Court of Virginia on 
Heptember, 11, 1936, reported in Advanced Sheets, South 
Eastern Reporter, Vol. 187, beginning on page 456, Justice-
Hudg·ins discusses the ]aw with ability. In delivering the 
opinion of the court he in part says : 
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''While we have some difficulty in trying to follow the 
reasoning outlined in the jPlaintiff 's brief, he, in effect, con-
tends that, while the answers to the above questions were 
untrue, he was not responsible therefor. The effect on a 
contract of insurance, of the agent's mistake in filling out 
the application, has been a fruitful source of litigation, and· 
much printer's ink has been consumed on the subject by 
judgP.s and test writers. Judge Prentice, in dealing with the 
application for a fire insurance policy on an automobile, in 
North River Ins. Co., v. Lewis, 137 Va. 322, 327, 119 S. E. 43, 
45, said: 
''There are many pertinent cases, and they cannot be recon-
ciled: but there seen1s to be little doubt that by the weight 
of authority, in the absence of deceit and fraud of the assured, 
wh~re there is no application (and there was none here), 
or if the answers are written by the agent on his own knowl-
edg·e or authority without questioning the applicant (as is 
the case here), the company is generally held estopped from 
relying upon a forfeiture, either because of the falsity of such 
answers as are written by its own agent, or because of the 
failure to am;;wer questions matArial to the risk which have 
never bP.en asked.'' 
Notice Justice Hudgins says : 
"vVhere tlwre is no application (and thm·e was none here), 
or if the answers are written by the agent on his own knowl-
edg·e or authority without questioning the applicant (as is 
the case herP.)." · 
.T ustice Hudgins, it will be observed, was here speaking in 
tlu~ disjunctive. He says ''or'', after reciting that there was 
no application,· if the ans'\vers are written by the agent on 
his own knowledge or authority, showing that in either event, 
whether there '\vas an application or not, the Company is 
bound by the acts of its agents. 
~hen .Tustice Hudgins says further in this sam A ca~A: 
"The false statPments of the soliciting· agent and the 
medical examiner in thP. application and report on the health 
of a convict, for a life insurance policy, soug-ht by the f.ather 
of the convict, '\Vere befor~ the court in Harrison v. Provident 
Relief Association, 141 Va. 659, where Justice Holt, after 
revie·wing a number of cases dealing with the knowledge of 
the company, said: 
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''In the light of this law we have no difficulty in reaching 
the conclusion that neither misstatements nor concealment 
on the part of this company's agents could affect the plaintiff, 
unless he was in some wise responsible therefor, and that the 
evidence fails to show such responsibility. ' ' 
Mr. Sands, the learned counsel representing the defendant, 
contends that the case of North River Insurance' Cornpany v. 
Lewis, was a case in which there was no application ror the 
insurance; and in this he is correct. Then lVIr. :Sands further 
contends, as I understand him, that in the present case and 
in the Poole case, he relies on the fact there were applications, 
all of which is correct; and there were applications in the 
casP.s referred to and cited by Justice Hudgins in the Alley 
case. Justice Hudgins, in quoting, says: 
"Where the insured at the time of making the application, 
gives full, true and correct answers, relying upon the skill, 
honesty, and gO'od faith of the company's agent to fill out the 
application correctly, and such agent makes out the appli-
cation incorrectly or inserts answers different from those 
given or false answers, the company cannot take advantage 
thereof, and where the applicant is ignorant of the discrep-
ancy or wrongful act of the agent he is entitled to recover 
on the policy, and this rule applies even though the agent in 
such case has transcendP.d his actual authoritv. 2 J ovce on 
In~~urance, 475." ·· -
Then Justice Hudgins cites Cooley's Briefs on Insurance 
(2nd. Ed.), p. 4111, summarized the general rule on the sub-
ject thus: · 
''So, too, 'vhen the application is filled out by the agent 
from his own knowledge, no information being sought from 
the insured, who signed the application in blank or without 
reading it, relying on the agent's good faith and assumption 
of knowledge, the false statements are the fault of the com-
pany through its agent and the insured cannot be called on to 
bear the consequences.'' 
See F. Y. Van Ross, etc. v. Mett·opolitan Life b'tS. Co., 134 
Kan. 479, 7 P. (2nd.) 41, 81 A. L. R. R21, and note at page 834; 
Davern v. America-n M~tt. Lia.bilitJJ Ins. Co., ·241 N. Y. 318, 
150 N. E. 129, 43 A. L. R. 523, and note at page 527." 
The vital Question presentP.d is really one of fact. If the 
agent acting on his own knowledge or information, and with-
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out fault of plaintiff, wrote false and material statements in 
the application, then the insurance company is estopped from 
claiming a forfeiture. 
Permit me now to refer to the case of North River Insur-
ance Company before cited. While it is true as stated in that 
case, there was no application, but see what the court said 
in reg_ard to cases in which there were applications. On page 
330 of' the report Justice Prentis in delivering the opinion, 
says: 
''This case must also be distinguished from those in which 
thA agent has neither said nor donA anything to mislead the 
assured. Here we have the agent expressly giving the as-
surance that he alrP.ady knew every fact necessary to write 
valid insurancA and declining to make any further inquiry. 
We find him delivering a policy purporting to inde1nnify the 
assured, and receivin~ the premium which was paid in good 
faith for such indemnity. If the contention of the company 
is sustained, this policy affirmatively purporting to guarantee 
indemnity, and so, in g·ood faith received and paid for, was 
void at its inception and was a mere pretense, proclaimed a 
contract, but which nevertheless destroyed itself before it be~ 
came effective. So to construe it would be to hold that its 
paltering terms merely 'keep the word of promise to our ear, 
and break it to our hopA'." 
,Justice Prentis furthP.r says, in quoting from the case of 
.Aetna. etc., Ins~trance nompattlJJf v. Olm-stead, 21 Mich. 253, 
4 American Reports, 483 : 
"W11Are there was an ambiguous or falsA statement as to 
encumbrances, we find the principle expressed in these words 
by that great master, CoolAy, J.: • "' *' when an agent, who 
at the time and place is the sole representative of the prin-
cipal, assumes to know what infor1nation the principal re-
quires, and after being furnished with all the facts, drafts a 
paper which he declares satisfactory, induces the other party 
to sign it, receives and retains the premium moneys, and then 
delivers a contract which the other party is led to believe, 
and has a rig·ht to believe, gives him the indemnity for which 
he paid his money, we do not think the insurer can be heard 
in repudiation of the indemnity, on the ground of his agent's 
unskillfulness, carelessness, or fraud. If this can be done 
it is easy to seA that the community is at the mercy of these 
insurance agents, who will have little difficulty, in a lar~e 
proportion of the cases, in giving a worthless policy for the 
money they. receive." ' 
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On page 328 of this report, Justice Prentis, referring to 
the case of Washington J.l1ills, etc., MflJ. v. Weymo~tth Ins. 
Co., 135 1\{ass. 505, quoting, says: 
''The plaintiff made no misrepresentations and no conceal-
nlent of his title. * >!(: *~ The defendant saw fit to issue this 
policy without any specific inquiries of the plaintiff as to the 
title to the land, and without any representations by the plain-
tiff npon this point. It was its own carelessness, and it can-
not avoid the policy without proving intentional misrepresen-
tation or concealment on the part of the plaintiff. An inno-
cent failure to communicato facts about which the plaintiff 
was not asked will not have this effect. ('Citing cases) Com-
monwealth v. Hide db Leather Ins. Co. 1 112 Mass. 136; Fottvle 
v. Springfield Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 191; T¥ alsh v. Phitadephia 
Ti'i1·e 1 nsu.rance Association, 127 Mass. 383.'' 
.Justice Prentis in quoting from the case of VanHouten v. 
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 110 ~Iich. 682, says: 
"It is held that false answers written in an application 
for life insurance by the company's agent, in reliance upon 
his own knowledge, does not avoid the policy, even though the 
application was signed by the assured after answering other 
questions, he being ignorant of thP. former false answers con-
tained thP.rein. (Citing· cases): O'Neill v. Ottawa, etc., Ins. 
Co., ~0 U. C. C. P. 151: German Ins., etc., Inst. v. Kline, 44 
NAb. 395. 62 N. W. R57. Several Virginia casAs recog·nize and 
apply it. Amonp; them are: IJ:l m·otock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 
92 Va. 751, 24 S.. E. 393; 53 Am. St. Rep. 846, and Union As-
surance Soc. v. Nalls, 101 Va. 613, 44 S. E. 896, 99 Am. St. 
Rep. 923.'' 
The case of M~tt~tal Benefit Ilealth <I; Accident Ass'n. v. 
Ratcliffe, 163 Va. 325. is the only case that we have been able 
to find that refers to the case of Royal Insu'l·ance Oornpany 
v. Poole, reliAd upon by counsel for the defendant; and the 
reference. to the case is onA on the question of ostensible 
power of the a~ent. The language as we find it in the report 
i~ as follows: . 
''A. soliciting agent with power to take applications for 
insurance is the agent of his company and has all ostensible 
power. Where an applicant has no knowledge of limitations 
upon the agent's powers he may assume that they are co-
extensive with the business Antrusted to his case. But the 
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assured must not have been responsible for any mistakes or 
omissions in the application.'' 
In thP. case of 801nds v. Banke-rs' Ftire bzs. Co., reported 
in thP. October 14,' 1937, number of Advanced Sheets, South 
Eastern Reporter, beginning· on page 617, Justice Eggleston 
in writing the opinion, says: · 
"WherP. an insurance company defends liability on the 
~·l·ound that the policy was issued on the basis of ·material 
nlisstatAments or misinformation, the burden is on the com-
pany to prove such misstatP.ments or misinformation. The 
dP.fense is an affirmative one. Pal1netto Fire Ins .. co. v. 
Fansler, 14R Va. 884, 891; 129 S. E. 727; Aetna Ins. Co. v . 
. Aston, 123 Va. 327, 336, 96 S. E. 772; Virginia F. <f; M. Ins. 
Go. v. Hogue, 105 Va. 355, 360, 361, 54 S. E. 8; 3 Cooley's 
BriAfR on Insurance (2nd. Ed.), P.P· 1929, 1930" (page 
619). 
Justice Eggleston further says ( p. 621) : 
''It is CQllally well settled that, where the assurP.d makes 
a full und fair disclosure of all material facts to the agent, 
and the latter, either through ignorance, negligence, or fraud, 
fails to corrPctly impart this knowledg·e to thP. insurance com- · 
pany, and the assured is in no way at fault for the act of the 
ag·ent in failing· to correctly transmit the information, then 
the insnrance company is estopped from clahning a fore-
feiture of the policy. IJ,f~t(,·ual Benefit, etc., Ass'n. v. Alley, 167 
Va ..... ; 187 S. E. 456, 459; Harrison v. Pro11ident Relief 
.Ass'n., 141 Va. 659, 66R, 670, 126 8. E. 696, 40 A. L. R. 616." 
In the case of Universa,l Ins. Co. v. Mouel, 165 Va. 651. 
Justice Browning in delivering the opinion of the court, in 
part says: 
"It does not appear that any questions relating to the title 
or to the ownership of the residence ·were ever asked of either 
of the l\{ouels, therefore, they could not have misled or de-
ceived anyone as to the matter. "\Vhat advantage could have 
accruP.d to them from having the property in the name of the 
husband rather than the wife, who was the owner? What 
object could they have had in obscuring the true ownership' 
How can the thing be satisfactorily and logically accounted 
for, except on the inescapable theory that it was a mistake all 
around?'' 
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And Justice Browning further says in quoting from the 
case of Washin,qton Mills, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Weymouth Ins. 
Co., 1H5 Mass. (503) 505: 
''The plaintiff made no misrepresentations and no conceal-
ment of his title. * * • The defendant saw fit to issue this 
policy without any specific inquiries of the plaintiff as to 
the title to the land, and without any representations by the 
plaintiff upon this point. It was its o'vn carelessness, and it 
cannot avoid the policy without proving intentional misrepre-
sentation or concealment on the part of the plaintiff. An in-
nocent failure to communicate facts about which the plain-
tiff was not asked will not have this effect.'' (Citing cases) : 
Commonwealth v. Hide <f; Leather In.c;. Co., 112 }tfa.ss. 136 (17 
Am. Re-p. 72); Fo'Wle v. Springfield Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 191 
(2H Am. Rep. 308); R7ash v. Philadelphia Fire .Associatio-n, 
127 Mass. 383. 
Thr. writer is impressed with the language in the opinion 
rendered in the case of Croft v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 
40 W.' Va. 508, at page 520, 21 S. E. 854, 858, 52 Am. St. Rep. 
902, which language was quoted by Justice Browning in de-
livering the opinion of this court in -the Mouel case already 
cited, as follows: 
''Courts must not let insurance companies evade their 
policies through mere technicalities. They must be treated 
fairly, and only held np to their fair engagements. They are 
very valuable institutions, reserving patronag·e and encour-
agement; but when their contracts of indemnity prove worth-
less, for unsubstantial reasons, to those who are in distress 
and poverty from th~ waste of fire, against wl1ich their pru-
dencr. sought to proVIde, it derogates from the efficacy of the 
policies and the confidence of the public in fire insurance.'' 
For the forr.going reasons, it is respectfully hereby sub-
mitted that the judgment of the trial court entered on the 
10 day of ,July, 1937, is erroneous and should be reviewed 
and reversed. 
Therefore, petitioner prays that a writ of error be awarded 
to the judgment complained of and that the said judgment 
be annulled and set aside, and that the conclusions therein 
reached revP.rsed, and that the verdict of the jury will be sus-
tained and declared effective by this court. 
A. copy of this petition was mailed to Alexander H. Sands, 
Attorney of record for defendant in error at his office in the 
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.American Bank Building, Richmond, Virginia, on this the 26 
day of November, 1937. 
A.nd notice is hereby given that counsel for plaintiff in 
error desire to state orally the reasons for reversing the de-
cision complained of in the foregoing petition, and that they 
will adopt the said petition as their opening brief on behalf 
of the plaintiff in error at the. hearing of the case. . 
The importance of this appeal to petitioner has caused his 
counsel to prolong this petition further than the matters of 
law and fact involved woula appear to justify. 
Respectfully submi~ted, 
ROBT. E. SCOTT, 
BURNETT MILLER, 
E. E. JOHNSON, 
For Petitioner. 
GEO. W. SPICER, 
By counsel. 
We, Robert E. Scott, Burnett Miller and E. E. Johnson,' 
Attorneys at Law, practicing in the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in our opin_ion it is 
proper· that the decision complained of should be reviewed 
by the appellate court. 
Rec'd. 11-26-37. 
ROBT. E. SCOTT, 
BURNETT :MILLER, 
E. E. JOHNiSON. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
January 18, 1938. Writ of error awarded by the court. 
;Bond $300. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the 1Circuit Court of Culpeper County 
G. W. Spicer 
v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, :Conn., Inc. 
PI-'EADINGS before the Circuit Court of Culpeper County: 
On the 29th day of September, 1936, the plaintiff filed his 
notice of motion showing service on the defendant as of Sep-
tember 28, 1936, on 'vhich the jury's verdict is endorsed, which 
notice is in the words and figures following: 
''To The Hartford •Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, Con-
necticut, Incorporated: 
' ·You are hereby notified that. on the 19th day of Ocotber, 
1936, between the hours of ten o'clock A. 1\ti. and five o'clock, 
P. M., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard, I (who will 
hereinafter in this notice refer to myself as plaintiff) will 
nLOve the Circuit Court of Culpeper County at the court house 
thereof, in the town of Culpeper, Virginia, for a judgment 
against you for the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,-
000.00), with interest thereon from the 29th day of ].{ay, 1936, 
until paid, together with the costs incident to this proceeding, 
all of which is justly due and owing from you to the plaintiff 
under and by virtue of a certain contract of insur-
page 2 ~ ance in writing made by you on or about the 29th day 
of .T uly, 19R5, through R. A. Fifield, your agent at 
Reming-ton, Fauquier County, Virg·inia, which contract is 
your Policy No. C1437 and issued to the plaintiff, by which 
said contract you agTeed, promised and undertook to insure 
the plaintiff in considerf}tion of the stipulations in the con-
tract named, and of $31.12. paid in cash, and like amounts on 
the first days each of August, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, there-
after; the four last payments evidenced by an installment 
note of $124.4R which cash payment of $31.12 provided for 
was paid and which note was executed evidencing the last 
four payments, at the time the contract was made, the receipt 
of which cash payment you acknowledged; and the contract 
insured the property therein mentioned for a term of five 
years from the 29th day of July, 1935, at noon, against all 
direct loss or damage by fire and lightning .. to an amount not 
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exceeding· Five Thousand three hundred dollars ($5,300.00), 
which contract or policy embraced or included in the coverage 
part thereof a two-story metal roof frame dwelling. house lo-
cated near Elkwood in Culpeper County, Virginia, which was 
protected by the policy to the extent of $2,400.00, and certain 
household and kitchen furniture was embraced in the said 
policy and in the coverage part thereof protected to the extent 
of $600.00, which said dwelling house and personal property 
was thAn, that is at the time the contract was entered into and 
ever since, owned by and belonged to the plaintiff! and in 
said policy described as follows: 
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Fh·e and Tornado or 
Lightnin@; Windstorm 
1. $2,400.00 $ None On two-story metal roof frame dwell-
ing house, including foundations~ ad-
ditions now and hereafter attached, 
irremovable fixtures, plumbing, heat-
ing and lighting apparat1:1s, porches, 
storm doors and screens, while there-
in or attached thereto. 
2. $600.00 $None On household and kitchen furniture 
and furuishing·s of all kinds, useful 
and ornamental, belonging to assured 
or members of his family, incluqing 
family wearing apparel and materials 
for same, trunks, handbags, um-
brellas, canes, f~mily provisions and 
produce, musical instruments, sheet 
music, silver plate a11-d plated ware, 
watches, clocks, telephone, jewelry in 
use, printed books, pictures, engrav-
ings and frames (not exceeding cost 
price), firearms and their equipment, 
lodge and social regalia, fuel, sewinp: 
machine, tools and tool chest, all 
while contained in above-described 
dwelling house and in summer 
kitchen. 
The said loss or damage to be estimated according to cash 
value of the said property at the time of loss or damage, but 
not exceeding· the amount it would cost to repair or replace 
the same with material of like kind and quality, within a rea-
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sonable time after such loss or damag·e, and without allowance 
for any increased cost of repair or construction by reason 
of any ordinance or law regulating construction or repair 
and without compensation for loss resulting from interruption 
of business or manufacture, and to be paid by you within sixty 
days after due notice and proof thereof made by the plaintiff 
in conformity to the conditions, of said policy, and in said 
policy sundry provisos, conditions, prohibitions and 
page 4 ~ stipulations were and are contained and thereto an-
nexed. · , 
Before and at the tirne of making said policy of in-
surance by you, and at all times since, and no,v, the plain-
tiff_ was and is interested in the said insured property in said 
policy mentioned ·and described as aforesaid, to a large 
amount, to-wit: the sum of Fifty-three Hundred Dollars 
($5,300.00), and the said dwelling house and personal prop-
erty therein above described in said policy mentioned after-
wards and between the 29th day of July, 1935, at noon, and 
the 29th day of July, 1936, at noon, and on the 29th day of 
May, 1936, was burned down and consun1ed and destroyed by 
fire, and damage and loss thereby occasioned to the plain-
tiff to the amount of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), in 
such manner and under such circumstances as to come within 
your said contract, stipulation, promise and undertaking in 
the said policy contained, and to render liable and oblige you 
to insure, pay and make good to the plaintiff such loss and 
damage, of which the said burning and destruction by fire, 
and the loss and damage aforesaid, thereby occasioned to the 
plaintiff to the amount of $3,000.00; due notice and proof was 
afterwards made to you and to your agent, R.. A. Fifield, in 
conformity to the conditions of the said policy, but in the fol-
lowing manner: ·plaintiff called upon your duly authorized 
agent, R. A. Fifield, at his office in R.emingion in Fauquier 
County, Virginia, and asked for a form for proof of loss and 
was told by the ag·ent that there was no occasion for it, that 
he was the authorized agent to speak for the Company in that 
regard, that all plaintiff wanted was an adjuster; that the 
adjuster came to his premises, representing you, 
page 5 ~ and later agreements were entered into which are 
here filed as a part of this notice of motion. And 
plaintiff relied upon the statements of your agent in the afore-
mentioned regard and did not further insist on the furnishing 
by you, or your agent, forms of proof of loss. 
Plaintiff is advised and here alleges that the act of vour 
agent in the aforementioned regard constituted a waiver of 
you:r righ.t to and demand a proof· of loss signed and sworn 
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to as provided for in the contra~t or policy of insurance here 
sued on. 
N ot,vithstanding, plaintiff has performed, fulfilled, ob-
served and complied with each and all the conditions, pro-
visos and stipulations of the said policy on the part of the 
plaintiff to be performed, fulfilled, observed and complied 
with, and has violated none of its prohibitions, according to 
· the form and effect, true intent and meaning of said policy. 
And although sixty days . have elapsed since you received 
notice, as aforesaid, of the burning and destruction by fire of 
the building and personal property belonging to plaintiff as 
hereinabove set forth, and of the loss and damage aforesaid 
thereby occasioned to the plaintiff, you have not paid nor 
made ~·ood to the plaintiff the said loss and damage of three 
thousand dollars, of any part thereof, but the same and every 
part thereof are wholly unpaid and unsatisfied to the plain-
. tiff, contrary to the force and effect of the said policy; and 
although often requested you have wholly neglected, failed 
and refused, and still doth neglect, fail and refuse to keep 
and perform your said agreement and contract; 
page 6 ~ vVherefore judgment for the said sum with inter-
est as aforesaid, tog·ether with cost, will be asked 
at the hands of the said court at the time an¢[ place herein. 
above set out. 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of September, 1936. 
Respectfully, 
E. E. JOHNSON and 
BUR.NETT MILLER, 
Counsel for Plaintiff.'' 
Endorsement on Notice : 
G. W. SPICER, 
Plaintiff. 
Executed in the City. of Richn1ond, Va. September 28-36 by 
delivering· in duplicate a copy of within Notice of Motion to 
Peter 1Saunders the Secretarv of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia and as such Secretary of the Commonwealth the Statu-
tory A.gent for The Hartford Fire Insurance o~ Hartford, 
Conn. Incorporated. 
Place of residence and place of business of said Saunders 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
being· in the City of Richmond, \T a. Fee of $2.50 paid the 
Secretary at time of servic(\ . 
• J. HEl~BERT MERCER, 
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, Va. 
By W. M. LUCI(, 
Deputy Sheriff. 
Sheriff fee 1.00 
Paid 50 
Bal. Due 50 
page 7 ~ The Jury's Verdict: 
We the jury on the issues joined find for the Plaintiff and 
assess his damages at $1,639.41/100 (Sixteen hundred and 
thirty-nine dollars and 41 cents) with interest from August 
3rd, 1936. 
I 
J. l\10FFETT BROWN, 
Foreman.· 
On the first day of ,October Term, 1936, Defendant appeared 
and plead the general issue. 
And on March 25, 1937, defendant filed its grounds of de-
fense in the 'vords and figures following: 
The defendant, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Hart-
ford, Connecticut, Incorporated, relies upon the following 
grounds of defense and says that the plaintiff is not entitled 
to recover in this suit because: 
1. Fraud in the procurement of the contract of insurance 
in that the assured concealed from the insurer the existence 
of other insurance then had or placed upon the property in-
sured; misrepresentations as to value, and fraud and mis-
renresentations before and after the loss. 
2. Any rig·ht of recovery that the plaintiff may have had 
under the policy sued on was lost or forfeited because at the 
time of tbe fire complained of, as set out in its notice of mo-
tion, the assured had, contrary to the provisions of 
page 8 ~ said policy, another contract of insurance on the 
property covered which additional insurance was 
not permitted or prov:ided by agTeement in writing added to 
the terms of the policy of insurance as required in such case. 
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3. The assured failed to comply with the provisions of the 
policy respecting the furnishing of proofs of loss in that the 
Proofs of Loss if tendered and furnished did not contain or 
carry under oath the data and information as is required and 
provided in the policy sued on. 
4. That the policy upon which this action is founded was 
and became void because: 
(a) The interest of the assured in the property insured 
was other than unconditional and sole ownership. 
(b) That foreclosure proceedings had been commenced by 
the Federal Land Bank which held a mortgage and/or deed of 
trust upon the property insured of which fact the insured 
had knowledge. 
5. That if said insured is entitled to any recovery, which 
this defendant denies, that such recovery would be limited 
in an amount not greater in proportion than the amount in-
sured under the policy su,ed on would bear to the whole insur-
ance covering the property andjor any item thereof whether 
valid or not and whether collectible or -not. 
HARTIFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
Hartford, Connecticut, Incorporated, · 
By ALEXANDER H. SANDS, p. d. 
pag·e 9 } And on the 25th day of :hiarch, 1937, the following 
order was entered: 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and announced 
tl1emselves ready for trail upon the issues joined. Thereupon 
came a jury of 9 qualified men, viz: I. J. Allen, J. T. White, ' 
.T obn lVIoffett Brown, Lucien Aylor, Ray Hudson, Herbert C. 
Brown, W. C. Lindsay, Edwin Field and J. Merry Lewis. 
Attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant each struck off one, 
leaving the followinp: Reven: J. T. White, John ~Ioffett 
Brown, Lucien Aylor~ R.ay IIudson, Herbert C. Brown, W. C. 
Lindsay, and .T. :Nierrv Le,vis; who were sworn to well and 
truly ti·y the issues joined and a true verdict render accord-
ing to the law and the evidence. Whereupon, opening state-
ments were made to the jury by the attorneys for both the 
plaintiff and defendant, and evidence was introduced on be-
half of both the plaintiff and defendant. The Court, after 
instructing the jury not to discuss this case with anyone or to 
allow anyone to discuss it in their presence, adjourned until 
tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. 
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page 10 ~ And on the 26th day of March, 1937, the follow-
ing order was entered: 
This day again came the parties by their counsel and the 
same jury heretofore empaneled to try the issues submitted 
to them in this case, to-wit: J. T .White, John 1foffett Brown, 
Lucien .Aylor, Ray Hudson, Herbert C. Brown, W. 10'. Lindsay, 
and J. Merry Lewis. Both sides having c.ompleted the pre-
sentation of their evidence, the court was adjourned until to-
morrow morning at 10 o'clock . 
.And on th~ 27th day of March, 1937, the following order 
was entered : 
This day came again plaintiff and defendant by their re-
spective attorneys and the same jury as of yesterday; and 
the jury after hearing the instructions of the court and argu-
ment of counsel retired to their room in the company of the 
sheriff to consider of their verdict, and after a brief interval 
of time returned into court with their verdict in the words and 
.figures follo,ving, to-wit: ''We the Jury on the 
page 11 ~ issues joined find for the plaintiff and assess his 
damages at $1,639.41 (sixteen hundred and thirty-
nine dollars and 41 cents) with interest from .August 3rd, 
1936. J. 1\{offett Brown, Foreman;'' which verdict was ac-
cepted and approved by the court. Whereupon the jury were 
then discharged from further consideration of this case . 
.And thereupon the defendant by counsel submitted a motion 
to set aside the jury's verdict as contrary to the law and the 
evidence, and for misdirection of the jury by the court, and 
upon exceptions to certain points taken to the ruling of the 
court during the trial; and also moved the court that the ver-
dict be &et aside and judgment rendered in favor of the de-
fendant. The court not then being advised of its judgment 
took time to consider thereof, and it is ordered that the mo-
tions be docketed and set down for argument at some future 
day to be agreed upon between counsel for both plaintiff and 
defendant. 
page 12 }- .And on the lOth clay of July, 1937, the following 
order was entered: . 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys and the 
Court having· maturely considered the motions heretofore 
made on behalf of the defendant, including its motion to set 
aside the verdict of the jury rendered herein, and to enter 
up judgment for the defendant, doth sustain such motion. 
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To which action and ruling· of the Court, the defendant by his 
attorneys excepted. It is, therefore, considered by the Court 
that the plaintiff take nothing- by his bill and the defendant 
go hereof without day and recover against the plaintiff its 
costs by it about its defense herein expended. And the plain-
tiff signifying his intention to apply to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals for a writ of error and supersedeas it is ordered 
that execution under this order be suspended for ninety days 
from the date of this order if the plaintiff, or someone for 
him, shall give b9nd before the Clerk of this Court within 
ten days from the date hereof in the penalty of $250.00 and 
conditioned according to law. 
page 13 ~ Agreement between Counsel : 
Virginia: 
In the 1Circuit Court of Culpeper County. 
G. W. Spicer 
v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, Conn., Incor-
porated 
AGREE~IENT. 
It is hereby agreed this 31st day of August, 1937, between 
Burnett Miller and E. E. Johnson, representing the Plaintiff 
in the trial court and Alexander H. Sands, representing the 
Defendant in the trial court, that the original papers men-
tioned in Certificates Numbers 2, 3, .5, 6, 7, and 8, need not be 
printed but can be used in the Supreme Court in event a writ 
of error is granted. 
Signed this 31st day of August, 1937. 
page 14 ~ 
E. E. JOHNSON, 
. BURNETT 1\IILLER, 
.ALEXANDER H. SANDS, 
Counsel of Record. 
GRil\1:SLEY & ~!ILLER 
Attornevs at Law 
Culpeper, Va. 
.August 28, 1937. 
RE: G. W. Spicer 
v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co.;. Hartford, .Conn., Inc. 
42 Supreme Court of . Appeals of Virginia 
To Alexander H. Sands, 
Attorney of Record for Defendant, liartford Fire Ins. Co., 
Inc., 
American Bank Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear Allie : 
This is to notify you, and I am sure it will be satisfactory 
to you, that I will on Saturday, September 4, 1937, between 
the hours of eleven and twelve o'cloek, at his office in the court 
house building at Orange, Virginia, present to Judge A. T. 
Browning, certificates of exception for signature to be used 
in the above styled cause. 
Respectfully, 
BM/W . 
E. E. JOHNSON, 
BURNETT MILLER, 
Attys. for Plaintiff 
G. W. Spicer. 
. Legal service accepted this 30th day of Aug. 1937. 
page 15 ~ Virginia : 
ALEX. H. SANDS, 
Counsel fo:;:-
Hartford In~. Co. 
In the Circuit Court of ·Culpeper County. 
G. W. Spicer 
·V Hartf~rd Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, Conn., Incor-
porated 
CERTIFICATE OF TRIAL JUDGE. 
I hereby certify that it appears of record that notice was 
duly given to Counsel representing the Defendant in the trial 
court of the time and place of presenting certificates for sig·-
nature. 
Teste: this 4th day of September, 1937. 
ALEXANDER T. BROWNING, 
Judge. 
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page 16 ~ CERTIFICATE NO. 1. 
The following EVIDEN'CE on behalf of the Plaintiff and of· 
the Defendant respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all the 
evidence that was introduced on the trial of this cause. 
And the following INSTRUCTIONS, as hereinafter de-
noted, offered at the request of the defendant, (all of which 
were granted except Instruction G, which was refused), on 
the trial of this case are all the instructions offered by the 
defendant as shown in this Certificate No.1. And the instruc-
tions so offered at the instance of the Defendant as set forth 
lH~rein, and the instructions granted at the instance of the 
Plaintiff as set forth in Certificate No. 4, are all the instruc-
tions offered or granted at the instance of any one on the 
trial of this causA. 
And the following as hereinafter denoted, are INCIDENTS 
of the trial, and all OBJECTIONS and EXCEPTIONS made 
by the Attorneys representing Plaintiff and Defendant in 
granting and refusing instructions, and all ~lOTIONS sub-
mitted by Plaintiff and DefP.ndaut on the trial of this cause. 
page 17 } Virginia : 
' 
In the Oircuit Court of Culpeper :County. 
G. W. Spicer 
v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Ifartford, Conn., Incor-
pol'ated. 
March 25-27, 1937. 
Appearances: Mr. Burnett Miller and 1\{r. E. E. Johnson, 
Counsel for Plaintiff, 
:\ir . .L~ • .II. Sands, Counsel for Defendant. 
This case came on to be heard on this 25th day 
page 18 } of ]\{arch, 1937, before his Honor, Alexander T. 
Browning, Judge of the Circuit Court of Culpeper 
County, Virginia, and a jury of seven men, duly impaneled 
and sworn to try the issues involved. · 
Whereupon, the following proceedings were had· 
By Mr. Miller: If your Honor please, I have a motion to 
make, which should probably be made in the absence of the jury. 
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By the Court: The jury will retire to their room. 
Jury out. 
' By Mr. Miller: May it please your Honor, the motion now 
submitted is to strike certain grounds of defense submitted 
by the defendant company. The object of this motion is to 
narrow the real issues in the case and not require us to be 
taking evidence to prove issues when they are immaterial 
circumstances, and the time of the Court should not be con-
sumed in hearing them, therefore, I make the motion now to 
strike those grounds of defense which raise those objection-
able issues. · 
The defendant filed its grounds of defense as follows: 
''.The defendant, Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
page 19 ~ pany, fiartford, .Connecticut, Incorporated, relies 
upon the following grounds of defense and says 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this suit be-. 
cause: 
'' 1. Fraud in the procurement of the contract of insurance 
in that the accused concealed from the insurer the existence 
of other insurance then had or placed upon the property in-
sured; misrepresentations as to v:alue, and fraud and misrep-
resentations before and after the loss.'' 
We have no objection to that one, if they can prove or es-
. tablish those facts, that is a proper ground of defense. 
'' 2. Any right of recovery that the plaintiff may have had 
under the policy sued on was lost or forfeited because at the 
time of the fire complained of, as set out in its notice of mo-
tion, the , assured had, contrary to the provisions of said 
policy, another contract of insurance on the property co~ered, 
which additional insurance was not permitted or provided 
by agreement in writing added to the terms of the policy of 
insurance as required in such case." 
That one is all right if they take evidence on issue raised 
by the assertion of that ground of defense. 
page 20 ~· '' 3. The assured failed to comply with the pro-
. visio~s of the policy respecting the furnishing of 
proofs of loss if tendered, in that the' proofs of loss so ten-
dered and furnished did not contain or carry under oath the 
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data and information as is required and provided in the policy 
sued on.'' 
That is one of the grounds of defense that we move to ex-
clude. 
"4. That the policy upon which this action is founded was 
and became void because: 
'' (a) The interest of the assured in the property insured 
was other than unconditional and sole ownership. 
'' (b) That foreclosure proceedings had been commenced by 
the Federal Land Bank which held a mortgage and/or deed 
of trust upon the property insured of which fact the insured 
had knowledge.'' 
That is all right. 
''5. That if said insured is entitled to any recovery, which 
this defendant denies, that such recovery would be limited in 
an amount not greater in proportion than the amount insured 
under the policy sued on 'vould bear to the whole insurance 
covering the property andjor any item thereof 
page 21 ~ 'vhether valid or not and whether collectible or 
not.'' 
That is one that we object to. 
By the Court: You move to strike No. 3 and No. 5 ~ 
Bv Mr. Miller: Y cs. In the motion to exclude these 
grounds of defense, of course, we have to approach them as 
on a demurrer-proceed to see what is alleged in the gro1Jnds 
of defense and see if they are correct. Lt states in ·No. 5, 
"That if said insured is entitled to any recovery, which this 
defenda·nt denies, that such recovery would be limited in an 
amount not greater in proportion than the amount insured 
under the policy sued on would bear to the whole insurance 
covering the property and/or any item thereof whether valid 
or not and whether collectible or not". 
I submit, your Honor, that as stated it is very i·ndefinite. 
I cannot understand what is meant by it. 
He means to say, as stated in another ground, that there 
was another policy in existence covering the same policy that 
the policy sued on covers at the time of the destruction of 
the property sued on by fire. Now his idea is, or what he in-
tends to make the impression on the court, or the informa-
tion given to the court is that, althoug·h the jury ntay reach 
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the conclusion that we are entitled to recover on 
page 22 ~ the policy sued on, there being another policy in 
existence at the time, that the court could instruct 
the jury to determine by their verdict the amount that could 
be recovered here, the pro rata; in other words, we must take 
into consideration the other policy. Say this policy is for 
$3,000, and suppose the other is for exactly $3,000, and that 
in the event of recovery here we could only recover $3,000 
and the $3,000 would be paid by the two companies; in other 
words, that each would pay $1,500. I say that cannot be done. 
1 will go further and say that there is another policy cover-
ing· this same building that was destroyed by fire; but there 
is a litigation in regard to that and that is in equity now, and 
I maintain that this is an action on a contract; this is a pro-
cedure to recover on one single contract and there can be no 
distinction by the court between this company and another 
company that issued a policy in the same property, but that 
is a matter of equitable jurisdiction. We are entitled to re-
cover here, if entitled to recover at all, the amount sued on. 
If the amount of the verdict, whatever, it is, is paid and the 
Company feels aggrieved, they can fall back on the doctrine 
of subrogation and say we can recover back what we have 
already paid. If there is a verdict against the 
page 23 ~ Hartford,- they can say we have already paid that 
amount and the other company should pay their 
pro rata; or they can fall back and say we want to be subro-
gated to the rights of Spicer, who is the insured, because they-
paid it out to him, as a matter of fact. 
What 've have to determine here in a court of law is the 
question as to the liability of the insurance company for de-
stroyed property. 
vVe say we are entitled to recover here on this policy, and 
if this Company feels aggrieved it can fallrback on the doc-
trine of subrogation and say, "I have paid Mr. Spicer; now, 
if you want to do it, you can be subrogated to the rights of 
Spicer. 
By the Court: . Bear in mind, Mr. Miller, you represent 
the plaintiff. You are suing in a court of law on this insur-
ance policy contract. The clause referred to reads: "This 
Company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any 
loss or damage than the amount hereby insured shall bear to 
the whole insurance covering the property, whethc1· valid 
or not and ·whether collectible or not.'' If you are suing on 
this contract and the contract sets up a specific defense why 
cannot that defense be set up here without going· into the mat-
ter of subrogation. · 
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By l\fr. Miller: That is true, but that don't mean 
page 24 ~ that it can be settled here in a court of law. It 
simply says it is a question that can b~ settled in 
the proper court. I say the proper court is in the chancery 
court, where the other company is in court. 
By the Court: You mean that clause makes only an equi-
table and not a legal defense 1 
By Mr. Miller: Yes; that it can only be settled in equity. 
I ·say we are entitled to recover on this policy on the single 
issue here and that clause of the policy makes no issue in 
the legal remedy at all. Suppose the defendant company is 
required to pay every dollar of that policy. They say both. 
of us have insured it. You must pay me one-half of it. To 
whom have you paid itf Paid it to Mr. Spicer. We paid 
:h1:r. Spicer $3,000, when 've should have paid him $1,500, as-
suming that to be the amount. We think under the doctrine , 
of subrogation that question should be settled in a court of 
equity as between the two companies and cannot be settled 
here. · 
vVe are entitled to recover here on this policy and no other. 
That is a matter to be settled between those two companies 
in any way they think proper. This policy is to be paid by 
the Hartford Co1npany and when they have paid it, if they 
have paid something they ought not to have paid they can fall 
back on the doctrine of subrogation. 
page 25 ~ By 1\fr. Sands: If your Honor please. The in-
justice of 1\fr. Miller's argument, if it ever had any 
n1erit, is evident. You take this policy with its provisions 
and conditions. He says take our money and let us subro-
gate. Subrogation is an aftermath of a case. That is the 
terms of the contract, and I submit the point is very novel. 
I prepared an instruction 1based on the possibility of that hap-
pening, as always. I venture to make the assertion where 
there has been dual insurance you will find that he takes it 
on the ratio. The same instruction has been acted upon and 
acquiesced in where the case has gone to the Supreme Court, 
and counsel have never found t;he original thought that he 
makes now. 
By the Court: I will hear you now on No. 3, Mr. Miller. 
By l\fr. ~Hiler: I-:Iere is my objection to No. 3. It reads: 
''The assured failed to comply with the provisions of the 
policy respecting the furnishing of proofs of loss if tendered 
in that the proofs of loss so tendered and furnished did not 
contain or carry under oath the data and information as is 
required and provided in the policy sued on.'' 
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Now, certainly the record shows on its. fact that this notice 
of motion is defended on other grounds than the failure to 
submit proper proofs of loss. ·The grounds of defense show 
that they do rely on other grounds therefore, this one ground 
cannot be relied on. I say under the authorities 
page 26 ~ when applied to the statement made there that one 
ground as alleged shows it is waived, because it 
shows on the face of the pleadings that they are relying on 
other grounds. I think when the Company cornes in cou1;t 
and files the grounds of defense and shows one of the grounds 
of defense is the failure to give any proof of loss at all that 
that is the defense relied on and then go on and say we de-
pend on other grounds, they must in that event show there 
'vas sufficient notification and that it is waived. In other 
'vords, they cannot come in and say we rely on a number of 
grounds and then rely on the failure to show proof of loss. 
When they rely on the failure to show proof of loss, then they 
waive the other grounds. 
By the Court: The Court is of the opinion that the motion 
to strike out the grounds of defense under the subheading 
''5'' is not well taken, and having sued in a court of law the 
plaintiff is subject to the defense set forth. 
As to that portion of the motion to strike out the grounds 
of defense under the heading figure '' 3 '', the court is of 
opinion that the citation does not bear the construction con-
tended for by the plaintiff that the defendant was depending 
upon more than one ground of defense and for that reason 
they cannot rely on the failure to sho'v proof of loss. Of 
course, it is true that the defendant may waive the require-
ment of furnishing proof of loss, but that becomes, if prop-
erly pleaded, a matter of defense. I think as stated 
page 27 ~ on the face of the pleading, the ground as set forth 
is good, and, therefore, the motion as to that sub-
head is likewise overruled. 
Counsel for Plaintiff excepts to the ruling of the court in 
overruling· his motion to strike from the g-rounds of defense 
furnished by the defendant grounds under heading, figure 
"3'' and fit,rure "5", for the reason that ·neither ground will 
set forth proper defense to the plaintiff's action. 
No. 3 is to the effect that the assured failed to cmnply with· 
the provisions of the policy respecting proofs of loss if ten-
dered, and then says if tendered the proof was not under 
oath and the data and iufonnation as required not furnished 
and also that no proof was furnished at all. The contentio1~ 
of Counsel for Plaintiff is that the gTounds of defense as sub-
mitted contain other reasons than the failure to give or sub-
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G. W. Spicer. 
mit proper proofs of loss, and, in fact, that other grounds 
are relied upon, as shown by the pleadings, which shows con-
clusively that the grounds relied on under figure '' 3' ', as 
stated, is waived. 
The exception to figure No.5 is that the grounds of defense 
as set forth in No. 5 clearly should not be passed upon in 
this, a court of law, but in a court of equity, and 
page 28 ~ counsel for plaintiff excepts to the action of the 
court in not so holding and in holding that the 
question if there be another company, the liability of the two 
compa:nies can be settled and determined in this litigation. 
By the Court: Sheriff, bring the jury in. 
Jury in. 
·Opening statements were made by Mr. Miller for the plain-
tiff and by ~fr. Sands for the defendant. 
By Mr. l\£iller: 1\tir. Sands; we want to give you notice now 
in the begiiming that in regard to all there what I call 
"weasel" 'vords in this policy here, all those that are not of 
the size type required by law, 've will ask the court to instruct 
that they are not binding and oblig·atory on the insured. 
By Mr. Sands: You can introduce the evidence as you 
please. 
By l\{r. Miller: I know, but if we introduce the evidence 
and you don't combat it that settles the case. 
Whereupon, the following evidence as introduced on behalf 
of the Plaintiff: 
page 29 ~ G. ·vv. SPICER, 
the plaintiff, introduced in his own behalf, being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAlVII1NATION. 
By ~fr. 1\tiiller : 
Q. You are 1\fr. G. W. Spicer, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Sixty-three the 11th of l\{arch. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Two miles from Elkwood. 
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G. W. Spicer. 
Q. In what county~ 
A. Culpeper County, Va. 
Q. How long have you lived there~ 
A. I bought the place, I guess, in 1914. I am pretty sure 
that is right. 
Q. In 1914? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that property insured in the Hartford Company, 
the building on it Y 
A. When I bought itY 
Q. YesY 
A. No, I got the insurance on it. 
Q. ·After the property was purchased how did it 
page 30 ~ happen that you insured it with the Hartford Fire 
Insurance Company? 
A. For protection. I did not have much on it a~d he wanted 
· to put more on it. 
it. 
Q. Why did you select that Company? 
A. Because the agent of that Company advised me to do 
Q. Who was the· agent 1 
A. Ashley Brown was the agent. 
Q. Of the Hartford Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long did you continue with the Hartford Com-
pany? . . 
A. I am pretty sure eighteen or maybe more or twenty 
years possibly. . 
Q. During that eighteen or twenty years, it may be, how 
ma·ny times was the defendant insurance company's agent a 
Mr. Fifield? 
A. This last policy would be fifteen years with him. 
Q. He was the agent of the Hartford people? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say he had been issuing· the policies Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had been paying the premiums Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I now hand you Policy No. C I -437 Hartford Fire In-
surance Company, Hartford, Connecticut, dated 
page 31 ~ the 29th day of July, 1935, which appears to have 
been issued to G. W. Spicer and 'vhich policy I 
will ask the stenog"rapher to mark for identification, "Ex. 
No. 1'' with G. W. Spicer's evideuce, and ask you if that is 
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G. W. Spicer. 
the last policy issued to you from the Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, through its agent, R. A. Fifield! 
A. That was the last policy. 
Q. The policy provides that your building is insured for 
, $2,400 and your household goods for $600, is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Then it proyides for a hen house, a dairy,. a. smoke 
house, a barn and a garage. Were any of those buildmgs de-
stroyed? 
A. No, nothing excepting the house. 
Q . .And the household furniture? 
A. Yes, the household furniture. 
Q. Now, you paid the $31.1~, the first premium due, which 
was all that was due until August 1, 19,36 7 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. And you took a receipt for it, which was $31.12i· 
A. Yes, $31.12. . 
Q. Now, J\1r. Spicer, tell the jury where that policy that I 
am asking you a'bout was issued and what took place at the 
. time of its issuance and who was the representa-
page 32 ~ tive of the Insurance Compan) looking after the 
issuance of that policy? 
A. 1\!Ir. Fifield came to my house, I think it was on the 27th 
of July, 1935, and the policy would be out on the lst of Au-
gust. He said, "You know, your policy is ·about out". I 
said, ''Yes, I was coming over to see you''. He said, ''Mr. 
Spicer, I have come over to see you. I know the policy is 
important. You want to be protected''. He said, "We will 
measure the building''. He stepped off the building, hen 
house, barn, meat house. 
Q. l-Ie did that, himself~ 
A. Yes, and he ·said, "Mr. Spicer, I will take the policy 
h01ne with me and fill, it up". I said, "A)l right". He said, 
"You just sign the note''. He said, ''Who must I znake it 
payable to 1 You 1 I said, ''You make it payable to me and · 
my wife, the same as l\1r. Hudgins. He said, "All right, Mr. 
Spicer; you and me being friends, I will make it right". In 
two or three days it came and I took it to the National Bank 
and put it in my ·box, and I did not know \vhat it \vas until 
after the fire. 
Q. You told him to issue it to you and your wife Y 
A. Yes, because me and my wife were in the joint deed. 
Q. What did you say about Mr. Hudgins Y 
A. I said "the same as Mr. Hudgins'' .. 
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· Q. You mean Mr. Hudgins had issued one to you 
page 33 ~ and your wife1 
A. Yes, years ago. I trusted to Mr. Fifield. 
Q. 'Now, ~fr. Spicer, you say, as I understand, that Mr. 
Fifield had you sign the blank application~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you at that timet 
A. Standing in the yard at home. 
Q. That was, of course, before you l~ad any fire ·z 
A. Yes, that was the 27th of July, 1935. 
Q. All you did \vas to sign that application Y 
A. Yes, that was all. 
Q. Was there anything· in it at that timeY 
A. Not a thing. He said, ''I will take it home and fill it 
out". 
Q. And you don't know now what is in it~ 
A. I do not. -
Q. Were any questions asked you at ~II except what y-ou 
have stated f 
A. No; he said, "I will fix it rig·ht''. No questions what-
ever. I said, "Mr. Fifield, come into the house". He said,. 
''No, it is not necessary. I Imow what is in your house''. 
He said, "I kno\v you cannot furnish a room liln~ that for 
less than $250 or $300' '. He said, '' l know you are fixed 
nicely''. . 
· Q. J\tir. Spicer, what was a fair cost of that 
page 34 ~ house f 
A. I guess when that house was built it cost 
$6,000 or $7,000. 
Q. Frame ·or brick f 
A. Frame. 
Q. Located near and fronting on a macadam road¥ 
A. Sand road; good road. 
Q. Well, now, after the building and your furniture was 
destroyed by fire, what did you dof 
A. I notified J\tlr. Fifield to come over and bring the man, 
the auditor, and he wrote me it \vas not necessary for him 
to come, ·but as soon as this man came he \vould come over, 
and in a few days, I don't know how many, maybe five or 
six days, they came and made adjustment. 
Q. Where does Mr. Fifield live? 
A. Remington, in Fauquier County. 
Q. How far from you f 
A. I guess a bout three n1iles. 
Q. · The man he broug·ht over was whom f 
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A. The auditor. 
Q. What diil. they do when the auditor came? 
A. He took the measurements of the house and everything 
and after he did that, he said, "];Ieet me over at Remington 
at 1 o'clock, where we have a typewriter. I said,'' All right", 
and I went over and he wrote a paper. You hav:e it there. I 
said, "Is that all that is necessary?" He said, 
page 35 r ''That is all. You will have a check in a few days". 
· He said, ''let me give you a good piece of advice. 
Go ahead and build you a house, not over $2,500 or $3,000 
and I will go over''. I took him at his word. I got a con-
tractor and put 10,000 feet of lumber there and that lumber 
laid there and the check did not come and that man had to 
come and move that lumber away and it was damaged con.-
siderably. 
Q. Where do you live now Y . 
A. Well, I hate to say it, but I live in a chicken house, a 
brooder house. I lived in. my garage a while in the su..rnmer 
and it. got cold and I had this brooder house, 101hx16, and I 
am living there. You know how I am cramped. 
Q. Mr. Spicer, has the insurance company ever paid you 
anything on .account of your loss? 
A. Not a thing. They never even said they were· sorry. 
Q. When did you first receive notification that the policy 
was canceled ? 
A. You have the date, have you not? I have not got the 
date. 
Q. Is the paper I now hand you, which I will ask the ste-
. nographer to mark for identification, ''Ex. No. 2" with G-. · 
W. Spicer's evidence, the first notification that you received 
of the cancellation 1 
page 36 r A. That is the date, July 27, 1936. 
Q. You don't remember the date exactly, but the 
date was somewhere about July 27, 19361 
A. Yes; I said that. 
Q. Do you remember ho'v long after that you received itf 
A. No, I could not tell you. 
Q. But it was about that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, at the same time that you received that notifica-
tion of cancellation your premium note for $12±.48 'vas re-
turned to you, was it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That note I will ask the stenographer to mark for iden-
tification, "Ex. No. 3" with G. "\V. Spicer's evidence. The 
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record shows, i'n fact, your policy shows, that $31.12 was paid 
to protect you, that is, your building and pers,onal personal 
property was burned, as you say, on May 29, 1936. Was any 
part of that $31.12 ever returned to you 1 
By 1\tir. Sands: What do you contend, 1\{r. Miller? . 
By ].,fr. J\Hller: I contend that the very fact that they re-
tained that unearned pren1ium is a waiver of your rights of 
that provision of the policy about foreclosure.· 
page 37 ~ By :Nir. Sands: We take issue in law on that and 
will ask the Court to instruct on it. . 
By Mt. ]\filler: 
Q. You say that when the adjuster came, you and he talked 
the matter over and you signed a writing, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You signed two writings on the 3rd of June, did you 
notY 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And the two writings are now handed you, marked ''Ex. 
4" and "Ex. 5", respectively, with G. W. Spicer's evidence, 
and I will ask you if the two papers so marked and now 
handed you are the papers signed by you at the time you men-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That seems to be signed by G. W. Spicer, the Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company and J. R. Lloyd, Adjuster~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I notice in that you placed the valuation of $2,902.46 · 
on the building and $7 40.70 on the personal property, did 
you ag-ree to that? 
A. I agreed to that. 
Q. You thought that was about a fair valuation Y 
A. He, he said that was a half valuation. 
Q. He said what? 
'A. He said that was not a half valuation. When 
pag·e 38 ~ I gave him the list he said, ''Some people put an 
enormous valuation". He said, "I 'vant to con-
gratulate you; you did not put half value. 
By l\{r. ].,filler: Your Honor, all that exhibits that I have 
identified by the witness are introduced in evidence except 
the policy of insurance. 
Q. Did you after the destruction of the property by fire 
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make any effort to find out upon what. grounds payment was 
refused? 
A. I never have found out. 
Q .. Did you try~ 
A. Yes, we tried. 
Q. Through whom? 
A. I tried through you and the Company and they just re-
ferred me to the policy, which they said was clear and spe-
cific. That was all I could get out of the Company. 
By :Nir. ~Iiller: Now, J\IIr. Sands, I don't want to be a wit-
ness, but I want to prove the correspondence ·between the 
Company and myself. 
By J\IIr. Sands: That is perfectly agreeable to me. 
Q. You say no part of the policy has been paid to you. 
The house got burned up and :you never knew on what grounds 
they refused to pay you until you saw these grounds of de-
fense? · 
page 39 ~ 
faction? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You went to see Mr. Fifield a number of times 
to see why it had not been paid and got no satis-
A. That is correct. 
Q. What did he tell you Y 
A. He told me to write to the Company and they referred 
me to the policy, which they said was perfectly clear, and I 
turned the paper over to you. 
Q. Tell the jury now about that proof of loss. You knew 
of the proof of loss and were advised it had to be submitted? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhat was said' 
A. 1\fr. Fifield said it was not necessary. 
Q. That was less than ten days after the fire? 
A. He fixed the papers. I said, "Is anything else neces-
sary!'' He said, "·Nothing at all. You will have a check in 
a few days". 
Q. You put what you have related on that statement to Fi-
field and never issued any further proof of loss, because you 
thoug·ht it was not necessary? 
A. That is right. 
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OROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. You knew about that time-it was about the time of the 
date of the agreement was signed-it 'vas your 
page 40 ~ duty to .file a proof of loss T 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. When did you first learn that¥ . . 
A. 'Vhen I asked Mr. },i:field the question was 1t necessary 
to do anything else. He said, ''No ; you will get a check in 
a few days".· 
Q. That was the only time after the fire, was it, that you 
had a talk with Mr. Fifield Y 
A. No.; I had a talk with him after that. I went to ·see him 
about it; why it had not been paid. He said, ''Spicer, I could · 
not tell you to save my life. I refer you to the Company'.', 
and gave me their address. • 
. Q. When he told you to expect your money in a few days 
was Mr. Lloyd present, the adjuster? 
A. No; he had two rooms; one back here. He followed me 
b.ack here (indicating). He said, "Mr. Spicer, you will get 
your money in a few days''. 
Q. That was the day you met Mr. Lloyd, the a<;Jjuster? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Spicer, do you remember whether Mr. Lloyd or 
Mr. Fifield asked you whether there 'vas any lien on the prop-
erty 'to the Land Bank and if you did not tell them there was 
a $500 lien and that was allY 
A. They never asked me such a question in their 
page 41 ~ life; if they had they would have gotten it. 
Q. But you admit you did not tell them you had 
two liens with the Land Bank? You did not tell them about 
that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. you did not tell them about having· any more insurance 
with Hudgins? · 
A. No ; but I told them I had two insurance policies. 
Q. You told .Mr. Fifield and yon state that on that same 
date Mr. Fifield told you you would get your money in a few 
days? 
A. I told Mr. Mifield? 
Q. Fifield or Lloyd, either one 1 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. When Fifield made that statement, so far as yon knew, 
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neither one knew that you had other insurance on that prop-
erty? 
A. No; I told 1\Ir. Fifield when he issued the insurance to 
make it to me and my wife, a joint policy, the same as Mr. 
Hudgins. 
Q. If that be true, that is the only information of any 
character that you ever carried to ~ifield or any other person 
that you had double insurance Y 
A. No. 
Q. You did not tell them anything of the kind 1 
A. No, and 1 they did not ask me any questions. 
page 42 ~ Q. When they went there to adjust the loss and 
they were asking you about the value of the prop-
erty and were settling with you on the basis of $2,902 and 
$700, respectively, you knew when you collected this amount 
of money, you also expected to ·collect from the Continental 
Company; is that true Y 
A. I did not tell them and they never asked me any ques-
tions. 
Q. But the value you put on this property, you were de-
manding of them the full amount of insurance, of paying 
you what you had lost from that Company alone, were yo:u . 
not? 
A. No; that is not one-third of my loss. · 
Q You said that you agreed that that was· the amount of 
loss and value, and you said this adjuster congratulated you 
and he told you that was not half the value? 
A. I said not half the property He said it was not half, 
but I agreed to take that. He cut the amount and I agreed 
to make it $2,900. 
Q. Did you read the statement' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And signed it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said you expected to collect that amount from the 
Hartford Company? 
page 43 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not tell him you expected to collect 
any amount from anyone else, did you? 
A. No; they asked me no questions. Lots of people have 
three policies, or four policies. 
Q. You did not feel under any obligation to tell them any-
thing about it? . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He told you you would have the money in a few days 7 
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A. Yes. He told other parties I would have it in thirty 
days. 
Q. You don't know whether that was- before or after he 
learned about these other facts in the case' 
A. ·No, sir. 
Q. Is that your handwritingY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You signed that, did you? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You spoke of the diagram he stepped off. Is this the 
diagram? 
A. I guess it is. I don't know whether that is the one he 
made or not. 
Q. Is that the paper he had? 
A. No, he did not make that. He said he would make that 
after he got home. He just put down the meas- · 
page 44 ~ urements on a book. I signed the blank at home 
and he went home and filled it. 
Q. How many times have you signed these applications? 
A. Over eig·hteen or twenty. 
Q. Did he ask you that day, or did you tellnim, answering 
this question, "Is any of your property under mortgage lien; 
· if so, state the amount and when duet" and did you say, "Yes, 
the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, $800, amortization 
plan"? · 
A. He never asked me any que~tions. 
Q. How did you expect Mr. Fifield to know? 
A. He could ask n1e, if he wanted to. 
Q. When he was dealing with you, how would he guess; 
he would not know anything about the Federal Land Bank 
if you did not tell him? 
A. He was a director of the bank there and I always paid 
my premium there. IIe knew I had a mortgage. 
Q. He knew you had a mortgage? 
A~ Of course, he did, if he was a director of the bank there. 
Q. You did not tell him? 
A. No, I did not tell him and he never asked me the ques-
tion. · 
Q. In other words, you did not give him any information 
of the $800 that was a lien on it? 
page 45 ~ A. No, and. he never asked any questions. 
Q. You deny that when Fifield and Lloyd met 
you when they came over there with an jdea of adjusting the 
matter that you told them you only had a $400 loan on it? 
A. I never did; never mentioned it. 
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. ·· Q. You are as positive of that as everything else you have 
said here t<>day Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did not sign anything on this paper at all7 
A. I signed the paper and they filled it out at home; I 
have never seen it until I saw it just now. 
Q. You never saw the companion of this paper, did you;· 
in other words, this information on here, you never saw the 
value of $2,400 on any of these statements Y 
A. I never looked at the policy. It was sealed up when it 
was sent to me and I came and put it in my box in the bank 
and I never looked at that policy until after the fire oc-
curred. 
Q. You state to these gentlemen that you did not tell Fi-
field either, when you applied for this insurance and when 
you had the conversation with Lloyd Y 
A. I never told him I owed anything and he never asked 
me. 
Q. It was not mentioned? 
page 46 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. .1\nd you signed this in b~ank? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many of these did you sign 7 
A. I could not tell you. 
. Q. You signed for ten or fifteen years, did you not, on this 
farm policy? 
A. For five years at a time. 
Q. He had been getting· you to sign on these policies for 
flfteen vears at least? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q: Ho'v many years previous at intervals of :five years had 
you been signing· these papers just that way? 
A. I could not tell you. 
Q. At least three of them 7 
A. I could not tell you. 
Q. Did you ever read this provision: "The foregoing is 
my o'vn agreement and statement, and is a correct descrip-
tion of tl1e property on which indemnity is asked, and I here-
by ag-ree that insurance shall be predicated on such state-
ment, agreement, and description, if this Application is 
approved, and that the foregoing shall be deemed and taken 
to be promissory warranties running during entire life of · 
said policy." You mean to say you never read 
page 4·7 ~ that at any time in the preceding year? 
A. No, I just trusted to Mr. Fifield to be ·right. 
60 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
G. JV. Spicer. 
Q. You 'vere raised iu Fauquier Countyol · 
A. Been in Culpeper twenty-six years; born in Culpeper. 
Q. You signed these from your personal confidence in Mr. 
Fi:field~s integrity T 
A. I signed those in blank. 
Q. You n1ean you have never read the insurance policy 
through at any time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You say when Fifield and Lloyd were there you did not 
tell them about the existence of the farm loan, whether $500 
or $800? 
A. I never n1entioned it. The only said, I just said, ''Make 
this policy a joint policy to me and my wife, like 1fr. Hudg-
ins "Y 
Q. Did you tell him about that $500 before when you got 
the policy in the same way? 
A. I left it to him every time. 
_ Q. Did you -tell him on the preceding occasion, :five years 
before that, ''I 'vant this to run for me and my wife, just 
like Hudgins T 
A. Always did that. 
Q. Just like Mr. I-Iudgins had, is that rightY 
A. Yes, a joint policy for me and my wife. 
Q. You say on that specific occasion that is the 
page 48 ~ only notice that was given? , 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you not turn back and try to refresh your mem-
ory a little better--did you have a discussion with Mr. Fifield 
as to whether or not the -value of that property was $3,500 
and whether you could get $2,400 on itT 
A. No, sir, ·nothing of the kind. 
Q. Don't you recollect that did come up and when you in-
sisted that he would allow this that you told him you would 
paint in August, 1935 T Did you not tell him that on that day 
after you had had a discussion there? 
A. I never had any discussion. 
Q. Do you deny that you told him you would paint the house 
in August? 
A. Nothing at all. 
Q. But you do say you told hin1 "like Hudgins'', you 
\vanted it for your wife and yourself? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You did not tell him Y 
A. No. 
Q. This discussion came up about the house f 
G. W. Spicer v. Hartford Fire Ins. ·Oo. 61 
G.' W. Spicer. 
A. No, really he put more on the house than 1 wanted him 
to. 
Q. Let me as}r you this. You had a provision in your policy 
in respect to the subject of foreclosure of the 
pag·e 49 ~ mortgage, in reference to the mortgage provision 
which reads as follows : ''This entire policy shall 
be void, unless otherwise provided by agreement in writing 
added hereto, (a) if the interest of the insured be other than 
sole and unconditional ownership.'' You say you told him 
your wife did have an interest in the property 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say you told Fifield that Y 
A. Yes; he knew it; knew it before. Just an oversight he 
did not put it in. I left it to him. 
Q: You signed it in blank because you had confidence in 
his integrity Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The policy further reads : '' (c) if, with the knowledge 
of the insured, foreclosure proceedings be commenced or no-
tice given of sale of any property insured hereunder by rea-
son of any mortgage or deed of trust.'' Did you get notice 
that the Land Bank, after postponing for two years or mQre 
on this deed of trust, were going to sell you out? Did you 
have notice a few days before the fire of a foreclosure pro-
ceeding? 
Bv Mr. Miller: I object to that. You make him your own 
witness. 
By J.\tir. Sands: I will change the question. 
Q. Did you at any time have a.n action brought 
page 50} against you, a few days before the fire? 
A. No; I was notified on the 17th day of July 
to appeal' here at court and I was here in regard to my loan, 
and I had the money in my pocket to pay it. 
Q. When was that? 
A. About the 171th c;f June. 
By the Court: You said just now, J'uly . 
.A. I mean July. 
By Mr. 1\Hller: I object to that. You are making him 
your own witness. 
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By Mr. Sands: I take that responsibility, if that be true. 
I deny the responsibility, but I take it. 
Q. vVhat day did the fire occur? 
A. On the 29th of l\!Ia:y. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Ed. Payne, the deputy sheriff! 
A. Yes, I know him. 
Q. Did he not come over here and bring you a paper and 
serve that paper on you on the 26th day of ~fay, before the 
fire Y 
By Mr. Miller: I object to that, your Honor. 
By the Court: Objection overruled. 
:Sy Mr. Miller: First, I 'vant to put my grounds in. 
By the Court: Yes, because I don't think that 
page 51 ~ can be, if I know ·what you are leading up to. I 
overrule the objection and you can put in your 
objection when the jury retires for lunch. 
By Mr. Miller: I would rather put it in no,v. 
By the Court: All right, the jury will retire. 
Jury out. 
By ](Ir. Miller: If your Honor please, I object. This 
is a subpoena in chancery that tells him to come before the 
court on the first 1\rfonday in June. It says: "To appear 
at the Clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the County of 
Culpeper at the rules to be heard in said court on the first 
Monday in June, 1936, to answer a bill in chancery exhibited 
against them in our said court by the Federal Land Bank 
of Baltimore, a corporation, and ha.ve then there this. writ." 
And it is signed by the Clerk. There is a sheriff's return 
thcrc•on showing it was served three days before the destruc. 
tion of the property by fire. I say all the notice he had be-
fore the fire was this. He did not know what that was. It 
just told him to comP. hP.re. I do not consider that was notice 
to him. 
By the Court: I understand that that notice on its face 
does not show whether the Federal Land Bank was 
page 52 ~ suing him for some other matter, or on a fore-
closure proceeding on a. lien that was admitted 
by him to be held by them against him at that time; but in 
view of the transaction had between him and the Federal 
Land Bank, 'vhich is the only transaction between them so 
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far us the P.vidence shows, I rule that that is an ·admissible 
question as to whethe1· or not that was notice of foreclosure 
by them. I simply rule now that it is admissible as evi-
dence. The effect of it would be for the jury to pass on. 
By J\tir. Miller: I don't object to tha.t, but we object to. 
it on the ground of insufficiency, because Mr. Spicer could 
not tell what it '\Vas for from that paper. 
Jury in. 
By Mr. Sands : 
Q. J\tir. Spicer, did you have any suit brought against you 
a few days before the fire? 
A. No, I did not know anything about it. 
Q. Will you state whether or not Mr. Ed. Payne, on the 
26th day of May, 1936, served a copy of this paper on you, 
which reads: 
''Commonwealth of Virginia. 
To the Sheriff of the County of Culpeper-Greeting: 
We command you tha.t you summon George W. Spicer 
. and Mildred Spicer, his wife, to appear at the 
-page 53 } clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Culpeper at the rules to be held in said court 
on the first ~Ionday in June, 1936, to answer a bill in chan-
cery exhibited against them in our said court by the Federal 
Land Bank of Baltimore, a corporation, and have them there 
this writ. 
Witness: C. T. Guinn, Clerk of our said court at the court-
house the 25th day of JVIay, 1936, and in the 160th year of 
the Commonwealth. 
(Sig"Iled) C. T. GUINN, Clerk.,. 
Did you receive that paper? 
A. I did. 
Q. You received this notice. Were you here on the day 
named in the notice? 
A. When they notified me to be here I was here. 
Q. So, you admit you got this paper on the 26th day of 
:h£ay, a few days before the fire 7 
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A. I don.'t know what day it was. 
By the Court : 
Q. Was it before or after the fire you got this notice 1 
A. It must have been before. 
Q. That is the correct date, is it' 
A. I don't know; but I know I was up here when I was 
summon~d here. 
By Mr. Sands: · 
Q. What did you do with that notice, the copy that you 
had? 
A. I have no idea where it is. 
Q. What did you think that notice meant f 
page 54 f A. It meant for me to appear here in court. 
Q. Did you know it was a suit Y 
· A. No, I did not. 
Q. Do you mean to say, 'vith your intelligence, you did not 
know it was to answer a suit Y 
A. No. 
Q. Did yon go to a lawyerf 
A. No. 
Q. But you were here on that date? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you knew the Land Bank was suing you, did yon· 
not? 
A. No, I did ;not. 
Q. Did not Mr. Spears, representing the Insurance Com-
pany, come to see you about this and did you not deny you 
knew anything about the Land Bank, hut say you thought 
you had a suit by some bank here in C~p.eper on something 
else? · 
A. No. 
Q. Do you deny that you got notice from the Federal Land 
Bank that they were going· to foreclose? 
A. No. I had until the 16th day of August; that was the 
day for me to pay them. . 
Q. They had given you until the 16th day of August' 
A. Yes, they said pay it any time you want; you have until 
the 16th day of August. 
page 55 ~ Q. Do yon deny that two years before they had 
' threatened you with foreclosure Y 
A. I did not know anything about it. 
Q. And they brought this snit against you when you had 
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this agreement with them that you had until the 16th day of 
August? 
A. I lrnew nothing about it. 
Q. You admit you got this summons, but did not know what 
it was about Y 
A. I came here, but could not find the Commonwealth. I 
did ask the Clerk. He said he did not know. 
Q. So, the date you received this, on the 26th day of May, 
1936, you did not know anything about this Y 
A. Other than it said to appear here. 
Q. The first day of June Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you got notice from the Clerk that you had been 
sued by the Federal Land Bank what did you do Y 
A. I did not know it was a suit. I owefl them $600 and I 
had the money to pay it. 
Q. What day? 
A. The day I was here. 
Q. You did not know it was past due, but you were trying 
to borrow money from your friends to pay it Y 
A. I went to one and he said he did not have it, and I went 
to another and got it. 
page 56 r Q. Within hvo weeks before the fire was not the 
Bank pressing you so hard that you went to Mr. 
Haught and tried to borro'v $600 to pa.y your interest Y 
A. Yes; he said ''I would not mind lending it to you to 
pay the whole thing· if I had it, and I am getting too old to 
borrow''; but I got the tnoney from another friend. 
Q. When did you borrow that money and from whom did 
you borrow it previous to the :fire f 
A.. That is my business from whom I borrowed it. I bor-
rowed it from my friend. 
Q. You mean you could have gotten the money to have paid 
off the whole thing? 
A. $2,000, if I wanted it. 
Q. When the paper was served on you, did you have the 
money then? 
A. No, I had it a few days afterwards. 
Q. Did or did not you have that money at the time of the 
fire? . 
A. Yes, in my pocket. 
Q. •Whom did you borrow it from? 
A. That is my business, my friend. 
Q. vVas it Mr. HaughtY 
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By Mr. Miller: I object. I don't think he can be made to 
go into his private affairs. 
page 57 } By the Court: I think he is entitled to say from 
whom he got it; whether he got it from the bank . 
or where. 
A. I got it from a friend. He said, "If you want $2,000 
you can get it. 
Q. So, you tell the jury, on the 29th day of May you had 
in your possession $1,000 Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. From whom Y 
A. A friend. 
By the Court: You must tell who it was. 
A. George E. Douglass, of Elkton. 
Q. Had you actually gotten $1,000 from Douglass and did 
you have it at the time of the fire, or not? 
A. I got it. 
Q. Did you have it between the 26th and 29th of May? 
A. I got it. 
Q. Did you have it on the day of the fire Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ·have it in your possession oil the 26th or 29th 
of May? 
A. I did. 
Q. Douglass had given it to you previous to thatY 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you borrow it from him Y 
A. I borrowed it a week or two before. He said, 
page 58 ~ ''If you can get it anywhere else do so; if you can't 
get it I will let you have it". 
Q. When did you get the $1,000 Y 
A. A few days before the fire. 
Q. How long did you have to pay? 
A. Until the 16th day of August. 
Q. You say you got that money from Douglass and you had 
this money? 
A. I got that money and have it now, and have more than 
·that if you want it. 
Q. The purpose of borrowing that was to pay the interest 
, which was due in August? 
A. The 16th day of August. 
Q. You said you went to Haught to try to borrow it? 
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A. I spoke to ~fr. Douglass before that. He said, • 'I am a 
little tight; if you c~ get it elsewhere do so, but if ypu cannot 
come to me". 
Q. When did you go back Y · 
A. I did not go back to Mr. Haught. 
Q. When did you go back to Mr. Douglass! 
A. He is my neighbor. 
Q. Did you have that on the 26th of May! 
By the Court: I think he has covered that. 
page 59 ~ By the Court: . · 
Q. Mr. Spicer, in reference to the notice that was 
served on you by Mr. Payne, I understand you to say that was 
served on you on that day and you came up on the first day 
of June to answer it; but, as I understand you to say, you 
did not know it was a foreclosure proceeding? 
A. I did not know what it was. 
Q. You did not know it was a foreclosure proceeding! 
A.. I certainly did not. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. I also understood you to say you had not received any 
notification from the Land Bank that there would -be a fore_; 
closure1 
A. No, sir, I had not. 
Q. And that you had until the 16th of August to pay the 
interest? 
A. Yes, until before the 16th of August. 
Note: At this point the hearing was adjourned for lunch 
until 2 o'clock P. 1\L 
Note: The hearing was resumed at .2 o'clock P. M. 
By Witness: Mr. Sands, one thing I said I want to make 
a correction in, the money I was speaking of as in my pocket 
it was there at the time, but it is in the bank now when I 
need it. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. You mean the money now is in the hankY 
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A. Yes, when I need it; but not in my pocket 
page 60 ~ now. 
Q. What I was asking you about was the time of 
the fire, from the 26th to the 29th of May, 1936, at that time 
you had it in your pocket! 
A. Yes, it was in my pocket. 
Q. You borrowed that from Mr. Douglass! 
A. Yes, in the bank now. 
Q. Did you state before the jury that you had borrowed it 
from Douglass and you had it in your pocket at the time of 
the fire? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. It was in your pocket at the time of the fire¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You understand thatY 
A. Yes, sir, I understand it. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Mr. Spicer, in respect to this fire, what time of the night 
did it occurf 
A. I could not tell you; I left home a few minutes to 8 
o'clock. 
Q. What time did you get back f 
A. I did not look, but somewhere near 10 o'clock and the 
house was gone. 
Q. Whom did you leave at the house Y 
A. Not a soul. 
page 61 ~ Q. You left how long after 8 Y 
A. About five minutes to 8. I think around 5 
minutes to 8. I was in a hurry to get to tl1e store and get 
back early. I reckon it was 10 o'clock or 10 :30 when I got 
back. I was right much worried. 
Q. You ha.d the $1,000 with you when you went to the store 
and had it with you wben you came back from the storeY' 
A. Yes, and it is in the bank now. 
Q. How did you secure l\ir. Douglass for that moneyf 
A. I was going to give him the mortgage. He was going 
to take the whole loan. 
Q. You never gave him a mortgage for itf 
A. No, I was going to do it. 
Q. You have not done it todayf 
A. No, when I settled with the Land Bank I 'vould give 
him the loan. 
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By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Did Mr. Douglass turn that money over to you in cash, 
or how? -
A. He gave me a check for it, and I turned it back. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Do you mean you had Mr. Douglass' check for $1,000 
or the money Y 
A. The same thing as money. 
page 62 r By Mr. Miller: 
Q. You never got the check cashed Y 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. You never .had the money then? 
A. The same thing as money. · 
Q. You turned it back and put it in hankY 
A. I turned it back and he put it in bank himself. When 
I need it I get it. 
Q. Is it to your bank account or his 7 
A. It is in his. When I get straight here I will settle up 
with the Federal Land Bank. 
Q. What was this, before dinner you said you had $1,000 
in your pocket in money Y 
A. I had it in a check. I will take his check anytime. 
Q. You borrowed some money in July, recorded here Spicer 
to Robert Button, trustee. Did Douglass let you have that 
moMy7 · 
A. Sure. 
Q. He took a deed of trust? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you not give him a deed of trust on personal prop-
erty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. How much was that 7 
page 63 ~ A. $229. 
Q. Have you paid that 7 
A. I have paid part of it. 
Q. How much have you paid Y 
A. I have paid some of it; I said part of it. 
Q. What do you call partY 
A. I don't know that it is particular for me to say, but 
'.. I have paid part of it. · 
Q. Have you paid $50 on it? 
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A. No, because it is not due. 
Q. When did you turn back that check for $1,000 to him? 
A. A few days after the fire. 
Q. Then when. you went to get the $229 you had to give a 
deed of trustY 
A. That some months afterwards. I needed a little money 
and gave him a deed of trust and will pa:y it back when it is 
due; will pay it back before it is due. 
Q. And yet, you say you borrowed that money and got the 
check and you1; loan was not due to the Federal Land Bank 
until August. You 'vent and got a check for the man and 
after the fire carried it and gave it back to him Y 
A. I did not need it at the time. I offered it to them and 
they would not take it. 
Q. Whom did you offer that toY 
A. To the Federal Land Bank. 
page 64 r Q. Who said that? 
A. Mr. Bickers said he would not accept it; said 
they could not accept ::).nything until the thing was settled. 
Q. You tell the gentlemen of the jury you went to Mr. 
Bickers and told him you had the money to settle the loan 
with and he would not accept it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you offer it to him f 
A. I offered it to him and he would not take it; said he 
could not do it. 
Q. You offered it to him and he declined Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was lVIr. Bickers Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which Mr. Bickers? 
A. Mr. Travis Bickers. 
Q. How long was that after the fire? 
A. I could not tell you. 
Q. \\Thy can't you; don't you remember? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Q. Was that before you came in ans"rer to the summons you 
have been talking about? 
A. I went to 1\{r. Roger Bickers. 
Q. When was it you offered Mr. Travis Bickers $1,000 and 
· he would not take it? 
page 65 r A. I reckon a few days after the fire, or a few 
days before the fire. I offered it to him and he said 
he could not take it. 
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Q. You offered him Mr. Douglass' check and he would not 
take it, and that was.some time after the fire? 
A. I think so. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 66 ~ RALEIGH T. GREEN, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller : 
Q. You are Mr. Raleigh T. Green, are you not! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Editor of the Culpeper Exponent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been engaged in the printing busi-
ness? 
A. Forty years this summer. 
Q. What part of the printing business were you engaged 
in before you became editor of the Exponent? 
A. I was a typesetter and did everything around a country 
newspaper and job printing office. 
Q. Are you suffieiently familiar with the size of type to 
tell the jury what size of type is that appears in print Y 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. What do you mean by linotype Y 
A. I linotype is a machine that sets type instead of setting 
by hand. I think linotype went into practical use about 1890. 
It has been used in Culpeper since about 1914. Prior to 
that time all type ever set in Culpeper was set by 
page 67 } hand. · · 
Q. Don't you mean by linotype line of type Y 
A. Linotype means set in one piece. 
Q. I no'v hand you an insurance policy issued by the Hart-
ford Fire Insurance Company No. CI 437, and identified as 
"Exhibit No. 1" by the stenographer with Mr. George W. 
Spicer's evidence, and I will ask you to look at the words 
opposite the X mark, letter (a), reading as follows: "while 
the insured shall have any other contract of insurance, whether 
valid or not, in whole or in part by this policy; or (b) while 
the hazard is increased by any means within the control or 
knowledge of the insured' 1 and all the letters on that page 
down to and including "Company", and ask you if that type 
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is less than 8-point in size, or brevier type. I mean (before 
you answer the question) as it appears. in print and not at 
the base of the typeY 
A.· I am positive that is smaller than 8-point. 
By the Court: 
Q. Is brevier 8-point Y 
A. Yes. There is another type called minion. That is 
7 -point; just the thickneS's of that paper smaller than 8-point. 
Q. That includes the provision ''This policy shall 
·page 68 ~ be cancelled at any time at the request of the in- · 
sured'', &c. Y 
A. Yes. The headlines are large~ than 8-point. 
By the Court : 
Q. Mr. Green, so the jury and I may see it later, will you 
take a pencil and draw a mark to show what you include! 
A. The whole thing except the headlines. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands : 
Q. Mr. Green, what type do you say the body of this is in! 
A. I am familiar with 5-point, 6-point, 7 -point, 8-point, 9-
point, 10-point, 11-point and 12-point. I would say that is 
7-point type, what we use to call minion. 
Q. Look at the Code of Virginia, Sec. 4227, the print, what 
is that? · 
By Mr. Miller: What is that you have given the witness, 
Mr. Sandsf 
By Mr. Sands : A publication gotten out by the insurance 
companies. 
By. the Court: An excerpt from the Code as applied to 
insurance? 
By Mr. Sands : Yes, sir. 
A. That looks more like 8-point than the policy. 
Q. You think that is larger? 
· A. Yes. 
page 69 ~ Q. What would you call that Y 
A. I would call that brevier, or 8-point. 
Q. What is this? 
A. Minion, or 7 -point. This is 6-point, or nonpareil. 
G. W. Spicer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 73 
Raleigh T. Green. 
Q. This type in the Code, what do you call that-take the 
same section Y 
A. The same as that. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. The same as 'vhat Y 
A. Tha.t is the same as the insurance pamphlet print. To 
my eye this Code print looks slightly larger than the type 
in the policy, but I am not prepared to say it is. The capital 
letters look like they are a little larger, but the lower case 
letters don't appear to be. 
Q. Don't you keep in your .stock illustrations of your various 
types; have you any rule in your office of your types Y 
A. It could be subject to measurement. I have been using 
the linotype since 1914. You can't tell anything about the 
size of type to a point on a linotype. Hand set type is 
different. 
Q. Is this hand type or is this linotype Y 
A. It depends on when that was printed. I can't tell whether 
hand set or linotype. There is nothing here that 
page 70 ~ I could express an opinion whether hand set or 
linotype. • 
Q. It is your opinion, judging by your eye, that that is 
smaller than 'vhat you found here (referring to pamphlet, 
Sec. 4227) Y 
A. I am doubtful about that. I think that is about the same 
type. This is slightly larger. That is, the insurance pamphlet 
is slightly larger than that condition in the policy. The dif-
ference between 7-point and 8-point is about the thickness 
of that paper. 
Q. When was the last time you saw any 7-point type? 
A. I never had any 7 -point type in my office. I have had 
8-point and 6-point type, but the note the.re, there is no ques-
tion about that being 6-point. 
Q. But you have never had, in the forty years you have 
been here, any 7-point type Y 
A. No, because we call that a bastard size. 
By the Court : 
Q. As I understand you, the larger the point the larger the 
type; in other words, -7 -point type is larger than 6-point and 
so onY 
A. Yes. 
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By Mr. Sands: · 
Q. But, I am asking you this, when you say this is 7 -point 
type, and you admit you never had any 7-point, or 
page 71 ~ bastard type, as you call it, in your office, what 
do you base that statement on, or by what process 
of elimination do you state that to be true? 
A. I have used a lot of 8-point type in my experience, read 
proof on it, set it up a~d made it up and have used a lot of 
6-point, or nonpareil. 
Q. In other words, you don't know whether this is 7 -point, 
but you assume this from your recollection of what 8-point 
is and what 6-point is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have no yardstick, but is there not a scale that they 
use to measure those things 7 
A. I have one in my office. I don't know whether 8-point 
on it or not. 
By the Court : 
Q. You are satisfied that type is less than 8-point? 
A. I am positive it is . 
• 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. 1tiiller: 
Q. 8-point and brevier mean exactly the same? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What you mean to say is that the type you have referred 
to is not at as la.rge as 8-point or brevier? 
page 72 ~ A. Yes, not as large as 8-point or brevier. 
By the Court: Mr. Green's testimony is directed to the 
conditions and rest~·ictions in the policy sued on, as found on 
page 2 thereof. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 73 ~ J. B. LAVINDER, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. What is your name? 
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A. J. B. Lavinder. 
Q. What is your profession 7 
A. Minister. 
Q. Where are you located Y 
A. -Brandy, Culpeper Circuit. 
Q. What denomination 7 
A. Methodist. 
Q. How long have you lived at BrandyY 
A. Five years and five months. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. G. W. SpicerY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him Y _ 
A. Ever since _I have been here, five years and five months. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the general reputation of G. W. 
Spicer in the community in which he liv~s for truth and 
veracity and honesty! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What it is 1 
page 7 4 ~ A. Good. 
Q. Why do you say that 1 
A. Because I never heard anything to the contrary! 
Q. Would you believe him on oath in any matter in which 
he is interested? -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you visited in his homeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And know him well Y 
A. Yes, I have visited him at least three times a month evet 
since I have been here. 
Q. Have you visited him since his building was destroyed 
by· :fire? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever had any eonversation with the Agent of 
the Company,. Mr. Fifield, about the fire Y 
A. Just once. 
Q. What was that conversation? 
A. He was talking with Mr. Newman, the agent at the depot 
about the fire, and I asked him a question, how long it would 
be before Mr. Spicer would get his money and he said about 
thirty days. 
Q. That was how long after the :fire Y 
A. That was only a few days. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
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page 75 r RALEIGH T. GREEN, 
being recalled by Counsel for Defendant, testified 
as follows: 
By Mr. Sands: · 
Q. I asked you whether you had any rule which would go 
in the ordinary printing showing these different sizes of type t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you any of those Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you compared it with that? 
A. No, I have compared it with 8-point or brevier type, but 
I used that some years ago. . 
Q. Will yon please bring that over here, or send it over here, 
for my use at the proper time? 
A. Yes, but in that catalogue you 'vill find they call 8-point 
four or five different sizes. 
Q. Let us have the catalogue Y 
A. All right. 
By Mr. Miller: 
· Q. Mr. Green, I want yon to explain fully to the jury about 
that type at the base and on the surface. Explain that more 
fully' 
A. My linotype machine-we call a linotype a slug, on which 
the letter appears. On an 8-point slug I ca.n put 
page 76 ~ a 10-point face or a 6-point face. 
Q. The face is what appears in print? 
A. Yes, a linotype catalogue will show under the heading 
"8-point" type half again as small as 8-point, or half again" 
as large as that. 
Q. Yon tell the jury again that the type as it appears on 
that policy is less than 8-point Y 
A. Yes, less than 8-point. • 
(The witness stood aside.) 
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page 77 ~ MRS. MILDRED F. SPICER, 
a w.itness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff; 
being first duly sworn, testified ·as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By M:r. Miller : 
Q. Give the jury the benefit of your name? 
A. Mildred F. Spicer. 
Q. You are the wife of George W. Spicer, the plaint~ff in 
this case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember a visit by ~Ir. R. A. Fifield, agent for 
the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, to your home at the 
time or before the policy was issued T 
A. Yes, I remember his being in the yard, walking around, 
talking to Mr. Spicer; but I never heard what was said. I 
know he carried the paper-home with him and it came back. 
Q. You mean he carried t-he application home with him Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was returned by mail Y . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know anything about his filling out the appli-
cation Y · 
A. No, I do not. 
page 78 r Q. A notice is in evidence here, which was served 
on you and Mr. Spicer, about a sui't. Do you know 
anything about a notice served on you on the 26th of }.!lay, 
just before the building was burned downY 
A. No, I know it meant for us to come here, but for what 
purpose I don't know. 
Q. You don't know how, do you Y 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Mrs. Spicer, you were not at home at the time of the 
fire, were you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You all left home at what time that evening? 
A. I could not say positively, but somewhere between 7 and 
8 o'clock. 
Q. Whom did you leave at home? 
78 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Mrs. Mildred F. Spicer. 
A. No one. 
Q. What time did you get back? 
A. I could not say; between 9 and 10, I suppose; I could 
not say positively, because I don't Imow. 
Q. Do you know whether ~Ir. Spicer borrowed any money 
from Mr. Douglass during the spring or summer of 1936, 
either before or after the fire 1 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. When? 
page 79 r A. I could not tell you exactly when it was; but 
I remember his borrowing it from him. 
Q. Did you sign a deed in connection with that at the time 
you borro,ved that money? 
A. Yes, it was a deed-I don't know what you call it, but 
I Higned a paper when he borrowed it. 
Q. Did you ever know of his borrowing any other money 
except that 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Only one instance and you signed a paper for that? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Mr. Spicer did not tell you he borrowed any other money 
from him except that, did heY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When the policy came back did it come in mail to you T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From Atlanta~ 
A. I suppose it came from Mr. Fifield; I know it was turned 
over to 1\{r. Spicer and I did not have anything to do with it. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. 1\{r. Spicer did not tell you all his business at all times, 
did he? 
page 80 r A. No, I left it to him to attend to those things. 
Q. I want you to tell the jury the best you can 
from your recollection what was in that house in the way of 
furniture and personal belongings at the time of the destruc-
tion by fire? 
A. I could hardly tell you. There were three bedrooms fur-
nished, linen, wash stands, be~ding, bed clothing of all kinds. 
Then we had a parlor that was furnished, piano, chairs, &c., 
rugs and pictures and books of different kinds, bookcase. Then 
we had our dining-room furnished out and out with the gen-
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eral run of things ·for dining-room; sideboard, rug, pictures 
and little tables, side tables, and I cannot think of everything 
we did have. . 
Q. Your home 'vas nicely furnished 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All of that furni~ure you mentioned was destroyed by 
:fire the 29th of May, 1936? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. That was the property that was insured Y . 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Sands : 
Q. Mrs. Spicer, I want to ask you as to whether or not you 
recall making a statement as to this property here-
page 81 r is that your signature? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did that paper and those figures correctly state, in your 
judgment the list and value of the property which was cov-
ered by insurance which was on that property at the time it 
was destroyed by fire? 
A. That is the list I n1ade off, myself. 
Q. The total valuation that you and Mr. Spicer put on it 
was $591 as its value at that time 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
By J\rir. Sands: I offer that paper as "Defendant's Exhibit 
No.1". 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 82 } OTIS l{EMPER, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Ml'. 1\Hller: 
Q. How old are you 1 
A. I was sixty-five the 22nd of February. 
Q. What business are you engaged in? 
A. I work at the carpenter's trade. 
Q. Where do you live? 
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A. Elkwood, "(V a. 
, Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. G. W. SpicerY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you been to his house! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you acquainted with his building thereY 
A. Yes, been there many times. 
Q. Were you well eno"Ugh acquainted to tell the jury what 
its general value was? 
A. I did not observe everything, just visiting there. It 
was a good, big, old-time house. 
Q. What do you think1 
A. I think that house today could be rebuilt for $3,500 to 
$3,800. 
Q. In the condition it was at the time it was destroyed Y 
A. Well, it was not suffering for anything at the 
page 83 ~ time it was burned; only needed painting; the in-
terior was in good s~ape. 
Q. You have been to the house frequently, hav:e you nott 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. I will ask you this, are you acquainted with the general 
reputation of Mr. George W. Spicer in the community in 
which he lives for truth and veracity and honesty~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is itY 
A. Good. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
By Mr. Miller: For the plaintiff, we rest. 
By Mr. Sands: If your Honor please, before we go into 
the defendant's evidence, I would like to interpose a motion. 
B~ the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you may retire to 
the Jury room. 
Jury out. 
By Mr. Sands: May it please the court, on behalf of the 
defendant, we desire to move that the evidence· as introduced 
on behalf of the plaintiff be struck from the record, upon 
the following grounds, seriatim, set out in the 
page 84 ~ gTonnds of defense. 
By 1\fr. 1\Hller: 1\Ir. Sands, one thing I want to 
do, I want to formally introduce the policy of insurance. 
By Mr. Sands: All right. 
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The policy of insurance is formally introduced. 
By }fr. Sands: If your Honor please, I know the general 
policy adopted ·by your Honor and generally followed is not 
to entertain a motion of this kind at, this stage, but I really 
would ask your Honor's serious consideration, because I 
frankly believe that if it can be sound in law it will serve 
every good purpose for it to be granted. The insurance con-
tract in Virginia is practically as well understood as in any 
State in the Union, and practically every question has been 
up before the courts, and these grounds of defense go to the 
vital points, and if it be true t4at they are sustained, I sub-
mit there is no use in going· any further in this case. 
By the Court: The motion is overruled; to 'vhich ruling 
Counsel for Defendant excepts. 
page 85 ~ E.VIDENCE FOR DEFENDANT. 
GEORGE E. DOUGLASS, 
a witness introduced on ·behalf of the Defendant, being first 
duly sworn, t~sti:fied as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~fiNATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Please state your name? 
.A. George E. Douglass. 
Q. Where do you live, J\IIr. Douglass? 
A. I live at Elkwood. 
Q. Are you a friend of Mr. Spicer here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have known him for some years 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ~{r. Spicer stated in the trial of this case today that in 
the latter part of }\~fay, behveen the 26th and 29th, that he 
had in possession a check of yours for $1,000. That you is-
sued him a check for $1,000, is that true 1 
. A. iN o1 sir: J. promised him he could get a check, but I never Issued hrm a check for $1,000. 
Q. Do you recall that you did lend him a cer-
page. 86 ~ tain sum of money and secured it on personal prop-
erty? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that? 
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A. Around about $250. I have forgotten just the amount.-
Q. That was secured_ on what? 
A. That was secured on personal property. 
Q. And when you loaned him that you took a deed of trust 
from him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EX.A.:MINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: · . 
Q. Mr. Douglass, did you agree to lend him $1,000? 
A. I did under certain conditions. 
Q. Did you not issue him a check and he afterwards re-
turned the check to you? 
A.· No ; I told him I \vould lend him $1,000 under certain 
conditions. 
Q. If he would say you gave him a check_ and he gave it 
back to you, would you contradict his statement? 
A.. My dear sir, I think I would have to. I did not give him 
the check. I told him I would let him have a check. I did 
not write a check. 
Q. Are you certain of that; or is that just your recollec-
tion? 
A. That is my recollection. Of course, nothing 
pag·e 87 ~ is certain that far back. · 
Q. Will you look at your checks and see if you 
did? 
A. I will be glad to do so when I get back home. The bank 
here would know. 
Q. He don't claim that the check was ever paid, but that 
you gave him a check and he gave it back to you? 
A. I promised to give it to him. 
By the Court: 
Q. Do you keep stubs of your checks that you issue? 
A. Not always. 
By ~ir. Miller: 
Q. He don't claim ·that he cashed your check.· You say you 
agreed to give him a check? 
A. Yes, but if I gave him a check I don't recollect it· I 
have no recollection of writing him a check; but I do ~e­
member promising him a check and it is in bank now for 
him. 
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Q. You don't recollect whether it is possible that that did 
happen? 
A. I don't recollect it. I remember ·promising him the 
money. I had let 1\ir. Spicer have various small sums of 
money up to that time. 
By the Court: 
. Q. Did you ever write him a check for as much as $1,000 
that you did not keep the stub T · 
page 88 } A. I don't think so. It seems to me $1,000 would 
have made such an impression on me that I would 
remember it. · 
Q. Do you keep your checks dated as far back as a year 
.ago? 
A. Yes, I think possibly I have my checks at my place,. but 
I am not certain I could produce them. · 
Q. It may be that you could refer to your cheeks of a year 
or so ago and see if you have it? 
A. I might have misplaced them. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMI'NATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. You a1:e morally certain that you did not issue him a 
check1 
A. I w·ould not say morally. I would not swear I did not 
issue it, but at the same time I have no recollection of it, and 
I will say that I think I ·would recollect it. I know I promise4 
him the money and the money is still in bank. 
Q. When you go back 'viii you look in your check book and 
if you find a check was issued for that amount will you 'phone 
over here to the sheriff? 
A. If I can find it I will be glad to do it. 
Q. What were the conditions on which you told him you 
would loan him the money Y · · 
.l\ .. He told me that he wanted the money; that 
page 89 ~ he needed the money. 
Q. For what purpose, did he say? 
A. I think for some money he owed. 
Q. To whom? 
A. I think possibly the Land Bank. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. But you don't know that? 
A. No, sir. 
84 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Fred Hudgins~ 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Would you have issued a check for $1,000 without get-
ting your deed of trust or note to handY 
By Mr. :Miller: We object to the form of the question and 
the substance. 
By the Court: The fonn was objectionable. 
Q. What were the conditions when you said yon would loan 
him a thousand dollars f 
A. I told him I would have to have a deed of trust. I re-
member that distinctly. 
Q. Did you go into 'vhat you wanted the deed of trust on Y 
A. On property. 
Q. Did you go into it any further as to the conditions of 
the dealT 
A. No, I told him it would haye to be a first mortgage. 
page 90 t RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Douglass, don't you remember that you did give 
him the check and he brought it right straight back to you 
the next day? 
A. I don't recollect it. 
Q. How old ~re you Y 
A. I am seventy-eight, going on seventy-nine. 
Q. And your recollection is not as good as it was 'vhen you 
were a boy? 
A. No, I don't reckon it is. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 91 t FRED HUDGIN.S, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Sands : 
· Q. Mr. Hudgins, will you please tell the gentlemen of the jury your name and your occupation? 
A. ~{y name is Fred Hudgins ; I am in the insurance busi-
ness ; local insurance business. 
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Q. How long have you been in the insurance business? 
A. Forty-two years. · 
Q. Are you acquainted with the plaintiff here, Mr. Spicer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please state as to 'vhether or not you carried 
insurance on certain of his property in the county f 
A. Yes ; I carried insurance of $1,700 on the dwelling (if 
you wish to know the amount) and, I think, $500 on the per-
sonal property. . 
Q. What Company was that in Y 
A. Continental Insurance Company of New York. 
Q. Ho'v long, ]rfr. I-Iudgins, had you carried that insurance·? 
A. You mean since I wrote the first policy? 
Q. Yes, when you wrote the first policy? 
A. I don't lniow, been quite a long time. 
pag·e 92 ~ Q. Eig-ht or ten years, at least Y 
A. Longer than that . 
. Q. Do you know whether that policy carried the standard 
form clause in favor of the Federal Land Bank? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the character of that house? -
A. It was a two-story, frame, metal roof building. 
Q. How much in your judgment, from your last inspection, 
was the insurance which should be paid on it Y 
.A.. Somewhere near to where we had put it. We aim not 
to insure for more than three-fourths of the value and $1,700 
was somewhere in that neighborhood, in my judgment. 
Q. For eight or ten years before the fire did you know 
that additional insurance was carried by Mr. Spicer on tliat 
property? 
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. Would you, as an insurance agent, if you had known it, 
have allowed your insurance to remain on that property, 
$1,700 on the dwelling and $500 on the personal property Y 
By Mr. 1\filler: I object. 
The Court: · The objection is good. 
Q. The. question is, whether, in your judgment, that prop-
erty, as you knew it, realty and personalty, would 
page 93 ~ have carried additional insurance to the extent 
of $2,400 on the real property and $600 on the 
personal property Y 
A. It would not, in n1y judgment. 
·Q. Will you please state as to whether or not 1\Ir. Spicer 
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at any time ever gave you any information that there was 
additional insurance on the property 1 
A. He did not. . Q. When was the first time you learned there was addi-
tional insurance on it 1 
A. I think 1\{r. Warren's letter to me was the first knowl-
edge I had of it; but it was after the fire, I am rather under_ 
the impression. 
CROSS EXAMINATIO·N. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. JVIr. Hudgins, I know you very well and you are very 
conservative about the policies you issue in representing your 
Company, are you not¥ 
A. I want to be fair about it; but I don't go to the ex-
treme. 
Q. Pardon me, but I insure with you; but other companies 
do insure property for more than you are willing to carry, 
don't they~ 
A. Sometim.es they do and sometimes that don't. 
page 94 ~ It is a question of judgment as to the value. 
Q. Is it not a fact that certain people have taken 
policies from you and taken them out with other companies 
because the other companies would give them more insurance 
than you would carry¥ . 
A. I think that is true in certain instances. 
Q. vVere you ever inside the Spicer· house? 
A. Yes, not all over it; only on the first floor. 
Q. Do you remember how many rooms there were? 
A. I could not state how many rooms were in the house. 
I 'vent in, I think, two rooms only on the first floor. 
Q. Did you regard them as well furnished Y 
A. I do not remember sufficiently now to say whether or 
not they were well furnished. That would be a matter of 
opinion. You might have the opinion they were well fur-
nished and others would not think they were. I don't have 
a picture now of how they were furnished. 
Q. Do you remember whether they 'vere both bed-rooms you 
went in, or what kind of rooms? 
A. The room I went in on the left I think that was the sit-
ting room. Of course, I 'vent in the main hall. I think I 
went in the roon1 on the right, but I am not positive about 
that. I don't remember positively whether I went in two 
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rooms, or just the hall and one room. 
page 95 ~ Q. If a competent carpenter and contractor like 
1\'Ir. 1\::emper, well recognized as a competent 
builder, would come in and say it would cost $3,500 to $3,800 
to rebuild that home would you put your opinion against his 
as to the value of the property! 
.A. My statement awhile ago referred to the value of the 
property as it then stood. Doubtless ~{r. Kemper's state-
ment was when it would cost to build it. The house was quite 
old. It was not in good repair. It was in xery poor repair. 
Consequently, that is to be taken into consideration as to the 
value of it at that time. 
Q. Do you remember when you went there last before it 
burned? 
.A. I don't remember definitely, Mr. Warren and I were 
there I suppose about three years ago. 
Q. You don't know ·what improvements had been made since 
you were there Y 
A. I think he told me he put a. new porch to it, but I would 
not swear to that. 
Q. Did it need a porch' 
A. It certainly did.· 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. The last time you were there Mr. Marion 
pag·e 96 ~ Warren ·was there with you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember tl1e date of the last policy you is-
sued to 1\tlr. Spicer1 
A. February, 1935. 
Q. In other words, just about a year before the fire 7 
A. Yes, I believe the fire occurred in May, 1936. 
. I 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 97 ~ MARION B. vV ARR.EN, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~{r. Sands: 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Marion B. Warren. 
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Q. Will you tell the gentlemen of the jury for whom you 
work¥. . 
A. The Continental Insurance Company of New York. 
Q. How long have you been working for that Company? 
A. Since April 1, 1919. 
Q. Will you state whether or not you in co1npany with 1\{r. 
Hudgins inspected the· property that was destroyed by fire, 
as testi:Qed in this case, any time in 1936 t 
A. I think not; I think it was in 1935. 
Q. I meant 1935. 
A. Yes, in 1935. The date of the inspection was April, 1935. 
Q. Will you please state as to what was the amount of in-
surance you had on it at that time? · 
A. $1,700 on the dwelling and $500 on the household fur-
niture. . 
Q. Will you please state the general condition of the house 
at that time? 
A. I made several inspections for Mr. Hudgins 
page 98 t that day and a good many places, if the flues and. 
painting looked good, I passed one; but as I passed 
this place I noticed the front porch was apparently half gone 
and the house did not appear to be so good outside; for that 
reason I made an inspection both outside and inside. I met 
a gentleman in there I did not know. He said his name 'vas 
Mr. Spicer, and there was an incul;lator under the stairway-
By Mr. Miller: I object. 
Q. Do yo:u see Mr. Spicer in here now¥ 
A. I don't know him. 
Q. The person you met, were you introduced to him by Mr. 
Hudgins as Mr. SpicerY 
A. I could not swear to that. 
Q. Did you approach him and talk to him as if he were the 
owner of the house? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know, or did your Company know at that time 
that there was any additional insurance on that property? 
A. No, we did not. · 
Q. What were you carrying on that property at that time? 
A. We were carrying $1,700 on the dwelling and $500 on 
the household furniture, and I thought that was all the prop-
erty would carry. 
Q. How long have you been inspecting farm property? 
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A. I have been inspecting farm property since 
page 99 ~ 1921 ; sixteen years. 
Q. From your inspection, will you please state -
to the gentlemen of the jury whether in your judgment that 
dwelling house was of sufficient value to haye carried insur-
ance in addition to yours of $2,400 1 
A. It was not. ~Iy valuation, utility :value, as stated to 
my Company was $2,500, total value, the dwelling alone, and 
I estimated the household furniture. at $1,000; that is horse-
back judgment. 
Q. Did you question him as to the amount of the mort-:-
gage? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. $220. 
Q. The gentleman who represented himself as the owner 
told you that f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he tell you who that was with 1 
A. The Federal :rarn1 Loan Land Bank; what I have writ-
ten down. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Do you recollect that positively? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was a lieu for that amount, was there not? 
A. I don't know. 
page 100 ~ Q. He was the owner, was he notf 
A. There was an incubator of chickens there 
he was handling, I don't suppose he would have been han-
dling· them, if he had not been the owner. I would not have 
recognized Spicer the next day. 
Q. You inspect a g·ood many houses that you would not 
remember the next day, don't you T . 
A. Yes, l1ut I remember this because the porch was half 
gone. 
Q. Did you not say you go to a good manv houses and if 
the flues and painting look go.od you pass on' 
A. Yes. 
Q. What per cent of the houses you pass by and look at 
are examined in that way 1 
A. It is a hard question, but probably 60 per cent. 
Q. That you pass on that way? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You think you are n1ore competent to pass on that than 
- a contractor and builder? 
A. I am not. 
Q. If a carpenter and contractor, engaged in that business, 
were to tell you it ·was worth more than the value you fix 
it at, would you take his or your own opinion~ 
A. My inspection report calls for utility value. 
Q. Would you put vour opinion against his? 
.A. As to .. the desirability of the property I ·would 
page 101 ~ not; as to the cost of the property I would not; 
on its insurable value I 'vould. 
Q. Did you not say you passed about 60 per cent of them 
and went on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you examined this one? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Did you examine the furniture f 
A. In a general way. 
Q. Could you tell what was in there? 
A. No. 
Q. Could you even go and locate the house again~ 
A. No, I don't think I could. 
Q. As to this 60 per cent- ].!lr. I-Iudgins represents you 
here? 
A. Yes; he has for over twenty-five years. 
Q. You don't place farm property policies 1 
A. Not as a rule. 
Q. That is generally placed ·by ~Ir. Hudgins? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are those places you inspected places that Mr. Hudgins 
had passed on and insured, or new ones Y . 
A. If the insurance value appears very close then I would 
go all through it. 
Q. You are employed by the Company to make 
page 102 ~ inspections.? 
· A. Yes. 
Q. I-Iow many houses did you yisit that day to inspect 
them? 
A. Possibly six or eight. 
Q. Did you go in another one? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. 1\'Ir. Spicer has testified that at the time he was getting 
a policy from Mr. Fifield, the agent of the Hartford Com-
pany, the policy in litigation here, he said he wanted the 
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policy issued like the one in the Continental to him and his 
'vife jointly, do you Imow how the one in the Continental was 
issued f 
A. As is custo1nary, issued by Mr. liudgins and reported 
to us. 
Q. Do you know whether issued to l\£r. Spicer or Mr. S.picer 
and his wife jointly? 
A. I don't recall it now, but I hav:e it in my records there. 
Q. You can look and see? 
A. George F. Spicer and M. F. Spicer. 
Q. Is that all you know f 
A. Oh, no, I know lots of other things. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 103 ~ J. R. LOYD, 
a witness introduced on behalf of ~he Defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT .EL\1\tiiNATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. lVIr. Lloyd, will you please state to these gentlemen your 
name, residence and occupation f 
A. J. R. Loyd; I reside in Richmond and I am an insur-
ance adjuster for the Fire Companies Adjustment Bureau. 
Q. Will you please state as to whether you were engaged 
or employed in connection with the adjustment of a loss of 
property listed with the Hartford .Fire Insurance Company 
by Mr. Spicer in June, 1936? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. vVill you please state to these gentlemen exactly what 
occurred,. where you were and wl1at was done Y 
A. I drove up from Richmond to Remington, where I in-
terviewed l\{r. Fifield, the agent for the Company. We then 
drove to the location of this loss, Mr. Fifield and myself. We 
interviewed Mr. Spicer. vVe als·o measured up the founda-
tions of the building and asked him certain questions as to 
the construction. We then made an appointment with Mr. 
Spicer to meet at Mr. Fifield's office some time after lunch. 
We then came to Culpeper to inspect the insur-
page 104 ~ ance policies, l\{r. Spicer having· told us it was 
in his lock box here at a bank. We found it was 
a bank holiday and were unable to inspect the insurance 
policy, and we had luncl1 here and then returned to Reming-
ton, and in a little while Mr. Spicer came in. I made up an 
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estimate, I think, of which I considered the replacement of 
the house, the new cost, !in~ from that deduct~d what I ~on­
sidered a proper depreCiation, and ag-reed with Mr. Spicer 
on a valuation, the exact figures. of which I don't recall at 
this time. Q. They were introduced in evic}ence here. In other words, 
did you get the measurements and the data giyen you as to 
the house destroyed f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You went over that and worked with Mr. Spicer in con-
nection with it? 
Q . .And from that you figured the value of $2,902.46 as the 
value of the house~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you reached an estimate of $747 on the personal 
property on information given you by 1\{r. Spicer1 
A. That is right. 
Q. How long- were you talking to him about the matter? 
A. I suppose in all three hours ; ROssibly longer 
page 105 r than that, including the time we talked with him 
at the scene of the fire. We talked with him pos-
sibly two and a half_ hours at l\1r. Fifield's office. 
Q. Was this figure reached by you and signed by hin1 ac-
cepted as the value·of the property at that time; was that an 
agreed statement Y 
A. Yes,· both of us agreed on it. 
Q. At that time had there come up any question as to there 
being other insurance. on that property 1 
A. No ; no question. . 
Q. Did you know at that tiJne there was any other insur-
ance on that property owned by 1\llr. Spicer? 
A. I did not know it. 
Q. You were there with Mr. Spicer three hours talking 
about it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you all reach this. sound value with the idea of pay-
ing that full loss in accordance with the insurance on the 
property? 
A. That is correct, on that value and loss. I reallv had 
in mind he would eventually submit a proof of loss support-
ing that. . 
Q. At that time ?id he or not tell you or give you any in-
formation that there was other Insurance on it 1 
page 106 ~ A. No, he did not tell me or intimate there was 
other insurance on it. 
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Q. How long after that did you learn from other sources, 
or through any other channel, that there was .other insur-
ance? 
A. 'iVhen I g·ot back I wrote to the Federal Land Bank at 
Baltimore and asked them what was the amount of their 
mortgage and whether there was other insurance, and they 
advised me there was other insurance on it. 
Q. Did 1\tir. Spicer ever give you that information 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I will ask you whether you have ever seen ~.fr. Spicer, 
or had any communication from him directly or indirectly, 
after the day he left you? 
A. I did not see ~.fr. Spicer after the date I left. I think 
I received a letter from him some time later. 
Q. Did you reply. to that letter? 
A. I think that I did; I think I merely referred him to the 
policy contract. 
Q. You merely referred hin1 to the policy contract 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you waive any proof of loss when you were that 
day? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did he tell you that there was a lien ·with the Farm Land 
Bankf 
page 107 ~ A. He told me there was a $500 Federal Land 
Bank lien. ' · 
Q. And after you got that information then it was that you 
checked up and wrote to the Federal Land Bank about it? 
A. Yes; they informed me there was some $3,200 or $3,400 
on it. 
Q. Is this the gentleman (~.fr. Spicer) to whom you were 
talking· over there f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he told you there was a .$500 lien on it and he did 
not tell you there was any more than that¥ 
A. No, sir. 
CRlOSS EXA~.fiNATION. 
By 1\tir. 1\tiiller: 
Q. You say Mr. Spicer never told you in your long con-
ference in Fifield's office in Remington that there was any 
other insurance? 
A. He did not tell me that there was other insurance. 
Q. And you did not ask him if there was other insurance? 
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A. No, I did not ask him. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 108 ~ R. A. FIFIELD, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~1INATION. 
By Mr. Sands: . 
Q. }fr. Fifield, please state to the gentlemen of the Jury 
your name and 'vhere you live? 
A. R. A. Fi:f;ield; I live at Remington. 
Q. That is in Fauquier County~ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Do you represent any insurance companies~ . 
A. I represent the Har~ford Fire Insurance Company and 
other fire insurance companies. 
· Q. How long have you represented the Ifartford ~ 
A. I have represented the Hartford since 1921. 
Q. Will you please state whether the Hartford carried since 
that time insurance on Mr. Spicer's property~ 
A. I took the Hartford insurance policy over from another 
company and l\{r. Spicer's policy was on the Company's books 
at that time. As I remember, the policy expired July 29, 
1925. I took a new policy and got a policy from him. Again 
in 1930, I did the same thing for him, and again on July 29, 
1935, I took another application from him and got him another 
policy. 
page 109 ~ Q. Is that the last policy, the one that is here 
_ involved? · 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Will you please state whether you· Imew, or any informa-
tion was given you at any time during that period of time 
when those several renewals were being made for a five-year 
period that he 'vas carrying insurance through Mr. Hudgins 
here on that same property? • 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When did you first learn about that Y 
A. The first itme I learned that was when l\1:r. Spears was 
investigating the loss and 1\tir. Spears came to my office and 
asked what I thought about this matter. 
Q. You cannot state 'vhat he said. Was that or not after 
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Mr. Loyd, the adjuster for the Hartford Company, had been 
there adjusting this ·lossY 
A. It 'vas afterwards. 
Q. So, at the time you met there with Mr. Spicer and Mr. 
Loyd you did not have any knowledge of that? . 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Since you acquired that knowledge have you ever had 
any conversation with Mr. Spicer in reference to this lossY 
A. I think Mr. Spicer was in my office once or twice, .but 
I don't remember any particular conversation. He was in 
my office once or twice and we talked in a general way, but 
nothing particular, that I remember. 
page 110} Q. I show you this application and ask you to 
state whether or not this was the application that 
was signed by Mr. Spicer and which I now offer as "De-
fendant's Ex. 2", and state whether or not he signed that 
paperY 
A. Absolutely; he signed it with my pen. 
Q. This morning, when he was on the stand, I asked him 
the question as to whether or not there had been any dispute 
or discussion with you as to the amount of insurance that 
should be issued this time, or issued on this policy, namely, 
$2,400, and in that connection I asked him whether or not 
he made any statement to you as to his painting· the property? 
A. Well, practically the only discussion we had 'vas this: 
I told him his house was not painted and his porch had fallen 
down, and I told him I would feel very much better if he 
would reduce the house insurance to $2,000 instead of $2,400. 
He told me he intended to paint it in August, 1935, the next 
month, and pron1ised me he would fix the porch. He was 
going· to get some special money to do that with. I said, 
''1\{r. Spicer, I have been carrying you for $2,400; I will con-
tinue to carl'y you for $2,400, but in case of loss you will 
l1ave some difficulty in g·etting $2,400, but there will be some 
question''. . 
Q. Did you know at that time of the existence of the Con-
tinental policy? 
page 111 } A. I did not. 
. Q. How long have you be~n insuring property? 
A. Since 1913. 
Q. With your knowledge of insurance, 'vould you have felt 
justified in placing insurance in the amount of $2,400 on there 
if you had known there was additional insurance of $1,7007 
A. No ; I argued a: bout the $2,400. 
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Q. Did you think that was the full value the property would 
carry? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And you n~ake it plain to him! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he at that time disclose to you anything about car-
rying insurance in the Continental~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This morning when the question came up as to why this 
policy was 1nerely issued to himself and not to George W. 
Spicer and wife, he said he told you he wanted the policy 
to read as the Hudgins' policy did, or George W. Spicer and 
wife. Did he or not ever make that statement to you at this 
or any other time? 
A. No, every policy was issued in George W. Spicer's name 
and I never knew his wife had any interest in the 
page 112 ~ property. 
Q. Was 1'Ir. ·Hudgins' name ever mentioned in 
the matterY 
A. Absolutely !1:r. Hudgins' name was never mentioned. 
Q. When you and Mr. Loyd and J\ir. Spicer were there at 
the office, do you recollect whether or not any question came 
up as to the amount of lien due the Federal Land Bank'l 
A. I don't think it did; I don't remember; I don't think 
it did. To ~e frank about it, the only question of lien came 
up was this: I filled out at the time $800 in favor of the Fed-
eral Land Bank. !{r. Spicer admitted to me he owed that 
much money. Being such a small amount, I knew the mort-
gage blank 'vas necessary to put on there in my office. I 
don't think the question was raised what ·was on the property 
after the fire. 
CROSS EXAIVIINATION. 
By J.\IIr. Miller: 
Q. Where was this application signed by 1\{r. Spicer, Mr. 
Fifield? 
A. I-Ie was standing in his front yard, I talking to him. 
I went over there on the 29th of July and talked with him. 
He happened to be in the front yard. We had the conver-
~ation there and he signed there and I jotted a few items on 
It and took some measurements and went back to my office 
and filled it in from the one I had before. 
page 113 ~ Q. You never asked him any questions at that 
time? 
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A. The only proposition was this: I asked him the amount 
of the loan he had on the place, which he said was $800 and 
I. argued with him about the value of the place. I told him 
I would be better satisfied if he took $2,000 instead of $2,400. 
Q. But the questions were filled out at your office 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you sent the policy back to him? 
A. There were two. He had one in his possession. I had 
that amount on the house and this last part about painting 
' the house in 1935. The ·balance was taken from his old appli-
cation. 
Q. That was just a memorandum you put down there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The other questions were taken from your record Y 
A. Yes, from my record, the old application he had signed 
before, and I got the policy and sent it to him. 
Q. You say you never asked him about the other insurance? 
A. I took this standpoint; I argued with him about the 
value of that house. I said $2,400 was too much. It did not 
cross my mind that he had another policy. 
Q. And you never asked him. 
·A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you mean by stating· two or three 
page 114 ~ days after the fire to the Methodist preacher that 
Mr. Spicer would have his money in thirty days' 
A. That is our usual practice. We always pay promptly. 
· Q. Why did you not pay him Y 
A.. ~his is the first time since I have been in the insurance 
business that I have had any question raised. 
Q. That is a self-serving declaration T 
A. You asked for itt 
Q. What was the statement you made to the l\:Iethodist 
preacher as to when he would get his money' 
A. That was my supposition. I don't deny making the 
statement. That was our practice. 
Q. Don't you know you had quite a correspondence with me 
and you would never tell n1e the reason for declining to made 
the payment. 
A. I did not know. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
Bv 1\ir. Sands : 
.. Q. Yon told him he would g·et his money in thirty days. 
Did you at that time know the facts you afterwards learned 
in this case 7 
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A. No~ I did not. 
Q. Mr~ Fifield, the question has been asked as to whether 
1 you did say that would be paid in thirty days Y 
page 115 ~ A. Absolutely; that is our custom. 
Q. Would you have answered in that way if 
you had known at that time the facts which you subsequently 
iearned that he had other and additional insurance which he 
had not disclosP.d to you f 
By Mr. Miller: I objP.ct to that. 
By the Court: Objection overruled. 
A. .No, I would not, naturally; it was double insurance. 
RE-CROSS EXAl\IIINATION. 
By 1\1r. Miller : 
Q. Mr. Fifield, you have been in the insurance business 
quite a while? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a lawyer in active practice Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And located at Remington, Va? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
Note: At this point the hearing was adjourned until 10 
A. M. tomorrow, ~farch 26, 1937. -
The hearing was resumed at 10 A. M., March 26, 1937. 
page 116} ROGER BI!OJ{ERS, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAJ\IIINATION. 
By 1\{r . .Sands : 
Q. 1\{r. Bickers, please state to the court whether you are 
a practicing attorney of this bar and a. member of the bar of 
this county? 
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.A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Will you please state whether you were counsel for the 
Federal Land Bank of Baltimore in respect to a certain suit 
which was instituted on or about the latter part of May 1936 
against the defendant, ~ir. Spicer, and his wife? 
A. Yes, I was local counsel for the .F'ederal Land Bank of 
Baltimore in that suit. 
Q. Please state when that suit ·was instituted, if you have 
made an examination in the Clerk's office? 
A. The bill, itself, shows 'it was :filed at :first JunQ rules 
1936. I might state that my :files sho\v memorandum of the 
suit and bill was :filed and mailed to the Clerk on May 23 or 
24th. I have a letter from them enclosing copy .of all the 
papers on the same date. 
page 117 ~ By the Court : 
Q. What happened on ~{ay 23rd, 19361 
A. The memorandum for the suit and the bill was mailed 
and received by the Clerk. I know that, because I got copies· 
of the two· and verified it in the Clerk's office. I will make 
this statement: on 1\fay 26th I received from the Federal Land 
Bank of Baltimore a letter including a copy of a memorandum 
of suit and copy of bill in the matter of Federal Land Bauk 
v. George vV. Spicer and l\tfildred F. Spicer, his wife, which 
letter statP.d they had mailed tlu~ originals to the Clerk. I 
·went to the Clerk's office a.ncl verified the fact that they got 
thP. hill and memorandum of suit, and subpoena was issued, 
which was returnable to the first June rules. From the origi-
nal subpoena issued upon this memornadum it would show 
that it was issued on May 25, 1936 and served upon Mr. and 
~Irs. Spicer on 1\fay 26, 1936. · 
Q. Mr. Bickers, will you please state to the gentlemen of 
thP. jury the amount of indebtedness-in the first place was 
there one or two mortg·ages upon Mr. Spicer's property at 
the time of the filing of this suit? 
. A. The records would sho'v that there were two mortgag·es, 
one of $2,900 and one for $500. The original amounts were 
that. 
Q. Have you photostatic copies of the original 
page 118 ~ papers? ' 
A. Personallv I have not. There was filed with 
this bill I refer to photostatic copies of both the mortgages 
and the notP.s of $2,900 and $500. 
Q. What was the date of the first mortgage, $2,900? 
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A.. December, 1921, 'vhich is recorded in Deed Book 109 of 
the Clerk's. office of Culpeper County. 
Q. Please state the amount of principal that was due on 
that mortgag·e as of the 25th day of May, 1936, when this suit 
was instituted~ 
A. Of my personal knowledge I would not know. The alle-
gations of the bill filed and the_ photostatic copies of the notes 
would show that there was due upon the $2,900 tnortgage as 
of the first day of December, 1931, $2,510.38, with interest at 
varying· rates up until April 23; 1936. I might say that un-
der the Federal Land Bank loans in the various periods along 
there the Government reduced the rates of interest. 
Q. Did they make any difference between the rate which 
was allowed aftm· default and before default 1 
A. Yes; some of the rates were as low as 3-~/2 per cent. 
before default, and from information I have and the allega-
tions of the bill, this loan was declared in default as of April 
3, 1936, and after that date it carried 6 per cent, and attor-
nev's fees. 
.. Q. Will you please state when, from the papers 
page 119 ~ filed and the papers you have that was taken for 
confessed in the Clerk's office T 
By Mr. Sands: Mr. 1Iiller, there is no pleading to suggest 
any contest of the amount of money due to the Federal Land 
Bank, is there: What I want him to tell me is when those 
pleadings show Mr. Spicer paid the interest on that note t 
A. I can testify as to what the records show. This bill 
sho,vs it was taken for confessed, according to the memoran-
dum on the note. From the photostatic copy of 'the note filed 
with the bill of complaint, the last payment made was in 1931; 
that was the payment that fell due in December 1931. 
Q. In other. words, the bill shows no interest was paid by 
him after December 1, 1931 Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. When was the second trust executed T 
A. January 14, 1926, recorded in Deed Book 77, page 108. 
Q. When was the last interest payment made on that note 1 
A. As sho,vn by the photostatic copy of the note and the 
allegations of the bill, the last payment was made on Janu-
ary 14, 1933. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Johnson: 
" Q. When did you say the debts were in default? 
page 120 ~ A. According the allegations of the bill, it ap-
pears it was declared defaulted as of April 23, 
1936. 
Q. The suit was brought on May 25, 1936? 
A. Yes. I said defaulted. It was dec]ared in default and 
the exercised the option to foreclose. 
By the Court: 
· Q. Some of those payments, according to the amortization 
period some of them were not due. If any of them were de-
faulted, all of them may be declared due? 
A. At the option of the Federal Land Bank. As of April 
23, 1936, they exercised the option to declare the whole debt 
due. 
By J\tir. Miller : 
Q. ~fr. Bickers, ~{r. George Spicer came here to your of-
fice to see you at thP. June rules to 'vhich he was summoned 
in that chancery suit, did he not? 
A. To the best of my recollection he did, on the first 1\{on-
day in June, or probably the next day. I know he was in my 
office. 
Q. After the property had been destroyed, he came and 
asked you what that process meant, did he not? 
A. Yes, and I explained it to l1im. 
RE-DffiECT EXAlVIINATION. 
By 1\{r. Sands : 
Q. He can1e there after the fire? 
page 121 } A. To the best of my recollection, the first Mon-
day in June. · 
Q. He did not come there to see you previous to that date 
to the best of your knowledge f 
A. Not to the best of n1v recollection. 
Q. A:fter the receipt of that subpoena fron1 the Federal 
Land Bank, he did not come to Ree you until the return day? 
He did not come to see you on the 26th, 27th or 28th of May! 
A. No : the best of my recollection he did not. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
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page 122 r T. D. BICKERS, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the Defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. What is your name7 
A. T. D. Bickers. 
Q. What is your position, or what was your position in re-
spect to the Federal Land Bank? 
A. I was Secretary-Treasurer of the County Farmers Loan. 
Association. 
Q. When were you so appointed' 
A. In April 1929. 
Q. When you took over this position 'vas it brought to your 
attention whether there was any obligation due by the plain-
tiff in this suit, Mr. Spicer' 
A. Yes. 
Q. Please state what was the status of that obligation at 
the time this fire occurred on 1\.fay 29, 1936? 
A. They were delinquent at that time. 
Q. Will you please state 'vhcther or not they had been long 
due at that time Y 
A. Since 1932. 
Q. Will you please state to the gentlemen of the 
pag'l 123 ~ jury whether, as representative of your institu-
tion, you had been endeavoring to collect through 
peaceable means from Mr. Spicer? 
A. I had. 
Q. Had he come to see you frequently? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you frequently granted him any extension? 
A. The Local Association had. 
n. When was thatt 
A. At different periods extensions and re-extensions. 
Q. Was there any extension previous to the fire by which 
he was to have until August 8th to pay? 
A. No. 
Q. Will you please to the jury when 'vas the last com-
munication. so far as your rAcords show, you had with Mr. 
Spicer? 
A. That I had with him or the Land Bank had With him? 
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By Mr. Miller: May it please the Court, what has that to 
do with the issue involved here nowY 
By the Court: "\Vhat Mr. Bickers did individually I don't 
think has any bearing, unless it is connected with this mat-
ter. 
By Mr. Sands: Yesterday it was stated by the plaintiff that 
he did not know the meaning of this suit, and I want to know 
whether that was a well-founded position to take. 
page 124. r By the Court: All right. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Will you please state whether you had any communica-
tion with the plaintiff previous to this time in reference to the 
subject of the condition of this loan? 
A. Yes, several times. 
Q. Did he make you any promises? 
. A. Yes, he would make me promises every time I talked to 
him. 
Q. Did he state when and how and under what circum-
stances he was to pay? ' 
A. Along the latter part of the time he expected to borrow 
it from some other persons, different parties. 
Q. Did he tell you who those parties were~ 
A. I don't think he ever -called any name. 
Q. Did he make you any promise to come in on any specific 
date in respect to that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was the promise made, the last one Y 
A. May I look at my records? 
Q. Yes, refresh your memory in any way you can. 
By Mr. Miller: n{ay it be understood, your Honor, if he 
don't connect it up, I will move tQ exclude all this testimonyt 
By the Court: Yes. 
page 125 } A. The last promise I recollect he stated he 
would pay them July 15, 1935. 
Q. Did he pay them anything then 7 
.A.. No. 
Q. What did he say he would -pay? 
.A.. He said he 'vould either pay the whole of the delin-
quency, or the delinquencies and the mortgage. 
Q. When he made that promise and did not fulfill it, did you 
see him again? 
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A. The Association passed foreclosure resolutions about a 
month prior to that. . 
Q. In other words, the Association had as early as the year 
previous, June or July, 1935, passed foreclosure proceedings 
against him Y 
A. Yes. 
· Q. That was never rescinded Y 
A. No. 
Q. Was he notified of the position they took? 
A. He was notifi.P.d in this lP.tter of June 14, 1935. 
Q. Read that letter! 
A. It reads as follows: 
''l\1:r. G. W. Spicer, 
. Elkwood, V a. 
Dear Sir: 
''June 14, 1935. 
Your National Farm Loan Association has submitted to 
us a resolution requesting this Bank to take 
page 126 } necessary legal steps to protect its interest with 
respect to your mortgage. vVe 'vould dislike very 
much to do this, and truly hope you will make some arrange-
ment to put your loan in good standing, and thereby prevent 
any such action on your part. 
Under the circumstances, we will mark your case up ten 
days, with the hope that satisfactory arrangements can be 
made to settle your delinquency, otherwise we will assume 
that any action taken by us to force collection will not em-
barrass you. 
Very truly yours, 
P. A. FLEURY, 
Collection Division.'' 
Q. After that did he come in and see you 1 
A. Yes, he was in very frequently after that. 
Q. What was his purpose in calling? 
A. To tell me he expected to borrow the monev and take 
up these delinquencies. · 
Q. Did he make any payment f 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Did you give him to understand you were expecting 
those payments from that time on Y 
By Mr. Miller: Ask him what he did do. 
A. I told him as plain as I could, and after the Land Bank 
put it in the attorney's hands here for collection, I would 
send him to the attorney. Even after that he would come to 
see me at times. I told him it was out of my ".pands then. 
Q. Was that up to the time of the fire? 
page 127 ~ A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. From what you told him you tried tq make 
it plain to him Y 
By Mr. Miller: I object. 
Q. Did you g·ive this man to understand it was up to him to 
pay that money, if not, they would force collection Y 
By Mr. ~!iller: I object. 
By the Court: Sustained as to the form of the question. 
Q. 1\fr. Bickers, will you please tell the gentlemen of that 
jury whether or not you had given this plaintiff information 
that it was expected that loan should be paid, if not he must 
face the consequences Y 
By 1\{r. Miller: I object. 
By the Court: I think as to the form of the question the 
objection is good. 
By the Court: 
Q. What, if any, information did you give to the plaintiff 
along that line Y 
A. I would tell him at different times that the Land Bank 
was not going to carry him any longer and h~ had better 
hurry up and get these delinquencies up, and after the fore-
closure I told him it 'vas in the attorney's hands and if not 
·would be foreclosed. I don't think I ever made him believe 
that. 
page 128 ~ Q. Up to what time, approximately, did you con-
tinue to tP.ll him that, either by letter or word of 
mouth? 
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A. Abo;ut May 1, 1936. 
Bv Mr. Sands: 
· Q. Was that a written communication to him? 
A. W rittfm communication to me. 
Q. And you took it up with him at that time? 
A. I don't know what day I took it up; I discussed it with 
him. 
Q. After May 1, 1936, and before the fire 1 
A. I think so. 
CROSS EXAl\ITNATION. 
Bv }fr. 1\filler: 
· Q. And all of your talk to 1\'fr. Spicer amounted to nothing, 
did it? 
.A. Absolutely so, so far as getting results. 
Q. That is what I asked you. The F'ederal Land Bank and 
the Insurance Company w·ere active in their engagements with 
1\{r. Spicer until after the fire, then their lips closed, did they 
not? 
A. I don't know about that. 
Q. After the fire everything closed, did it not? 
A. I know as far as the I.Jand Bank was concerned theY 
closed their file, so far as I am concerned. .. 
page 129 ~ By 1\{r. ~[iller: Your Honor, I make the mo-
tion to exclude the testimony of JVIr. T. D. Bickers, 
on the ground that it don't amount to anything and only 
confuses the jury. 
Bv 1\tir. Sands: Your Honor, I object to a motion of that 
kind. 
Bv the Court: The motion is oYerruled. By 1\{r. Miller: It is excepted to and can go to the jury 
for what it is worth. 
By Mr. Sands: Your Honor, I object to that before the 
jurv. 
Bv the Court: It not infrequently happens that it is bet-
ter that a motion addressed to the Court should be made out 
of the presence of the jury. However, the jury has been 
told that they should draw· no conclusions from statements 
Rddressed bv counsel to the court. As to whether the evi-
dence should be excluded the court is of the opinion that the 
evidence can be consider~d b:y the jury, and therefore over-
rules the motion. The conrt passes on the question of the 
I . 
·, 
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admissibility of' the testimony of T. D. Bickers; the jury is 
the judge of the weights of that testimony. 
(The witness stood asidP..) 
page 130 ~ J. R. HA"UGHT, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the Defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRE;CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands : 
Q. Please state your name T 
A. J. R. Haught. 
Q. WbP.re do you live? 
A. I live out some eleven or twelve miles north of here, to 
the right of Rixeyville. 
Q. How far do you live from Mr. Spicer, the plaintiff in 
this case? 
A. I suppose it is eleven or twelve nliles. 
Q. How long have you known 1\tir. Spicer? 
A. Well, I have known 1\fr. Spicer for several years; I ex-
pect fifteen years, perhaps more, at a rough guess. I was 
never very well acquainted 'vith him; just kind of knew of 
him. I have right smart. land down there about him, but I 
don't g·o down so often. 
Q. Please state whether or not during the spring of 1936, 
about this timP. last year or subsequently, about May or 
~T uue, he came to see you with respect to borrowing some 
rnoney from you? 
A. Mr. Spicer came to see me some time last 
pag·e 131 }- year. I did not charge my memory with it. I 
don't kno'v what month it was. 
Q. Did he have a fire after that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long before that was it Y 
A. Not a gTeat while. 
Q. What amount of money did he want to borrow from 
vou? 
· A. Now, Mr. Spicer named two sums, two amounts that he 
was interested in. If I remember correct, five or six hundred 
do1Iars and a mortg-age, if ~ rP.member correctly, of about 
$2,800, and he would like to get enough to pay up the back 
interest. was my understanding, or he would like to get enough 
to pay it out, both interest and mortgage. 
J ' 
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Q. Did he tell you as to whom that money was payable tot 
A. No ; if he did I don't recall. 
Q. He either wanted enough to pay the whole, or to pay 
.- the interest Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you what he would give as secur.ityY 
A. I understood it was the land and its improvements. 
Q. What did you tell him Y 
A. I told him that I sympathized with him, but I was get-
ting told and everything little thing seemed to bother my 
· memory and I did not want to take anything more 
page 132 ~ on my mind on account of disturbing my peace of 
mind. 
By 1\Ir. Miller: I more to exclude that testimony on account 
of the immateriality to anything in issue here.· 
By the Court : The motion is overruled. 
By Mr. Miller: I note an exception. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Old people cannot remember as well as young ones, can 
theyf 
A. No, they cannot; at least, I cannot. 
Q. He came to see you, you don't remember all the details f 
A. No; we talked an hour or so. I cannot tell the whole 
conversation. 
Q. You cannot remember exerything a man said to you, as 
old as you are, last years, can you? 
A .. Well, it has to make some impression on my mind; I 
generally remember then. 
Q. Some things Y 
A. ·Yes. 
Q. If a man gets old he don't 'vant to be bothered about 
business, when he has plenty, as you have? 
A. Well, I find more comfort in not taking any more bnsi-
nes~ at my age. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
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\ 
J. A. SPEAR, \ 
a witness introduced on behalf of the Defendant, 
page 133 ~ 
being· first duly sworn, testified as follows : \ . 
... \\ DIRECT EX.A~MINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. What is your name Y 
A. J. A. Spear. 
Q. Please state to tho court where is your residence? 
A. 1\tly residence is ·at Purcellville, Loudoun County, Va.; 
but my headquarters are at Richmond. 
Q. Please state what your business is? 
A. I am a special agent of the National Board of Fire Un-
derwriters of New York; that is the service department of 
the stock broker~ of insurance companies. 
Q. What is the Fire Underwriters Association? 
A. It is budgeted from stock fire insurance companies and 
operates as a service department. They have several de-
partments, engineering department, law department, actuarial 
department, &c. -
Q. Please state as to whethe.r or not you are their repre-
sentative. You live in Virginia and your headquarters are 
where? 
A. 1\tly headquarters are at Richmond. 
Q. Please state 'vhether or not you interviewed 
page 134 ~ 1\{r. Spicer, the plaintiff in this case, with respect 
to this fire 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When was your attention brought to the matter and 
when did you talk to him? 
A. I talked to 1\Ir. Spicer on Friday, June 6th. 
Q. Whereabouts? 
A. At the scene of the fire. 
Q. Please state to the g-entlemen of the jury what tran-
spired between you? Did you question him with respect to 
this fire? 
A. Y P.s, I asked 1\tir. Spicer thP. usual questions that we put 
to the assured after a fire, as to 'vhether he had any idea of 
how the fire occurred. 
Ry 1\tir. 1\Hller: I object to his stating the usual questions. 
I want to know what questions he did put. 
By the Court: It is excluded. 
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Q. Tell what occurred Y 
A. I asked Mr. Spicer if he knew how the fire occurred and 
he said he had no idea. I then asked him at what hour he 
left the property and what hour he returned and the condi-
tions he found; when he did return, and if he had made any 
inquiry in the neig·hborhood as to whether any person in the 
neighborhood knew anything about the fire, and 
page 135 } who the first person was who got to the property. 
I asked him about tl1e mortgage on the property. 
· I asked him about the insurance policies; how many insur-
ance policies he had. I believe that constitutes the amount 
of questions I put to ~Ir. Spicer. 
By the Court: 
Q. You have not stated his answers to the questions-state 
his answers to these questions Y 
A. In regard to the origin of the fire, Mr. Spicer said he 
had not idea how the fire originated or where it originated. 
However, hP. told me that he understood that some person, 
whom he had forgotten the name of, told him that the fire 
orig·inated in the junk ro.om of the property. I asked him 
what the junk room contained and he said, old clothing and 
old pictures and old furniture and such junk, and I asked 
him if there was anything· of an inflammable nature in that 
part of the house, and he said no, and that neither he or his 
wife had been in that part of the house for seyeral days prior 
to the fire. 
Bv ~Ir. Sands : 
··Q. Did he tell you as to when he left. the house and when 
he returned? · 
A. Yes, 1\fr. Spicer said he left the house about 7:30 and 
returned as near as he could tell about 10 :15 and when he 
arrived they saw tl~e flames, but thought the fire 
pag·e 136 ~ was at Kelly's Ford, but when they got up in a 
short distance of the house he found it was their 
own property and several people were there. 
P. Taking up the subject of the mortgage, did he make any 
statement to you with respect to the mortg·age on it? 
A. HA said he owed the Land Bank $3,300-may I refer to 
my notes on that, I am not absolutely positive t 
Q. Yes. 
A. He said the Jnortgage with the Land. Bank amounted to 
approximately $2,700 (that was the Land Bank of Baltimore) 
and that he had $2,300 insurance with Mr. Hudgins, at Cui-
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peper, aud $300 on the furniture. I asked him if he had other 
insurance and at :first he said he did not. He finally. told me 
he had another policy; that it was with an agent at Reming-
ton, but he did not remember his name and he said as far as 
he ~ew that policy did not have any coverage on it as to the 
mortgage. In speaking of the mortgage then, Mr . .Spicer 
said that he, just prior to the fire, had obtained a thousand 
dollars from a friend of his and that this money he had on 
him at the time of the fire and that subsequent to that a day 
or two he went in to see Mr. Bickers, the representative of the 
Federal Land Bank and told Mr. Bickers he had this .$1,000 
and that at :first he thought he would apply it to the back in-
terest and loan, but he decided not to do that and he told me 
. he had returned that money to his friend. I asked 
pag·e 137 ~ who the friend was and he told me he thought that 
was his business and not mine, and I did not press 
it further. He also told me on this oceasion that he had made 
arrangements prior to the :fire to lift this mortgage entirely 
with thP. Land Bank with a man who lived near where he 
lived. I askr.d who the man waA. He said he did not know 
him well, but he thought his name was Haught. I asked where 
he lived and he said he lived northeast of Brandy and there 
was nothing morA said at that time about Mr. Haught; but 
I subsequently \VP.nt to Brandy and found other persons .who 
told me who this gentleman \vas and I traced Mr. Haught up 
through that information. ~{r. Spicer told me he had never 
received any notice of any foreclosure proceedings on the part 
of the Land Bank ; that there had been no sheriff or deputy 
there in connection with the Land Bank matter, but Ed Payne 
had been there with a summons, but it involved a matter of 
$120, through, I think, one of the Culpeper banks; but it had 
nothing to do with the ·Federal Land Bank matter at all. That, 
I believe,, is about the sum and substance of our interview. 
CROSS EXA~1INATION. 
By ~ir. 1\IIiller : 
Q. You sa.id Mr. Spicer told you he could not 
pag·e 138 } remember the name of the insurance agent at 
Remington. Is it not a fact that he could not re-
member it?" 
A. No, I have my notes here on that. 
Q. You say he told you he had a policy with the man at 
Remington and could not remember his name? · 
A. Yes, but could not remember his name. 
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Q. Did you not get that mh:ed up with Hudgins? 
A. No. 
Q. You were there representing the insurance companyf 
A. Yes. 
Q. Trying to defeat the payment of the policy Y . 
A. No, I was there trying· to get the facts surrounding the 
matter. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 139} FRED IIUDGINS, 
being recalled by Counsel for Defendant, testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXilfiNATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
. Q. Mr. Hudgins, you represent how many insurance com-
panies? 
A. Eig·ht. 
Q. Are you familiar \vith what is generally known as the 
Virginia Standard l\{ortgage Clause of standard policies f 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. This is the policy that was introduced in evidence and 
I want you to look at it and ask you whether these provisions,. 
beginning at line 101 and ending with line 200, give ali the 
standard mortgage provisions which have been promulgated 
and adopted by the State as to fire insurance policies f 
A. I could tell them by reading them, but the standard form 
of policy is promnlg·ated by the State Corporation Commis-
s~on. 
Q. And if there is any change they have to be approved by 
the State Corporation Commission? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Miller: 'Ve ask that that be stricken. 
By the Court: The question and answer a.re both stricken. 
By Mr. 1\Hller: The one preceding it, the san1e 
page 140 ~ objection is made. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Will you please state as to what is the difference be-
tween a recording farm policy and a farm policy? 
A. I never issued a policy in the fa.rm department of a.ny 
insurance company, but the recording· form is where th~ agent 
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has the authority and does issue all the policies from his own 
office. . 
Q. Will you please state whether it is not a fact that when 
you operate the ag-ency of a company that they leave with 
you a certain number of policies and they are in blank and · 
your authority is to issue policies and to deliver those policies 
when issued, and you have that power; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You do know the distinction between farm policies 1 
A. They are issued, as I understand it-
By Mr. :Miller: (interposing) I object to that. 
By Mr . .Sands: I withdraw the question. ~ 
Q. Have you a line of policies of different companies, Mr. 
Hudgins? , . 
A. Yes, five. 
Q. What policies Y 
A. One is the London, Liverpool &. Globe Company; one is 
the ·continental Fire Insurance Company of New 
p::~ge 141 ~ York; Insurance Company of North America, of 
Philadelphia Hartford Fire Insurance Company 
of Hartford, Connecticut. 
Q. The recording- form of tl1e Hartford Y 
A. Yes, and the Fire Association of Philadelphia. 
Q. Please open those policies so as to be able to exhibit 
thP.m in comparison 'vith ·the policv on file here? 
A. May I say I cannot deliver these policies to you or any-
, one else as exhibits? 
Q. Yes, I understand that. Turn to the Hartford policy 
and look at the standard provisions there Y 
By Mr. Miller: vVe object to the policies; there is no evi-
dence herA as to thP.m. 
By the 1Court: He wants to compare them. 
By ~fr. Sands: It is up to the plaintiff to compare them 
line by line; but I want to show every one of these standard 
policies are in the identical type as the one here involved and 
that these are the ones which have beP.n issued by the other 
companies, all carrying- the standard notification from the 
Virginia office. 
· By Mr. 1\Hller: We object. 
By the Court: That bring·s us to this consideration; this 
witness should compare the type or the size of the 
page 142 } type of a certain policy with the size of type of 
certain other policies. The witness has been in-
114 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Cla·ude Inskeep. 
terrogated as to this experience as an insurance agent. He 
has not been interrogated as to his experience in the com-
parison of the size of type. If the evidence is for that pur-
pose and that purpose alone, I think the objection is good. 
By JVIr. Sands: I will introduce 1\:Ir. Inskeep. 
By Mr. Miller: We object. to it on the further ground that 
even though other companies use the same size of type, it 
does not affect this policy, if it is not of the proper size of 
type. 
By the Court: I think that objection is good. I think you 
can introduce a qualified witness, or any number of qualified 
witness~s, if they qualify along that line, to testify to the 
size of the type -in the policy in question. I don't think you 
can say whether another policy is in the same size of type as 
the one in evidence here, but you can introduce any evidence 
you have as to the size of the type in the policy in question 
here. 
By Mr. Sands: If your. Honor please, I except to your 
ruling. My exception is for the reason that the policies re-
ferred to were all, as disclosed by a former question to this 
witness, designated as standard fire insurance policies of the 
State of Virginia and that according· to the testimony stated 
these were issued and in common use in his office. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 143 ~ CLAUDE INSI{EEP, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn. testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. Will you please state your name Y 
A. Claude Inskeep. 
Q. Where a.re you employed 1 
A. Virginia Star. 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Printer. 
Q. How long· have you been a printer? 
A. About fifteen years. 
Q. What are your duties a.t the Star Y 
.A.. J\{ostly typesetting. 
I . 
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Q. A.re you familiar with type generally and the style of 
type and the size of type 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A question has been involved here in this case as to 
whether or not certain type found on this policy which has 
been introduced in evidence '''CI 437 Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company, on the second page thereof, or the page which 
carries this X mark, whether that is brevier or 8-point type, 
and I want· to ask you to look at this policy, 
page 144} and state to the gentlemen of the jury what is the 
type of this policy, as you observe the general 
line of the policy; to be specific, that portion of it which con-
cerns '' othe1· insurance'', where that X is! 
By ]\{r. Miller: I object on the ground that he has not 
qualified on type, says he has been a printer for fifteen years. 
By the Court: 
Q. Are you familiar with linotype printing! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. You have had fifteen years' experience? 
A. Yes,sir. 
Q. Ca.n you state the size of the type on page 2 of the policy 
which lVIr. Sands just handed you¥ . 
A. It is 8-point. 
Q. vVill you please demonstrate to the jury how you meas-
urP. that and explain how you arrive at that T 
A. All type, -what they call lo,ver case, ascends and de-
scends ; for instance, lower case d would have an ascent and 
9 would be a descfmt. You measure from the top of the line. 
p 
Say an l, which is a high letter to the bottom of at, w)lich has 
a descent. Take a rulP (illustrating with rule), 
pag-e 145 ~ that is 8-point-that is 8-point scaled on this ru1e 
( illnstra ting on rule or type scale). ·Yon measure 
from line to linP., it is exactly 8-point. 
Bv Juror: . 
·o .. What is the difference in the size of 8-point type and 
7-point type? 
A. There is one point difference. 
Q. What is the space of a pointY 
A. The space of a point is approximately the thickness of 
this rule. 
14=1/72 of inch 
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By the Court: 
Q. Mr. Inskeep, I understand you1· testimony is that all of 
page 2 of that policy, except the head lines, which are larger 
-that all of page 2 is brevier or 8-point type, is that correctf 
A. I nevP.r. measured all of it. 
-By Mr. Sands: 
Q. This is page 2 (indicating policy). As I correctly in-
terpret the court, you say that so ·far as the body of page 
2 is concerned all that page is 8-point or larger¥ 
A. Yes, sir, 8-point. 
. Q. I want to show you another policy here, !\ir. Inskeep, a 
blank policy of the London, Liverpool and ~lobe Insurance 
Company, and ask you to look at the second page 
page 146 ~ of that policy and state whether or not that is 
also 8-point¥ 
By Mr. Miller: We objP.Ct to that. 
By the Court: The objection, I think, is good and we will 
get an answer to that, if you desire, ~lr. Sands, out of the 
presence of the jury. 
A. That is also 8-point. 
By the Court: The jury will disregard his answer and the 
jury may retire. 
Jury out. 
By ~{r. Sands: If your Honor please, my reason for urging 
that question is two-fold; first, because, I submit that 've have 
the ri~ht, in order to show the general familiarity of this 
gentleman to such matters, to g·ive him certain books or types 
to compare the size of the type as we did Mr. Green on yes-
terday. The second point is, I maintain that the question 
is proper because it is desirable to get before the jury the 
fact that this policy is in accordance 'vith other policies that 
are issued; that this is not any special policy in which they 
are attempting to limit or put restrictions on the assured. 
By the Court: The court has ruled on that. I 
page 147 ~ told the jury to go out so Mr. Sands could save 
the point. The court sustains the objection, and 
counsel for defendant makes the same exception as made to 
the original question. 
Jury in. 
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CROSS EXAMIN ... t\.TION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. :1\rfr. Inskeep, you say you \\rork for the Virginia StarY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which is the larger, 7 -point type or 8-point ¥ 
A. 8-point. 
Q. Which is the larger, 8-point or 9-pointY 
A. 9-point. 
Q. In what size type is the ·virginia Star printed f 
A. The body is 7-point. · 
Q. I am handing you a copy of the Virginia Star and over 
the words "most any and everything", beginning· with these· 
words, "A newspaper story from Scotland is to the effect,.',. 
&c., in what size type are the words I have just mentioned 
to you, as found on the first page of the Virginia Star Y You 
just said that was 7 -point type, is that right? 
A. The body. 
Q. In fact, all the body, except the headlines, is 
page 148 ~ 7-point type~ 
A. Not all of it, but practically all of it. 
· Q. All of the first column in the copy of the Star that I 
am handing you now, beginning, with the words ''a newspa-
per", all the way down through seven paragraphs to the 
word "considerably" is in 7-point type, is that right? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. You said in response to a question, as I understood you, 
from Mr . .Sands, that all along down the line on page 2 of 
the policy sued on is 8-point type, is that right Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. What is the difference between 8-point type and brevier 
type? 
A. The same thing. 
Q. Then, according to your testimony, the conditions and 
the restrictions and stipulations as mentioned in the policy 
sued on the type. there is one point larger than it is in the 
Star? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you mean to tell the jury, then that the type used 
in printing the Virginia Star is a point smaller than the type 
used on the policy in litigation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By }Ir. :Miller: Can I show that paper to the jury1 your Honor? 
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page 149 ~ By the Court: Mr. Inskeep, are you familiar 
with the contents of the Virginia Star there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There is nothing· in there about this case, is there? 
A. No, sir. 
By l.VIr. Miller: Gentlemen of the jury, the witness says all 
of this type in the Virginia Star is 7 -point and all of this 
in this policy is 8-point, and, therefore, is larger than that. 
All I ask you to do is to compare them. · 
By Witness : There are different faces on type. Here is 
the difference (illustrating with scale). You can see the dif-
ference. You see, this measure is 8-point and this is 7 -point. 
It is slig-htly under the mark. 
By Juror: Put your rule on the other one, now. 
A. It touches both lines. There is some little difference. 
It is hard to· detect without measuring- it. The size of type 
is judged from the top to the bottom. 
Bv the Court : 
"'Q. Mr. Inskeep, does the spread of the type, that is, its 
length along the base line have anything to do with what 
point it is; or is it purely from the top to the ·bottom of the 
letter, or both f 
A. Entirely from the top to the bottom. 
page 150 ~ Q. Then, what I designate as the spread o~ the 
type has nothing to do with the point number? 
A. No, sir. · 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Inskeep, the Virginia Star, in printing it you use 
the linoytpe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That word linotype is simply an abbreviation for line 
of type? . .' 
A .. Yes, I would think so; that is a trade mark. 
Q. Now, 1\fr. Inskeep, that type and all type that you set 
is larger at the base than on the face, is it not? 
A. The base of the type is larger than the face. 
Q. So, you can have an 8-point base on a 7-point face can 
you not? · ' 
A. You c~n put 7-point on 8-point base, yes. · 
Q. The d1fference between the 8 and 7-point-now, I am 
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talking about the face as it appears on the paper-is very 
little, is it not, hardly the width of a sheet of paperY 
A. State your question over, please. 
Q. I said, the difference in measuring between 8 and 7.-point 
is very little, is it not? 
· A. Very little. 
Q. You said, I believe, it was about the width 
page 151 ~ of that rule, is that about right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the thickness of that rule that I now hand you, 
and which you used in measuring before the juryt 
A. I would· say, I have nothing to measure it with, it is 
a point and a hal£. 
Q. What do you mean by a point, what fraction of an nich f 
A. Type is measured by picas ; 72 points to . an inch. 
Q. You tell the jury, after measuring and making your 
comparison, that the type referred to in the policy is larger 
by one point than the type in the Virginia Star f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the type referred to in the Virginia Star is 7-point 
type? 
A. Yes, sir, but a different face. 
Q. While in the policy it is 8-point? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And a different face f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The different face appears in both instances, in the Star 
. and in the policy? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Now, Mr. Inskeep, look up just above a little X mark 
on page 2 of the policy sued on and look at the words, "Un-
less otherwise provided bv agreement in writing 
page 152 ~ added hereto this Company shall not be liable for 
loss or damage occurring'', and tell nie in what 
size those words are as they appear on the ·face of the policy? 
A. That is 8-point. 
Q. You think it is, Mr. Inskeep? 
A. I know it. 
Q. Do you mean to tell me that those words I have just 
mentioned are of the same type that follows after the words, 
''(a) while the insured shall have any other contract of in-
surance'', &c. Y 
. A. The same size, but a different face. 
Q. That is 8-point, too? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
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Q. That is the same size as the words below there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Miller: I would like to hand that to the jury, if 
your Honor please. There is the words I referred to. The 
witness says they are all 8-point type and the same size. 
(Jury examines same.) 
Q. On this policy, which is the subject of controversy here, 
Mr. Inskeep, all of the printing is in black ink, ·but you tell 
the jury that those words I have quoted, which are apparently 
in blacker ink than the others, are in the same 
page 153 ~ type as the other T 
A. It is exactly the same size type from top to 
bottom. 
By Mr. Miller: Along Vv-ith Mr. Inskeep's evidence we want 
to introduce the Virginia Star of March 25, 1937, as "Exhibit , 
No. 6''. · 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 154 } G. G. 'V.ORSHAM, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being· first duly sworn, testified as follows: ~ 
DIRECT EXAl\ILNATION. 
By .Mr. Sands : 
Q. J\tlr. Worsham, will you please state your namef 
A. G. G. Worsham. 
Q. Your .age T 
A. Sixty-two. 
Q. Residence and occupation f 
A. President of the Richmond Press, Richmond, V a. 
Q. Mr. vVorsham, will you please state as to how long an 
experience you have had in matters of printing¥ 
A. Forty some years. 
Q. How did you start and wheref 
A. Started in as a boy. 
Q. On what paperY 
A. I was on the Leader; on the Times and on the Leader 
and afterwards on the Richmond News. ' 
Q. What 'vere your 'duties there? 
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A. J\ilaking up the paper; seeing that the type was set and 
n1aking it up. 
Q. Were you in business before the linotype 
pag·e 155 ~ was established 1 
. A. I had a small business of my own as a boy. 
Q. What was your position with the Times? 
A. I was the foreman on the paper. · 
Q. And your position with the News Leader~ 
A. The same thing. 
Q. \¥hen did you retire from the newspaper business and 
become jnterested in the printing business 1 
A. 1906. 
Q. Since that time you have been engaged at what? 
A. In my own printing establishment. 
Q. When was your business est~blished 1 
A. 1906. 
Q. During that time you have had much experience in print-
ing State printing work and pamphlets and records 7 
A. I expect I have printed 50,000 jobs. 
Q. There has been a question brought into this case as to 
the type of certain provisions in this insurance policy which 
is now the subject of litig·ation, which is the Ifartford policy, 
namely, the question of the type found on the second page. 
Will you please look at that and state to the court and the 
gentlemen of the jurv what type that is~ 
A. I have some type with me. I can tell from that. 
Q. Can you tell offhand from your inspection 
page 156 ~ of it what type it is? 
A. I 'vould say it was 8-point; it is brevier. All 
type is made on the point system, whereas some years ago 
it went by name. ' 
Q. Vrill you please explain to the gentlemen of the jury 
how that is arrived at, in some practical way. You say you 
have some type with you? 
A. I can measure this and tell you by the type. 
Q. That is what I want you to do 1 
A. (Witness measures the type in the policy.) Yes; that 
is 8-point. 
Q. Will you show to the court and jury exactly how you 
measure that? 
A. One line of type would be very hard to measure, but if 
you put several together you can get 20 points or 30 points. 
Type wiU fool you right much; some are flashy and some 
are Gothic. You can put a 6-point, or 7-point face on a 8-point 
body, hut that would be what you call leaded type, if you do 
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that· but solid type you can tell better by the fact of the 
y's ~nd the f's. I layman can tell it better by that, by the 
crossing when the f and y come together. Yo~ can hav~ an 
extended type. You can take a type and make 1t three trmes 
as wide, but you cannot make it any thicker than 
page 157 } t)lis. 
Bv the Court: 
• Q. It shows the vertical and not the horizontal Y 
A. Yes, sir; some is bold face. Old style type is the narrow-
est type, the thinnest type. Gothic is about as wide as any. 
Then, you can extend it more. You can haye it three or four 
times wider. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. It is a little difficult to tell the difference between the 
7 -point and 8-point type Y 
A. You cannot tell it with your eye, but you can absolutely 
tell it with the measure. 
Q. How was it 'vhen you went on the witness stand you 
could tell directly he questioned you y 
A. This is, a standard type. Bastard type are standard 
type, but hard to tell. 
Q. Were you in here when Mr. Inskeep was on the stand Y 
A. I was here during part of his testimony; not the first 
part. · .. 
Q. Look at this newspaper. I show you the first column 
there, following- the words, '' 4 newspaper story'', &c., and 
ask that you tell us what size type that is T 
A. I will take the type and show it. 
Q. I thought you could tell with your naked 
page 158 } eye f 
A. You want it positive, as I understand it. I 
tell you one thing about this type, this is leaded. 
Q. I asked you what type that was Y 
A. I can tell that with my eye, but I can t~ll it absolutely 
with this type. I think that is 7-point on an 8-point body. 
Q. How does it con1pa.re in size with 8-point or brevierY 
A. The face of it is bolder; the 7 -point is bolder than the 
8-point type, bolder face; but you can get a black face that 
will show up three or four times bolder. _ 
Q. You tell the jury the type in the policy is larger by one 
point than the type in the paperY . 
-
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A. This is 7-point in the paper carried on an 8-point body, 
while this policy is 8-point on the· standard body; this is the 
old style. · 
· By the Court: -
Q. When you say this, you refer to the poliey 7 
A. Yes, sir; it is a Roman, old style type, one of the stand-
ard types of the world. 
Q. There is really no difficulty for anyone, whether a news-
paper man, or not a newspaper man, if he has good eyesight, 
to distinguish between 7-point and 8-point type, is there·Y 
A. I think a layman can hardly distinguish it. 
page 159 ~ You can get some 6-point that will show up larger 
than 8-point. 
Q. Type speaks for itself, don't it? 
A. No, as I told you in the beginning, the y and f will prac-
tically touch. 
Q. You don't mean to say the newspapers and insurance 
companies try to deceive the public, do you f · 
A. I think the newspapers try to put as attractive type 
in as possible. The old style type is very hard to read at 
night. If you put it bolder they can read it better. 
Q. The question here is whether this is 7 -point or 8-point 
type in the body? · 
A. There is no question about that paper being 7-point on 
8-point body. 
Q. But not as large as the type in the policy? 
A. The policy type is 8-point on 8-point body. The type 
in the paper is 7-point on 8-point body, but that would be 
considered 7-point in the paper; that in the policy would be 
considered 8-point or brevier. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 160} · CLAUDE INSI{EEP, 
being recalled by Counsel for the Plaintiff, tes-
tified as follo,vs : 
DIRECT E·XAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
· Q. Did I understand you to say this type about which you 
testified as it appears in the Virginia Star was 7-point on a 
7-point bodyY 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. What did you say¥ 
A. I said it was 7-point type. 
Q. Did you say it was 7-point on a 7-point bodyY 
A. It is a 7-point type on a 9-point base. 
Q. Then, you differ 'vith the gentleman who just testified Y 
A. I know it, because 1 set it. 
Q. Then, he is wrong in what he sayst 
A. Slightly. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 161 ~ 0. B. ROBERTS, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the Defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMlNATION. 
By Mr. Sands: · · 
Q. Mr. Roberts, will you please state your nameY 
A. 0. B. Roberts. 
Q. For whom do you work Y 
A. The I-Ia1·tford Fire Insurance Company. 
Q. How long have you been an employee of the Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company1 · 
A. Since June 17, 1930. 
Q. What is your position now with that Company in the 
State of Virginia Y 
A. Special Agent. 
Q. For the State of Virginia f . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Roberts, I want to ask you something about the 
question of the recording policy and the farm policy; will 
yon please state the difference between those policies in the 
insurance world f 
By 1\{r. Miller: I want to make an objection. It will prob-
ably be better to make this objection in the absence of the jury. 
By the Court: The jury will retire. 
page 162 ~ Jury out. 
By the Court: We will examine the witness out of the pres-
ence of the jury and after the examination make your ob-
jections out of the presence of the jury. 
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By Mr. Sands: 
Q. I will repeat the question I put to you before the jury 
retired : I want to ask you something about the question of 
the recording policy and the form policy; will you please 
state the difference between those policies in the insurance 
worldt · 
A. The main difference is not in the insurance clauses, ·but 
in the method of issuing those policies. The recording poli-
cies are issued by agents usually in the locality near the 
risk, while those same agents are sometimes agents that only 
represent farm departments, and instead of issuing the poli-
cies, take applications, which are required to be signed by 
the applicant and sent to the head office. 
By the Court: Repeat the last, please, Mr. Roberts Y 
A. I say, agents writing insurance on the farm department 
plan take the application of the prospective assured and sub-
mit it to the head office of the Company, where the applica-
tion is either accepted, as evidenced by the issu-
page 163 ~ ance of the policy in this case, or rejected. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. In other words, is it or not true that as far as the ques-
tion of agency that where the reco1~ding policy is concerned 
there is a latitude .given the agent to place and deliver the 
policy as of that agent, which would make that policy binding 
from that time on 1 ' 
A. Yes, sir; that is right. 
Q. And it would be in force from that time on 7 
..A.. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : The foregoing questions and answers are 
ruled out. · . 
Q. I want to ask you whether or not the farm policy ex-: 
tends any privileges to the assured in the method of economy 
or saving in the terms, and, if so, as to what is that sav-
ing? 
A. Yes, under the farm department plan the policies are 
usually written for a term of five vears for four an.d one-
half annual premiums, and a fifth "'of the gross amount of 
the premium is payable on delivery of the policy and notes 
are given and payable at intervals of a year for the next 
four years in like amounts, 'vhereas, if that policy had been 
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issued on the recording plan the full premium would have 
been payable on delivery of the policy. In that way it makes 
the insurance easier for the average farmer; for 
page 164 ~ instance, to keep it up, he can pay one-fifth easier 
than he can the whole thing at one time. 
By the Court: The foreg·oing question is allowed to go 
to the jury and that portion of the answer which reads as 
follows: ''Yes, under the farm department plan the policies 
are usually written for a term of five years for four and one-
half annual premiums,· and a fifth of the gross amount of 
the premium is payable on delivery of the policy and notes 
are given and payable at intervals of a year for the next 
four years in like amounts.'' 
Q. Please state whether or not in issuing the farm policy 
which you have stated usually runs for a period of five years 
they are always issued for five years? 
A. As a rule. You can issue them for. one or three years. 
By the Court: The foregoing question and answer are al-
lowed to go to the jury. 
Q. State whether you require an application and whether 
that application is sent to the Company before the policy is 
issued? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: The foregoing question and answer are al-
lowed to g·o to the jury. 
page '165 ~ Q. I want to ask you whether or not there is a 
further difference in the two policies, that in the 
recording policy providing that "in consideration of the stipu-
lations herein named and of the :fig·ures named the policy is 
issued", and whether it is not true that in the farm policies 
similar to the farm policy issued by the Hartford Fire In-
surance Company it provides that ";:n consideration of the 
stipulations herein named and the consideration of money as 
mentioned and the warranty made in the assured's applica-
tion fo~· indemnity in said Company". In other words, is it 
or not specifically stated that the statements as found in the 
application are the warranties of the assured? 
A. Yes, the application and the policy provide it. 
• 
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By the Court: The foregoing question and answer are ruled 
out. · 
Q. I hand you the policy sued on and ask you whether this 
is the farm policy governed and controlled by the conditions 
you have testified toY 
A: It is and is so labeled. 
By Mr. Miller: We object to all of it. 
By the Court: At the end of the examination in chief you 
can make the same objection, which will have the same force 
as if made to each one of them. The question and answer 
will go to the jury. 
Q. State whether or not the Company has received any 
proof of loss in this case? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
page 166 ~ By the Court: The foreg·oing question and an-
swer are allowed to go to the jury. 
By lVIr. lVIiller: We object to it all. I don't see that it 
has anything to do with the issue here. One of the main ob-
jections is that he is trying to distinguish between two meth-
ods of writing insurance on an entirely different policy from 
the class of policy here sued on. Ile is trying to distinguish 
between other agents who write policies on a different plan 
and this agent who writes on this plan. Our contention is 
they ·are entirely distinct contracts and entirely different 
agents, and had nothing to do with this agent, nor his con-
tract with this Company, nor what he 'vas held out to do, and 
for that reason he has no right to make that distinction. 
By Mr. Sands: lVIay it please the Court, in reply to the 
gentlemen, it seems to n1e that it is absolutely necessary that 
the jury should receiye this information. We have been in 
the tri~l two days, as well as the opening statement, to· dis-
tinguish between the two and the liability involved in the two 
l1as been the subject of remark without objection. Evidence 
is necessary to distinguish and differentiate between policies. 
It is a difference which has been recognized, as I brought to 
the attention of the Court yesterday, by the Su-· 
page 167 ~ preme Court in construing the different classes 
of policies. I think the evidence is essential for 
the proper understanding of the case. 
By the Court: .In the Poole case (Royal Insurance Co. v. 
Poole), in the trial court, there seems to have been an objec-
~·,f·>_~·_;'j"""'-,',"·:~:~····; 
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tion to the admission of most of the testimony along the line 
concerning which this witness, Mr. R.oberts, has been inter-
rogated; therefore, the n1ost of that evidence was admitted 
without objection. This evidence sought to be introduced here 
now through 1\{r. Roberts as special agent consists in part 
of his e:x:planation of the difference between a record policy 
and a farm policy, and he seeks to explain the difference be-
tween the record policy and the farm policy and to some ex-
tent seeks to give, if I got his testimony right, the legal ef-
fect of that difference. I think to that extent the testimony 
impinges somewhat upon the province of the court. The 
method of handling, or the legal effect of the recording policy 
is not in issue in the case at bar.' I do not think the witness 
can testify as to the method of handling the so-called record-
ing policy, or ~vidence tending to .show his opinion if the legal 
effect of either the so-called recording policy, or the so-called 
farm policy, and to that extent the objection to 
page 168 ~this evidence being before the jury will be sus-
tained. · : 
I think the witness can state the method of handling the 
farm policy, but not his opinion, or comparison as between 
the farm policy and the farm recording policy. In other 
words, I think he can state the mechanism, so to tenn it, of 
handling the policy such as is in evidence and sued upon here, 
and can state that this policy is a farm policy. To that ex-
tent the objection to the admission of the testimony broug·ht 
out will be overruled. I think the witness can introduce be-
fore the jury his statement that no proof of. loss in this case 
has been submitted, if he knows, or the extent of his knowl-
edge on that particular phase of it. The jury being out, the 
court will also state that in admitting the evidence last men-
tioned the court is not passing upon the question whether or · 
not in this particular case proof of loss is required or has been 
waived. 
By Mr. Sands: On behalf of the Defendant, I note an ex-
ception to so n1uch of the ruling of the court as restricts the 
testimony offered by the defendant upon the ground that the 
issue between a general conduct of business and that pre-
sented in the case here requires some enlighten-
page 169 ~ ment in ord~r to impart knowledge to the jury of 
the mechanics, so to speak, of the handling of 
the proposition in question from an insurer's standpoint and 
some testimony is necessary, in the opinion of couns~l, in 
order for the jury to properly reach a conclusion as to the 
difference between this character of policy and the one that 
• 
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is generally in use, as has heretofore been testified in this 
case. 
· By Mr. Miller: Counsel for plaintiff now submits a mo-
tion to strike all the testimony of Witness Roberts, upon the 
ground that it is irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in-
volved in this case, and, further, excepts to the ruling of the 
court in admitting· any of his testimony, that is, of the tes-
timony of Witness Roberts, for the same reasons as form 
the basis of the motion to exclude all of his testimony as 
stated, and for the further reason that he is permitting the 
witness to testify as to the general plan of the handling_ of 
the farm insurance business and not. restricting him to the 
specific contract under which this insurance was solicited and 
secured. 
Note: At this point the jury was brought in and adjourn-
ment taken until 2 o'clock P. M. 
page .170 ~ In Chambers : 
By Mr. Sands: . 
Q. Mr. Roberts, you have stated that you have been in the 
insurance business some twenty years? 
A. More than sixteen yeat~s. 
Q. ·Will y9u please state where, during that period of time, 
has your work been, in what department of your Company? 
A. I have worked in the underwriting end of every de-
partment. I qualify that by saying except ocean marine. 
A. I notice from the application which has been introduced 
in evidence in this case, bearing the sig·nature if G. W. Spicer, 
and which has been testified to was signed by him, there are 
certain interrog·atories, one of which asks the question: ''Is 
there any other insurance on this property? Q. If so, state 
the amount on each item covered and give the date of expira-
tion o£ same?" and the plaintiff's answer thereto was writ~ 
ten, ''No". Will you please state whether from your experi-
ence and knowledge as an insurance man the existence or 
non-existence of other insurance than that stated by the as-
. sured is considered material to the risk when the 
page 171 ~ policy is placed or assumed? 
By Mr. Miller: We object on the ground that it calls for 
a ·legal opinion for this witness. The policy and the appli- . 
cation speak for themselves. They are in writing and ·the 
witnesses have testified both for the plaintiff and the de-
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fendant in regard to the application; how it was filled out 
and by whom. lVIr. Fifield, ~imself, said tha~ w~th t~e ex-
ception of one or two notations on the application 1t was 
filled out by him at his home, sent in to the Company, and 
that 1\tlr. Spicer had never seen it or had access to it until 
here during the trial. :Now, whether or not that other in-
surance policy mentioned by counsel for the defendant is ma-
terial or immaterial is a question of law, based upon the facts 
as stated, and a statement of this witness is nothing more 
than his opinion of what is material to the risk, or what is 
not material to the risk. For these reasons we object to 
the question and to any answer that may be given, and for 
the further reason that the witness is an agent of the Com-
pany and any statement he. made would be a self-serving 
declaration. 
·By Mr. Sands: In response to the objection made by coun-
sel for the plaintiff as to the questions asked the court will 
observe that the policy of insurance here sued on, 
page 172 ~ the form of it, provides that it is issued "in con-
sideration of the stipulations herein nan1ed, the 
· consideration of money as mentioned and the warranty made 
in the· assured's application for indemnity in said Company''. 
·- Under these circumstances, the question as to whether an 
answer as given in such application was material or imma-
terial is a question of fact, of which evidence mat be adduced 
from those who are qualified to express an opinion on a mat-
ter of insurance ; and to deny, therefore, the admission of 
such testimony would preclude the defendant from present-
ing to the jury evidence which was essential to its defense. 
The questions mentioned or urged by counsel in respect to 
how the application was executed and how signed is another 
and a different question and may be considered at a dif-
ferent time and in a different way. I might say it is abso-
_lutely essential and the universal practice on these ques-
tions is purely on a matter of warranty, that evidence may 
be introduced as to the materiality from the assured's stand-
point, and it is for that purpose that 've direct this question. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled. . 
By Mr. Miller: Exception is noted on the g·rounds stated 
in the objection. 
A. Very decidedly. The answer to that ques-
. page 173 ~ tion has a very decided effect on the underwriter's 
judg·ment of the risk, or the acceptance or rejec-
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tion of it, and it is material to the assumption of the risk from 
the underwriter's standpoint. 
Q. ~Ir. Roberts, from yo\lr experience as an insurance man 
engaged in. the underwriting business, if an application of 
insurance had been submitted to you wherein it was shown 
that the value of the property sought to be insured was a ru-
ral dwelling of a present cash value as certified or reported 
of $3,500 and the sum of insurance asked to be placed was 
$2,400, if it had come to the lmowledge of you as underwriter, 
with your experience as such, that there was at that time 
additional insurance upon that dwelling of $1,700, or carrying 
a total of $4,100, would or would not you have accepted that 
risk? 
By 1\fr. Miller: That question is objected to. It calls for 
an opinion of the witness and asks the witness what he would 
have done under certain conditions that don't exist here, and 
for the further reason that this witness is an agent of the 
Con1pany and is now speaking for the Company with as much 
force as. any representative of the Company could answer, 
and is purely, as Mr. Johnson suggested i·n regard to the 
·other questions asked, a self-serving declaration, 
page 174 ~ and I think it is clearly admissible. 
By lVIr. Sands : In reply to counsel, I would 
merely like to say that the objection as to the fact of Mr. 
Roberts being· an agent or representative of the Company 
would be solely to the question of the value that might be 
attributed by anybody passing upon such a question, but it 
would not disqualify the witness. The interest of the wit-
ness or any interested party has for many years ceased to 
disqualify in the law. 
A. No. You can talk to any insurance man and he sees a 
valuation stated by the applicant to be $3,500 and he already 
has $1,700 insura·nce on that item and he wants $2,400 more, 
making $4,100 insurance, m9re than the value of the prop-
erty, and you know that you can only collect under the tenns 
of the policy three-fourths of the sound value, which, assume 
the value would be $3,500, three-fourths of that is the most 
you can collect, naturally you cannot take the policy; it would 
be criminal to · take his money, knowing you would not be 
liable for so much. He would be paying a premium for more 
than he could collect. . 
By Mr. J o:hnson: The question is objected to and I ask 
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for the same to .be stricken out. It is not in re-
page 175 ~ sponse to the question; it is affirmative and not a 
. statement of facts. · · 
By the Court: The objection is good and is su~tained, t_he 
court stating as a reason, among other reasons, that it In-
volves the individual act of judgment on the part of the wit-
ness so situated. 
Q. Mr. Roberts, in the application, which was admittedly 
signed by Mr. Spicer and testified to have been sent to the 
Hartford Insurance Company's office at Atlanta previous 
to the issuance of this policy, among the questions propounded 
and answers certified was this question: ''Is any of your 
property, real or personal, under mortgage lien or encum-
brances? Q. If so, state at what amount and when due Y" 
The answer as shown in the application reads as follows: 
"Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, $800, amortization plan.'' 
·Will you please state to the court whether from an under-. 
writing standpoint, if the true facts as related were that the 
loan from the Federal Land Bank was not $800, but a sum 
in excess of $3,000, would you consider that the difference 
between those amounts, or the failure to report the true con-
ditions that such a comparison would disclose would have 
had or be considered a material matter in the issuance of the 
insurance granted upon such application? 
page 176 ~ By 1\Ir. Miller: Objected to for the same rea-
sons heretofore assigned, calling for an opinion 
and getting an answer in a different way. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled, to which ruling 
counsel for the plaintiff excepts. 
A. Yes, naturally such a wide difference in the statement 
of the amount of the mortgage would have an adverse effect 
in passing on the risk. 
Q. And in your judgment material to the risk assumed! 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Miller: Objected to because calling for an indi-
vidual opinion. · 
·By the Court:· The objection is overruled, to which ruling 
counsel for the plaintiff excepted. 
By the Court: The sheriff will bring the jury in. 
Jury in: 
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By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, to save time, the 
following examination in chief of Mr. Roberts, who was on 
the stand, will be read to you by the stenographer, to' have 
the same effect, and no more or less, as if Mr. Roberts, him-
self, were on the stand and had testified to that 
page 177 ~ before you. 
(The following questions and answers, taken in the ab-
sence of the jury, were. read to the jury by the stenographer:) 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. I want to ask you whether or not the farm policy ex-
tends any privilege to the assured in the method of economy 
or saving in the terms, and, if so, as to what is that saving? 
. A. Yes, under the farm department plan the policies are 
usually written for a term of five years for four and one-
half annual premiums, and a :fifth of the gross amount of 
the premium is payable on delivery of the policy and notes 
are given and payable at intervals of a year for the next four 
years in like amounts. . 
. Q. Please state whether or not in issuing the farm policy, 
which you have stated usually runs for a period of five years, 
they are always issued for five years 7 . 
A. As a rule. You can issue th~m for one or three years. 
· Q. State whether you require an application and whether 
!hat application is sent to the Company before the policy is 
Issued! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you the policy sued on and ask you whether this 
is the farm policy governed and controlled by the conditions 
you have testified to 7 
A. It is and is so labeled. 
Q. State whether or not the Company has re-
page 178 } ceived any P!Oof of loss in this caseY 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Mr. Roberts, you have stated that you have been in the 
insurance business some twenty years? 
A. ·More than sixteen years. 
Q. Will you please state where, during that period of tirpe, 
has been your work, in what d.epartment of your Company? 
A. I have worked in the underwriting end of every depart-
ment. I qualify that by sa.ying except ocean marine. 
Q. I notice fron1 the application which has been introduced 
in evidence in this case, bearing the signature of G. W. Spicer, 
and which has been testified to was signed by him, there are 
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certain interrogatories, one of which asks the question: "Is 
there any other insurance on this property¥ Q. If so, state 
the amount on each item covered and give the date of expira-
tion of same?'' and the plaintiff's answer thereto was written, 
''No''. Will you please state whether from your experience 
and· knowledge as an insurance man the existence or non-
existence of other insurance than that stated by the assured 
is considered material to the risk when the policy is placed 
or assumed? 
A. Very decidedly. The answer to that question has a very 
decided effect on the underwriter's judgment of 
page 179 ~ the risk, or the acceptance or rejection of it, and 
it is material to the assumption of the risk from 
the underwriter's standpoint. 
Q. Mr. Roberts, in the application, which was admittedly 
signed by Mr. Spicer and testified to have been sent to the 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company's office at Atlanta previous 
to the issuance of this policy, among the questions propounded 
and answers certified was this question: ''Is any of your 
property, real or personal, under mortgage lien or encum-
brance? Q. If so, state at what amount and when duet'' 
The answer as shown in the application reads as follows: 
"Federal Land Bank of Baltinwre, $800, amortization plan." 
Will you please state to the court whether from an under-
writing standpoint, if the true facts as related were that the 
loan from the Federal Land Bank 'vas not $800, but a sum 
in excess of $3,000, would you consider that the difference 
between those amounts, or the failure to report the true con-
ditions that such a comparison would disclose would have had 
or be considered a material matter in the issuance of the 
insurance granted upon such application? 
A. Yes, naturally such a wide difference in the statement 
of the amount of the mortgage would have an adverse effect 
in passing on the risk. 
page 180 r Q. And in your judgment material to the risk 
assumedt 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. 1\Hller: 
. Q. Mr. Roberts, you said in response to a question no proof 
of loss had been submitted to your knowledge. As a matter 
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of fact, in the various departments a good many things are 
done in your office without your kno,vledge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you lmo'v anything about the Adjustment Depart-
ment? 
A. Yes, I receive notices through the agents, or if the notice 
is forwarded to our Atlanta Office, or the Home Office, it is 
forwarded to me and I assign the matter to the adjuster. In 
that way, I know about all of· them. 
Q. Then, in the Adjustment Department, as well as other 
departments, you are always fair and aim to present the as-
sured all the necessary information he calls for, don't you Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Are you certain of that Y 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. All right; let me read you a letter to the Adjustment 
Department and the reply from the Company and see if. you 
think that is, exactly fair. I read now a copy of a 
page 181 } letter received by Mr. Spicer: 
"Elkwood, Va., August 11, 1936. 
''The Fire Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 
Richmond, Va. 
Gentlemen: 
I have not heard anything from you about my loss at Elk-
wood, Va., by fire. 
::Mr. Fifield, the agent for the Hartford Insurance Company, 
suggested that you be communicated with about the matter, 
stating that you were handling the matter for the Hartford 
Company. 
I am asking you whether I shall return the policy to the 
Company and what is going to be done about a settlement 
with me? My understanding is that there will be no ques-
tion about payment of my loss. 
If you will let me hear from you I will thank you ·very 
much. 
Very truly yours, 
GEORGE W. SPICER." 
-
The answer is this : 
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Richmond, Va., Aug. 13, 1936. 
"Mr. George W. Spi~er, 
Elkwood, Va. 
Dear Sir: 
Referring to your letter of August 11, we refer you to the 
policy, which is clear and specific. 
y ourcs very truly, 
J. R. LOYD, 
Adjuster.' 1 
Q. Do you think that is a fair statetnent, giving the man 
an explanation of what he wants 7 
A. I do and if you allow it I will give you an explanation. 
page 182 ~ By the Court : Go ahead. 
A. Between the time that the adjuster intervie,ved Mr. 
Spicer, the assured, and the time you wrote the letter from 
Mr. Spicer to the· Bureau, other information developed about 
the other insurance in excess of the amount of the mortgage 
which placed it in an entirely different position. 
Q. Don't you think it would have been nice in you to have 
written to him and told him thatY 
A. The 'policy tells him that. 
Q. Could you not tell him anything you kne,vf You had the 
policy, did you not.Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why could you not have given him the information asked 
ln there? . 
A. Had Mr. Spicer given us all the facts right we would 
have reciprocated by assisting him beyond the contract. 
Q. He says, "I am asking you whether I shall return the 
policy to the Company''. Here was your assured writing you 
a fair letter, and asking you what is going to be done about 
the settlement with him, and you write him this reply: '' Re-
ferring to your letter of August 11th, we refer you to the 
policy, which is clear and specific.'' Do you think that was 
a fair and considerate reply! 
A. I consider it so. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 183 ~ By Mr. Sands : The defendants rests. 
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Raleigh T. Green. 
RALEIGH T. GREEN, 
being. recalled in rebuttal by Counsel for Plaintiff, testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Green, you have heard the testimony of the gentle-
man from Richmond and the gentleman from Culpeper, Mr. 
Inskeep, in regard to the size of the type. Since you have 
heard that testimony do you adhere to the same opinion you 
gave before? 
By Mr. Sands: We' object to this, as mere repetition. 
By the Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Mr. Green, I am handing you a copy of the Virginia. Star, 
a newspaper published in Culpeper, which has been filed as 
''Exhibit 6", and ask you to look down these columns here, 
especially the :first column beginning with the words, ''A news-
paper story from Scotland'', &c., and all the way down that 
column to the word ''considerably'' in the seventh paragraph 
and tell me the size of that type as it appears in the paper? 
By Mr. Sands: I submit, if your Honor please, that the 
size of the type in the Star is not a matter of dis-
page 184 } pute or interest in this case; in other words, if 
he could, as I would suggest that he could, frame 
a question that Mr. So and So ~:)aid so and so, is that or not a 
fact, in rebuttal testimony. 
By the Court : 1\Ir. Green has been on the stand and has 
testified to certain n1atters. Other witnesses on behalf of the 
defendant have been on the stand and testified to certain mat- . 
ters. One of the matters concerning which the other witnesses 
for the defendant testified was as to the size of tbe type in the -
Virginia Star, concerning which this witness is now being 
asked a question. This witness was not interrogated as to the 
size of that type in the previous examination. I think it is 
proper rebuttal and I will allow him to testify to that. 
A. That is 7-point leaded. 
Q. Is it larger or smaller than the type to which you re-
ferred yesterday as appearing in the policy sued on 1 
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By 1\ir. Sands: If your Honor please, I submit that is not 
a proper question. He said this is 7 -point leaded. He testi-
fied yesterday as to what that was in his judgment. Now the 
· question is bringing back what we went over and 
page 185 ~ over again as to whether this is larger or smaller 
than that. 
By Mr. Miller: He has a right to compare it, because the 
newspaper had never been introduced when he testified before. 
·Now I ask him about a type which he has heretofore testi-
fied to was a 7-point type. He now testifies that the type 
in the Virginia Star is 7 -point leaded. 
By the Court: I think the purport of that question has been 
elicited from this witness in his former examination in a 
different form. 
By Mr. Miller: 'V e note a.n exception to the ruling of the 
court. 
By Mr. Miller:· Now, there is one further question I think 
we are entitled to ask this witness. 
By the Court: Suppose you propound the question and I 
will rule on it. 
By Mr. Miller: This is rebuttal testimony. Mr. Green 
has never had an opportunity to testify yet; he has never 
been asked- . 
By Mr. Sands: i object to counsel approaching the ques-
tion in this way. 
By the Court: It may not be objected to. Therefore, we 
may be wasting time. Propound the question. 
page 186 ~ By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Green, in your opinion can a layman, or 
a man not an expert in printing, tell the difference between 
7-point and 8-point type by the naked eye? 
- A. I don't think so. 
Q. You did not understand me. I say, can a layman, or a 
party not an expert in printing, tell the difference between 
7-point and 8-point typ.e with the naked eye7 
~ A. There all sorts of different faces set on linotype, but a 
layma.n may be looking at 8-point type printing on a lino-
type, yet it would be 7 -point by physical measurement, or 
vice versa. He may be looking at 7 -point and yet be 8-point. 
·By the Court: 
Q. Then, the effect of your answer, as I caught it, would 
be that a layman could not tell Y , 
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By Mr. Miller: · No, he said a layman could. 
A. I said all a layman can go by is appearance. He don't 
know anything about points of type; he would not know any-
. thing about 7-point and 8-p~~nt type. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. He can tell which is the larger, 7 or 8-point! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He can tell which is .the largest or smallest 7 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And he don't have to be an expert to do that 7 
page 187 } A. Absolutely not. · 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sands: . 
Q. The acid test is the measurement, is it not t 
A. I don't know whether it is or not. I should think the 
acid test would be the appearance. 
Q. The only question is the fact as to whether it is 7 -point or 
8-point. You said the layman could not tell with the naked 
eye, and therefore measurement would be the test, would it 
not? 
A.. Take the :virginia Star, they have 7-point on 9-point 
body. 
. Q. You consider that 9-point type? 
A. By measurement I do, as to the body. The body is 9-
point, but the face is only 7 -point. 
Q. You can only reach it by measurement, is not that true? 
A. The measurement varies too much in a linotype. 
Q. The linotype has run away with everything; there is 
no way you can get a mathematical test on a linotype, it varies 
so much? 
A. You can get a check on a linotype, but it varies so much. 
_ Q. There is a method by which a printer could 
page 188 ~ go at it and that is by measurement? . · 
A. You take a linotype slug-you take a column. 
of linotype slugs, say that long (indicating), the slug has a 
rough edge on every one of them and when you lock it up, 
it may have been 8-point when you locked it up, but after 
you lock it up it will be 7-point. 
Q. That is one of the puzzles of the linotype, it prevents 
you from being able to ascertain 7 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Is it not true that the only way you can find out is the 
subject of the measurement, to go from 6-point and all the 
way through Y 
A. There is 72-points to an inch. 
Q. That is the subject of measurement broken down from • 
tawY 
A. Yes. 
By the Court: 
Q. Mr. Green, is there any way by which by instrumentali-
ties it can be told with mathematical precision whether a 
specific piece of linotype is 7-point or 8-point? 
A. You can tell the point \Vith mathematical precision, but 
you cannot tell the face. 
By Mr. Sands: 
Q. That is the linotype Y 
A. Yes. 
page 189 ~ By Mr. Miller: 
A. Yes. 
,Q. You can tell by the appearancef 
Q. The appearance is what the public judges by, is it not f 
A. Yes. 
Q. You can only look and see for yourself which is the 
largest and which is the smallest Y · 
A. That is my opinion. 
Q. Your opinion is that there is no question about the type 
in the policy being 7 -pointY 
By Mr. Sands: I object to that; it has been ruled on. 
By the Court: The objection is sustained .. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
p_age 190 ~ G. W. SPICER, 
being recalled in rebuttal, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. ~Ir. Spicer, you heard the testimony this morning of 
Mr. Spears, who testified that he called on you where your 
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residence was located before it was destroyed by :fire and you 
told him about a policy being issued by a gentleman at Reming-
ton, his agent, whose name you could not recall? · 
A. I remember his face. When he came to the fence and 
hollered to me, I was plowing corn. He said he wante~ me 
to come to the house, he wanted to talk to me. He did not 
introduce himself, or who he was. He asked about the agents. 
I told him one policy .was with Mr. Hudgins and one with 
Mr. Fifield, at Remington. I been knowing him ever since 
he come to this country. 
Q. He said you could not remember the name of the agent Y 
A. He told something wrong; I been knowing Mr. Fifield 
ever since he come to this country. I told him Mr .. Fifield 
was at Remington. I was well acquainted with him. 
Q. The personal property, that is the household goods, in-
sured, in whose name was that assessed Y 
A. That was in my name. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
page 191 r ~IRS. MILDRED F. SPICER, 
being recalled in rebuttal, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Do you remember the visit made by Mr. Spears down 
to the place where your house was before the fire destroyed 
itt 
A. Yes, I certainly do. 
Q. Where were you~ 
A. I 'vas in the cook-room. Vje were occupying the dairy 
at that time as a cook-room. 
Q. Did you hear the conversation Y 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. Did you hear 1\ir. Spicer tell the gentleman he did not 
remember the name of the agent at Remington Y 
A. No, sir; I heard him say, just as he says now, Mr. Fifield, 
the agent at Remington. 
(The witness stood aside.) 
Note: Both the counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for 
defendant announced that they had conCluded their evidence. 
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At this point the jury was excused until tomorrow at 10 
A. M., March 27, 1937. 
page 192 ~ By :Nir. Sands: The defendant renews its mo-
tion at this point to strike all the testimony in this 
case as offered by the plaintiff upon the grounds heretofore 
asserted and stated to the court at the close of the plaintiff's 
testimony. He also moves to strike from the consideration 
of the jury the testimony introduced yesterday by Mr. Green 
in respect to the type and all the evidence introduced in sup-
port of the plaintiff's position since that time as bearing upon 
the subject of type, upon the ground that the provisions of 
the policy are now embraced in the law promulgating or pro-
viding for the standard policy. That statute not only provides 
the form, but also states that the type must be acceptable to 
the State Corporation Commission, and that the effect of 
that statute is the equivalent of repealing the provision (Sec. 
4227) insofar as it relates to the type upon ·which this motion 
was urged. 
2ndly. Upon the further ground that the plaintiff sues 
on this policy, carrying its full terms, files it and enters the 
court upon the policy, in lieu of pleading specially at common 
law, and that, therefore, the plaintiff is bound by the pro-
visions found in the policy, and, 
page 193 ~ 3rdly, that the evidence as disclosed in this court 
shows that the policy in question was a farm form 
policy, under the tern1s of which the statements contained and 
carried in the application upon which the policy was issued 
were made ·warranties, and according to the undisputed testi-
mony in this case it is disclosed t);lat the applieation failed to 
disclose that there was other and additional insurance upon the 
property; that the application fails to disclose correct an-
swers in resp~ct to the status of the mortgages upon the prop-
erty so insured, and that, there being· no evidence to the con-
trary, that construction on this matter is solely one of law, 
and that under that construction it is respectfully moved that 
the evidence should be stricken, as under no consideration of 
any other points in the case 'vould this plaintiff be entitled 
to recover. 
By the Court: The motion to strike is overruled and ex-
ception taken by counsel for defendant for the reasons as-
signed at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and here re-
assigned. 
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page 194 ~ INSTRUCTIONS. 
Counsel for plaintiff interposes, no objection whatever to 
the instructions offered by the plaintiff and as amended. 
\Ve think the instructions, so far as we can see, · announce 
fair and proper propositions and priuciples of law as applied 
to the evidence in this case. . 
Instruction, A, Offe'reiJ. by Defendan-,;. 
The Court instructs the jury that the policy sued on in 
this ease, including page 2 of the said policy, if the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that said page 2 is printed in type 
as large as or larger than 8-point type, constitutes a contract 
between the insurance company concerned and the insured, 
and the Court tells the Jury that according to the te.rms of 
this contract, if said page 2 is printed in type of the size above 
specified, it is, among other things, provided, that the entire 
policy shall be void if the assured has concealed or misrepre-
sented any material fact or circumstance concerning this in-
surance or the subject thereof; or in case of any fraud or 
false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating 
to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or 
a.fter loss, and if the jury believe from the evidence 'in this 
case that page 2 of the said policy is printed in 
page 195 ~ type of the ·size hereinabove specified and that the 
insured concea·led from the insurer or its agent, 
at the time of procuring the insurance policy sued upon, the 
fact that he had other insurance upon the property at the 
said time and that such misrepresentation or concealments 
'vere made for the purpose of deceiVing said company, or its 
agent, the jury should find for the defendant. 
(Granted.) 
Counsel for Plaintiff objected to Instruction ·A offered "by 
Counsel for Defendant when tendered upon the ground that 
it is a recital to the effect that in case of fraud or false swear-
ing by the insured touching this matter relating to insurance, 
or the subject thereof, whether befoi·e or after loss, and that 
this recital in the instruction, ''after loss", should not be em-
bodied in the instruction, and the instructi9n ha:ving been 
given over the objection of Counsel for Plaintiff, an excep-
tion is noted to the action of the Court in giving it for the same 
reason that the objective thereto was interposed. In other 
respects the instruction is not excepted to, except as to that 
recital therein about the insured concealing from the insurer 
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or its agent at the time of procuring the policy sued upon. 
Counsel for plaintiff is of the opinion and so urges 
page 196 r that there should be added to the recital the fol-
lowing, after the word ''insurer'', on the sixth line 
from the bottom, the word "knowingly". 
Instruction B Offered by Counsel for Defendant. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that page 2 of the policy sued on is printed in type 
as large as or larger than 8-point type, then under the terms 
of the policy of insurance sued on in this case it was pro-
vided that the entire policy should be void if the insured 
had at the time of the procurement of the said insurance .any 
other contract of insurance, 'vhether valid or not, on the prop-
erty covered in whole or in part hy said policy, and the jury 
ate instructed that if they believe from the evidence that page 
2 of said policy is printed in type as large as or larger than 
8-point type and that the plaintiffs bad any other contract of 
insurance, whether valid or not, on the property covered in 
whole or in part, under the terms of the policy sued on in this 
case, then the policy was revoked and annulled, and the plain-
tiffs cannot recover in this action, and the jury shall :find for 
the defendant . 
. (Granted.) 
page 197 r Counsel for Plaintiff. objects to the granting of 
Instruction B. offered by Counsel for Defendant 
because of the recital in the instruction to the effect that 
the entire policy sued on should be yoid if the insured had 
at the time of the procurement of said insurance any other 
contract of insurance, thereby telling the jury that the policy 
would be void if other insurance existed, whether there was 
notification to that effect to the agent who solicited and got 
the· insurance. in the present case or not ; and the instruction 
is further objected to because by this instruction the jury are 
told that under the terms Qf the policy if the conditions and 
restrictions as found on page 2 thereof are in type as large 
or larger than 8-point the policy is void if the insured had at 
the time of the procurement of said insurance any other con-
tract of insurance, whether void or not, covered in whole or in 
part by said poliey. For the foregoing reasons, as set forth 
in urging the objections to the instruction, it having been 
granted, Counsel for Plaintiff excepts. 
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Instruction C Offered by the Defen,dant. 
The court instructs the jury that under the terms of the 
policy sued on in this case, if the jury believe from the. evi-
dence that the hereinafter mentioned provisions were printed 
in the policy in type as large as or larger than 
page 198 ~ 8-point type, it was, among other things, provided, 
that the plaintiff shall within sixty days after the 
fire, unless such time is extended in writing by the company, 
render to the defendant company a proof of loss signed and 
sworn to by the insured statipg,- among other things, the 
origin of the :fire, the interest of the insured and all others in 
the property, the cash value of each item thereof, and the 
amount of loss or damage thereto, all encumbrances thereon 
and all other contracts of insurance, whether valid or not, 
covering said property. 
And the Court tells the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the said provisions were printed in the policy 
in type as large as or larger than 8-point type, the plaintiff 
has not at the time of the institution of this suit so rendered 
to the defendant such proofs of loss, as stated, under oath, 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover and the jury 
should render their verdict in favor of the defendant, unless 
the defendant by its action \Vaived such rendering to it such 
proof of loss. 
(Granted.) 
Counsel for Plaintiff objects to Instruction submitted by 
Counsel for the Defendant for the reason that at the end 
of the first paragraph thereof there should be recited the 
waiver provision, that is, this language should fol-
page 199 ~ low the word "property" at the end of paragraph 
1 of the instruction: ''unless the defendant 
through its agent, duly authorized to represent it, waives 
such rendering to it of such proof of loss.'' 
And the instruction having been granted over the objection 
of Counsel for the Plaintiff, the gTanting thereof is excepted 
to for the same reasons urged in the objection. 
Instruction D Offered by the Defendant. 
The Court instructs the jury that under the terms of the 
policy sued on in this case, if the jury believes from the evi-
dence that the said terms are printed in said policy in type 
as large as or larger than 8-point type, among other things, 
it was provided that the entire policy shall be void unless 
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otherwise provided by agreen1ent in writing added thereto 
if the interest of the assured in the ·property so insured by 
other than unconditional and sole ownership, or if with the 
lmowledge of the assured, foreclosure proceedings be com-
menced or notice· given of sale of any property ·insured by 
reason of any mortgage or trust deed, and the jury are in-
structed by the Court that if they believe from the evidence 
that the said provisions are printed in said poliey in type as 
large as or larger than 8-point type, and (a) that 
page 200 } the interest of the assured in the property insured 
was other than unconditional and sole ownership, 
or that if they believe from the evidence that foreclosure pro-
ceedings had been commenced by the Federal Land Bank 
which held a mortgage and/or deed 9f trust upon the property 
insured, and the assured had knowledge of the_ institution 
of such proceedings, the breach of either one of these condi-
tions, there being, as the Court tells the jury, no agreement 
in writing permitting such,. would and did, if so existing, void 
the policy; and if the jury so believe they should find for the 
defendant. 
(Granted.) 
Counsel for Plaintiff objects to the granting of Instruction 
D offered by Counsel for Defendant for the folloWing reasons: 
the Court tells the jury by this instruction that if the condi-
iions and restrictions on page 2 of the . policy sued on are in 
type as large .as or larger than 8-point, if ''it was provided 
· that the entire policy shall be void unless otherwise provided 
by agreement in writing added thereto, if 'the interest of the 
assured in the property so insured be other unconditional and 
sole ownership". After the words quoted above should be 
added, ''unless this provision is waived by the insurer or its 
agent, or that the agent or defendant had knowl-
page 201 } edge, or that knowledge was imputed to them". 
In regard to the recital in the instructions con-
cerning foreclosure proceedings, this recital is erroneous be-
cause the court tells the jury that if foreclosure proceedings 
be commenced with the knowledge of the assured, or notice 
given of sale of any property insured by reason of any mort-
gage or trust deed, and the jury are further instructed ''that 
if they believe that the type found on page 2 thereof is as 
large or larger than 8-point type, and tha.t the interest of .the 
assured in the property insured was other than unconditional 
and sole ownership, or if they believe from the evidence that 
·foreclosure proceedings had been commenced by the Federal 
Land Bank with the knowledge of the assured of the institu-
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tion of such proceedings, the breach of either one of these con-
ditions, there being, as the court tells the jury, no agreement 
in writing permitting such, would and did, if so existing, 
void the policy, and if the jury so believe they should find for 
the defendant". This is clearly erroneous, because, although 
under the conditions as set forth in the instruction that the 
ownership was otherwise than unconditional, we contend for 
the plaintiff that·this provision was waived by the defendant, 
or its agent, or with full knowledge on their part, that is, of 
the Company anfl the agent, and the jury should, 
page 202 r as we contend, be so instructed, instead of as in-
•. structed in the said instruction. 
Then the Court says, "the breach of either one of these 
conditions, there being, as the Court tells the jury, no agree-
ment iri writing -permitting such, would and did, if so exist-
ing, void the policy, and if the jury so believe they should 
:find for the defendant". 
There may be other grounds on which the plaintiff could 
recover, but this instruction practically tells the jury that 
there could be no recovery if the conditions recited exist, but, 
as a matter of fact, both the matters recited, or knowledge 
ther·eof, could be waived, and, as we contend, were waived by 
the defendant, and this question of waiver should be submitted 
to t11e jury for their consideration, and we submit that the 
policy would not be void under those conditions ; and the in-
struction is otherwise objectionable, in that the court recites, 
"no agreement in writing permitting such, would and did, if 
so existing,, void the policy", when as a matter of fact this 
question should be left to the jury for their consideration; and 
the question should also be left to the jury in regard to whether 
or not there was an agreement of any kind, whether in writ-
. ing or not, because there may J.tave been a verbal agreement 
which may have had the same effect as a written agreement 
if accepted and acted on by the Company. 
page 203 } Another objection urged is that the instruction 
is argumentative, in favor of the defendant, and is 
ambiguous in its terms, and is liable or calculated to mislead 
or confuse the jury. 
The instruction having been granted over the objection in-
terposed thereto by Counsel for the Plaintiff is excepted to by 
Counsel for Plaintiff for the reasons urged in support of the 
objections thereto; and another reason for objecting to and 
excepting to this instruction is that the court directs a verdict 
for the defendant if certain conditions exist, or certain facts 
are shown, when, as a matter of fact, these same conditions or 
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facts could be and were waived, and the court takes away from 
the consideration of the jury the right of any waiver. 
b~struction F Offered by the Defendant .. 
The Court instructs the jury ·that it was not necessary for 
the defendant to return any part of the premium paid it by 
the assured, in order to avail itself of any defense mentioned 
in the grounds of defense in this case. 
(Granted.) 
Counsel for Plaintiff objects to Instn1ction F"',. which is 
clearly e.rror, because if the defendant kept the 
page 204 ~ premium and returned no part thereof, not even 
the unearned part of the premium paid, this was a 
waiver, as we contend, of all the provisions and restrictions 
and conditions in the policy as set. forth on page 2 thereof, 
and we submit that even though the defendant company had 
a right to cancel the policy, in doing so the unearned premium 
should have accompanied the cancellation; yet the jury are 
told that it was not nec.essary for the defendant to return 
any part of the premium, and the defendant company is-try-
ing to hold the v:oid and yet at the same time retain the 
premium. 
Instruction E Offered by the De!enda1tt. 
The court instructions the jury that it is incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to prove by a fair preponderance 'Of evidence 
each and every allegation contained in the notice of motion; 
and the jury are instructed that in no event would the plain-
tiff be entitled to recover more than three-fourths of the 
actual cash value of thP. ·property alieged to have been de-
stroyed, immediately preceding the fire, and the burden of 
proving such value with reasonable certainty rests upon the 
plaintiffs, and the :Court tells the jury that there being evi-
dence in this case that there was at the time of the 
page 205 ~ fire another policy on the property alleged to have 
been destroyP.d by fire as set out in the notice of 
motion in ascertaining· the amount of recovery, if any, that 
the jury shall believe the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in 
this action undP.r the evidence and instructions given herein, 
in estimating· the arnount of such recovery, the jurv should 
first ascertain three-fourths of the actual cash value of the 
property destroyed immediately preceding the ·fire, and they 
should then ascertain the total amount of insurance covered 
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by such policies, and the ratio between the whole of such 
insurance and the insurance covered by the defendant's policy 
here sued on will determine the amount of liability, if any, due 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
(Granted.) -
Counsel for Plaintiff objects to Instruction E tendered by 
the Counsel for the Defendant, in that the Court tells the 
jury that in no event could the plaintiff recover more than 
three-fourths of the actual cash value of the property alleged 
to have been destroyed immediately preceding the fire. This 
is correct, but plaintiff contends and here urges that there 
cannot be any proration. The plaintiff is entitled to recover 
or not on this policy and the jury should not, as instructed, 
. first ascertain three-fourths of the actual cash 
page 206 ~ value of the property destroyed immediately pre-
ceding the fire and then ascertain the .amount 
of insurance covered by such policies, and then the ratio be 
found. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover on this policy or not, and any other policies, whether 
void or not, have no application, and because that in case of 
an action on any other policy if a judg·ment had previously 
been obtained on this policy a.ny such company would then 
have the rig·ht. to plead judgment obtained in this case as a 
bar against recovery on any such policy. 
Instruction G Offe.red by the Defendant. 
The Court instructs the jury that the policy sued upon in 
this case was issued upon certain information furnished to 
the defendant company through a written application, and 
that the correctness of the facts so furnished in this appli-
cation was warranted by the applicant to be true; and the 
court tells the jury that if they believe from the evidence 
that in the application upon which this policy was issued it 
-\vas among other things certified that there \vas no other 
insurance on the property the pla.intiff would be re~ponsible 
for the correctness of such statement, and if such statement 
was not true when the policy was issued, and if there was at 
that time other insurance on the property insured, and which 
was also on thP. property at the time of the fire, 
page 207 ~ the defendant would not be liable under the policy 
sued upon and the jury should render its verdict 
for the defendant. 
(Refused.) 
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Instruction H Offered by the Defendant. 
The Court instructs the jury that the policy sued on in 
this casP. constitutP.s a contract between the insurance com-
pany concerned and the insured and the Court tells the jury 
that according to the terms of this contract it is, among other 
things, provided, that the entire policy shall be void if the 
assured has concealed or misrepresented any material fact 
or circumstance, concerning this insurance or the subject 
thereof; or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the in-
sured touching any matter relating to this insurance or tho 
subject thereof, whether before or after loss, and if the jury 
beliP.ve from the evidence in this case that the insured con-
cealed from the insurer or its agent, at the time of procuring 
the insurance policy sued upon, the fact that he had other 
insurance upon the property at the time and/or if the plain-
tiff after the fire loss here involved made false and .mislead-
in~ statemP.nts to the insured, or it agent, as to the existence 
of other insurance upon the property so destroyed, or false 
misrepresentations aR to the value of the prop-
page 208 } erty insured, and that such statements made be-
fore or after the firP. as related 'vere made for 
the purpose of deceiving said company, or its agent, the jury 
should find for the defendant. 
Counsel for Plaintiff objects to Instruction H, because the 
burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove the required 
size of type in order to enable it to rely upon the conditions 
and restrictions on the second page of the policy, and the 
burden is not on the plaintiff. It is incumbent upon the de-
fendant to _prove its policy, and before the beginning of tak-
ing of testimo~y in this case, and, in fact, before the opening· 
statements were made, Counsel for Plaintiff notified Counsel 
for Defendant in the court-room that they would rely upon the 
type section, Sec. 4227 and 4227-a of the Code, because the 
restrictive parts of the policy as. found on page 2 thereof 
were written in type smaller than 8-point or brevier type as 
fixed by the statute. 
-Counsel for Defendant objects to each and every one of the 
plaint~ff '~ instructions, and upon consent or acquiescence by 
no obJection of counsel here present, all counsel being pres-
ent, the objections here made will be considered as an objec-
tion to each and every instruction so given on be-
pag-e 209 ~ half of the plaintiff as if seriati-m so restated so 
far as applicable to the peculiar lang-uage of such 
instruction, with understanding that if there is any specific 
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objection to any certain instruction the same may be later 
stated. 
1. It is first objected to on behalf of the defendant that the · 
policy sued on in this case is of a distinctive type, in that it 
is issued upon an application, which application, accordng 
to the terms and provisions of the policy, provided that the 
things stated in the application are warranties so made on 
behalf of the assured. · 
2. The application distinctly provides the limit of autho.rity 
· of the agent in securing said application as mentioned and 
car:ri~d in the terms of the application, which has been intro-
duced in evidence as ''Defendant's Ex. 2' ', so providing that 
the Company shall not be bound by any act or statement made 
by or to any agent or other person which is not contained in 
this application. In other words, the law of the case as g-iven 
by the court in plaintiff's instructions is not in accord with 
the law which has been heretofore adopted as the rule of law 
governing- the contract of insurance where the contract was 
similar in terms and conditions as that here pre-
page 210 ~ sented, such having been pron1ulgated or an-
nounced by the Sup rome Court of the State in the 
case of Ho1ne Insurance Cornpany v. Poole, 148 Va. 363. 
3. That according to the evidence introduced in the case it 
is shown by the plaintiff's testimony that he signed the ap-
plication in blank and that, therefore, he thereby n1ade the 
plaintiff, the· agent, his assured in signing the application re-
ferred to, while the instruction given by the court here ob-
jected to ignores such testimony and recognized throughout 
the position that Fifield was the agent of the Insurance Com-
pany and not an agent of the assured, as her claimed. 
4. The instructions are objected to insofar as they recog-
nize and leave to the jury the question of the type of the 
printed provisions of the policy as being a matter of con-
troversy and regulated by Section 4227 of the Code, it being 
the contention of tl1e defendant that Section 4227 of the Code 
has been repealed and is no longer applicable, by reason of 
the adoption of the standard fire policy and the provisions 
of Section 4305 of thP. Code. 
5. '~rhat even if such evidence in respect to the size of the 
type as carried throug·h the several instructions of the plain-
tiff was or not a leg-itimate matter of controversy, the plain-
tiff has not introduced any competent evidence to sustain 
the position taken that the type in the policy is 
page 211 ~ smaller than 8-point type, the only witness intro-
duced by the plaintiff on this point being a wit-
ness who failed to qualify upon the testimony as given by him 
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as an expert in matters of printing, namely Raleigh T. Green. 
On behalf of the defendant, without waiving the position 
as to the theory of the case of construction as adopted by the 
Court, the defendant has offered instructions which have 
been given by the Court, numbered A, B, C. D, E, F and H. 
Defendant objects to the rejection of Instruction G, because 
Instruction G recognized the distinction i~ the insurance 
policies as being one controlled by the warranties and the ap-
plication as hereinbefore referred to and submits that the 
same should have been given as pertinent to the contract pre-
sented in the trial. 
·In rPspect to the correction or addendum to Instruction C 
as asked~ the defendant objects to such addendum, both upon 
the ground that it recognized the 8-point type as being a sub-
ject of. dispute and objec.ts to the embracing of the 8-poiut 
type as an element of the various instructions as originally 
offered, numerically designated as stated. 
Objection is particula1·ly made to Instruction ;C upon the 
further ground that it carries the addendum in 
page 212 ~ the concfuding 'vords, reading as follows: "un-
less the defP.ndant by its action waives such re-
turn to it of such proof of loss". The defendant urges that 
the Court Elhould further an1end said instruction by the inser-
tion of this language: "The 1Court tells the jury that in con-
sidering whether the filing of proofs of loss has been waived, 
they cannot consider anything said or act done by the agents 
of the defendant which occurred before the Company, or its 
agents had been advised or ascertained the extended breach 
. of the policy conditions herein .9eriatim relied upon in the 
grounds of defense, or any of sueh' '. 
Counsel for Plaintiff further objects to the instructions of-
ferP.d by the defendant and the action of the Court in granting 
them, because the Court failed to differentiate between the 
liability of the Company for the personal property destroyed 
and for the real estate. and the action of the Court in grant-
ing the instructions for .this additional reason. 
page 213 .~ Note: The hearing was resumed at 10 o'clock 
A. M .• Saturday, 1\fa.rch 27, 1937. 
Whereupon the Conrt read the instructions to the jury. 
The Oounsel for both the plaintiff and the def.endant pre-
sented thP.ir arguments. 
Whereupon the jury retired to their room to consider their 
verdict and returned with the following verdict: 
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"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and fix his damages at 
$1,639.41 ". 
By the Court: ThP. verdict will have to be amended. 
By ,Juror: Your Honor, does that 1nclude interest or not1 
By the Court: That is for you gentlemen to say. Do you 
mean for it to bear interest f 
By Juror: Yes, from the date of loss. . 
By Mr. Miller: J.\IIake it from a certain date, for the jury 
to determine. 
By the Court: I think it is a jury question. 
By Juror: We understood you instructed us to find a ver-
dict for the plaintiff, if we found for the plaintiff, and inter-
est payable on this from an unknown tin1e. We thought this· 
date had been :figured by your Honor. · 
·By the Court: That is for you to determine. 
page 214 ~ By Mr. Sands: ln view of the fact that no date 
has been found, 've have to agree upon an arbi-
trary date. I will agree to sixty days from the time these 
people made the adjustn1ent. 
· By Mr. Miller: l\fake it from the 3rd day of August, 1936. 
Whereupon the jury again' retired to their room and re-
turned with the following· verdict: 
"We, the jury, on the issue joined find for the plaintiff and 
assess his damages at $1,639.41, with interest from August 
3, 1936. '' 
J. MOFJ:!.,ETT BROWN, Foreman.'' 
Whereupon the jury waR excused. 
By Mr. Sands: If your Honor please, on behalf of the de-
fendant, I move to set aside tl1e VP.rdict as contrary to the 
law and the evidence; for misdirection of the jury by the court, 
and upon exceptions to points taken to the ruling of the court 
during the trial; and also move that thP. verdict be set aside 
and a verdict be returned in favor of the defendant. 
By the Court: The motion 'vill be docketed and set down 
for argument at some future date to be determined. 
TestA: This 4th day of Sept., 1937. 
ALEXANDER T. BROWNING, ,Judge. 
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page 215 ~ Ex. #2 with G. W. Spicer's Testimony. 
Form 200092 
·FARM DEPART~iENT REGISTERED LETTER 
ASSURED 
CANCELLATION NOTICE 
HARTFORD FIRE INSURA_"N"CE COMPANY 
Hartford, 1Conn. 
Mr. G. W. Spicer, 
Elkwood, Virginia. 
Atlanta, Ga., July 27, 19H6. 
Agency Remington, Virginia. 
You are hereby notified that your Policy No. C-I 437 and 
Polic.y No. of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
Hartford, Conn., h~ by order of. said Company, and in accord-
ance with the stipulations and provisions thereof declared 
canceled. Herewith we hand yon your cancelled note to com-
plete the cancellation. 
Please return said Policy to this office with cancellation re-
ceipt on back of same duly signed by you; stamped envelope 
.for such purpose enclosed herewith. 
Yours very truly, 
A. A. ORR-ENDER, 
Manager Farm Department 
This cancellation is made without prejudice to any claim 
which may be outstanding against this policy. 
pages 216-217 ~ Exhibits Nos. 4-5-See MS. 
page 218 ~ CERTIFICATE NO. 4. 
The following lnstr1wtions, from 1 to 10 inclusive, less #5, 
granted at the request of the plaintiff as hereinafter denoted, 
are all the instructions that were granted on bP.half of the 
plaintiff on the trial of this case : 
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(1). 
The court instructs the jury: that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff was insured by the defendant com-
pany, that the policy was in full force and effect on the 29th 
day of ~{ay, 1936, and that the policy was issued the insured 
without misrepresentation or fraud on his part and that page 
2 of said policy is .Printed in type smaller than 8-point type; 
then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover ~11 money avail-
able to him under the terms of the policy, and your verdict 
should be for the plaintiff in such sum with interest from its 
due date until paid, ·unless the plaintiff subsequent to said 
29th of May, 1936, barred his right to recover, if any he had, 
by a failure to comply with the conditions in said policy, re-
quired to be performed by him after the destruction of the 
property by fire. 
page 219} (2). 
The court further instructs the· jury: that when the de-
fendant company interposes the defense of fraud or misrep-
resentation to avoid its policy, then as to such defense of 
fraud or misrepresentation, that the burden is upon the de-
fendant company to prove such claim by a clear preponderance 
of the testimony. You are further instructed that under the 
· statutes of Virginia all statements, declarations and descrip-
tions are representations and not warranties, and the facts 
stated in the application for this insurance must be so con-
strued unless untrue. · 
(3). 
The court further instructs the jury: that if they believe 
from the evidence that the agent of the defendant company, 
R. A. Fifield, filled in the_ application for the policy in dispute, 
and did so upon his own knowledge and information obtained 
from others than the plaintiff, concerning what was stated in 
said application. and that the applicant, that is the plaintiff, 
simply signed the application without knowing its contents, 
~ then the plantiff is not bound by the statements contained in 
said application. 
page 220} (4). 
The court further instructs the jury: that if you believe 
from the evidence that R. A. Fifield, the agent of the defend-
ant company, visited the plaintiff at his home near Elkwood 
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in Culpeper County, Virgini~, at the time of or immediately 
preceding the issuance of the policy, and asked the plaintiff 
no questions, but told him to sign a blank form, 'vhich the 
plaintiff did, and that no questions were asked the plaintiff, 
and he made no statP.ments, except that he wanted the policy 
to issue to him and wife jointly like Mr. Hudgins', but that 
the agent after the application was so signed carried it to his 
own office and supplied the answers furnished to the com-
pany as he thought they should he, then the plaintiff is not 
bound by the statements made in the application, whether 
they be true or false. 
(6). 
The court furthP.r instructs the jury= that if they believe 
from the evidence that any of the provisions, conditions, or 
restrictions in the policy obtained and sued on, are printed 
in type not as large as b1·evier or eight-point type, then the 
insured (plaintiff) is not bound by such provisions, condi-
tions and restrictions in said policy contained. 
page 221 ~ (7). 
The court further instructs the jury:· that if they believe 
from the evidence that the defendant company at the time it 
issued the policy sued on, through its agent R. A. Fifield~ had 
full knowledge of all the facts attending the ownership of the 
property insured, and that it was left with the defendant 
through its agent, with kno·wledge_ of all the facts, to issue a 
valid and legal policy upon t.he property, and the said ·policy 
by mistake or error of the Agent was issued in the name of 
George W. Spicer, when in fact the real estate on which the 
buildings were located stood in the name of George W. and 
Mildred Spicer; such mistake does not vitiate said policy, 
nor elf ect the right of the plaintiffs to recover in this case, if 
otherwise he would be entitled to recover. 
(8) .. 
The court further instructs the jury: that if there be ab- ' 
sence of deceit and fraud by an insured in making- statements 
at the time of and before the policy 'vas issued, or if answers 
are written by the agent on his own knowledge or authority 
without questioning· the applicant. then and under such con-
ditions the Compa~y is P.StoppP.d from relying; upon a for-
feiture therefor, either because of the falsitv of-such answers 
as are written by the company's ag·ent, or because of the fail-
G. W. Spicer v.' Hartford .Fire Ins. Co. 157 
ure to answer questions material to the risk assunied by the 
company ~hich have never been asked. · 
page 222 ~ (9). 
The court further instructs the jury: that neither misstate-
ments nor concealments on the part of the Company's agent 
can effect the plaintiff, unless he is in some wise responsible 
therefor. 
(10). 
The court further instructs the jury: that where an insured, 
when making an application for insurance, gives full, true and 
correct answers, relying upon the skill, the honesty and the 
good faith of the Company's agent to :fill out the application 
correctly, and such agents :fills out the application incorrectly, 
or inserts answers different from those given, or false an-
swers, the Company could not take advantage thereof; and 
where the applicant is ignorant of the discrepancy or wrong-
ful act of the agent, if he be otherwise entitled to recover his 
right to recover, would not be barred by such acts of def~nd­
ant's agent; and this rule applies even though the agent in 
such case has transcended his actual authority, if such acts 
be within the scope of his apparent authority. 
Teste : this 4th day of Sept., 19?7. 
ALEXANDER T. BROWNING, Judge. 
Pages 223-226) ~- Exhibits Nos. 6, 1, 2 and No. 1 (Defts.)-
See.MS .. 
page 227 } Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Culpeper County: 
I, ,c;_ T. Guinn, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Culpeper 
County, Virginia, do hereby ~ertify that the foregoing is a 
true and correct transcript of the record in the case stvled 
G. W. Spicer v. Hartford ·Fire Insurance Company, Hartford, 
Conn., Inc. pP.ndin~ in the Circuit Court of Culpeper County, 
and that the attorneys of record for the defendant had due 
notice as required by Section 6339 of thA Code of Virginia, 
of the time and place of making application for copy of the 
record, and of the intention of counsel for plaintiff to apply 
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for such transcript before the sarrie was copied, made out and 
delivered. 
And I further certify that the original exhibits referred to 
in Certificates 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the exhibits introduced 
in evidence in the trial of tbis case and certified and identified 
by the trial judge ; the originals are certified in accordance 
with the agreement of counsel for plaintiff and defendant 
filed with the record. ·· 
And I further certify that notice of the time and place of 
presenting certificates of exception to the judge of this court 
was duly gi.ven in writing to counsel for defendant. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of NoYember, 1937. 
C. T. GUINN, 
·Clerk of the Circuit Court of Culpeper 
County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
~L B. WATTS, C. C. 
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